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Abstract
This dissertation is a comparative study of first person narrative in Marcel Proust’s A la 
recherche du temps perdu (Remembrance ofThinps Past), and selected novels of 
William Faulkner, primarily those in which the character o f Quentin Compson appears: 
The Sound and the Fury and Absalom. Absalom? This comparison is based upon the 
assumption that the attempts to represent the patterns o f thought, memory, or 
consciousness in these novels is symptomatic of many twentieth-century novels, which 
dramatize an anxiety about the possibility of a solid ground for knowledge of the world 
or of the self. The language o f these novels displays the instability or incoherence o f 
human knowledge o f self and world, thus destabilizing the notion of the individual as a 
coherent, self-knowing entity. Subjectivity is portrayed as the weaving o f relations 
between signifiers. This implies a conception of being which is not that of a positive, 
substantial entity, but o f relation. In chapter two, the role o f language in the formation o f 
memory, and the relationship between narrative and time is examined in Proust. In 
chapter three, the narrative structure of Faulkner’s novels is examined from the 
perspective of Suassurian linguistics and through Continental criticism o f Proust. In 
chapter four, the role o f the proper name in the formation of a sense of social hierarchies 
is seen as central to the narrating hero’s formation o f a sense o f self and other, and is one 
aspect of rhe role of sign systems in the formation o f memories and personal identities. 
The role of an and representation in the formation o f self-awareness leads to a 
consideration of the mises en abyme, or textual mirrors, in the novels, in chapter five. 
Finally, the question o f identity and its expression in language gives rise to a 
consideration of the problems of reading and interpretation. These problems are also 
raised by the narratives under consideration. The activities o f reading, interpretation, and 
literary studies are best understood, not as the pursuit of meaning, but as the production 
of meaning through the ongoing activity of recontextualization.
vi
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Introduction: Identity Crises
This dissertation proposes to examine the attempt to represent individual thought 
or consciousness in works by Marcel Proust and William Faulkner, through an examination 
of Proust’s first person narrator in A la recherche du temps perdu, and the characters who 
narrate two of Faulkner’s most canonical novels, most notably the figure of Quentin 
Compson, whose point of view is one of the central features of The Sound and the Furv 
and Absalom. Absalom! The attempt to represent thought or memory in Faulkner’s work 
is symptomatic of many twentieth-century novelists since the time of Proust. In novels by 
authors such as Marcel Proust, William Faulkner, James Joyce or Samuel Beckett, the 
literary production of the twentieth century has reflected an anxiety about the possibility 
for a solid ground for knowledge of the world and of the self. In these narratives, the unity 
and stability o f human personality and identity are ultimately put into question, through 
the attempt to imitate the structure of thought in language. The language of these novels 
quite often display the instability or incoherence of human knowledge of self and world, 
thus destabilizing the notion of the individual as a coherent, self-knowing entity. The 
attempt to represent subjectivity in various forms o f first-person narrative demonstrates the 
constitutive role o f language and representation, of the exterior, the “Other,” as expressed 
in Rimbaud’s famous statement, “Je est un autre”. This can be seen particularly in the 
fragmentation and unreliability of narrative voice. Modern novelistic practice disrupts 
traditional narrative forms from within by a language which continually calls into question 
its own premises.
Self and Nation
The end o f the nineteenth century saw the culmination of nationalist aspirations in 
newly formed governmental entities such as Italy or Germany. This was also a period in 
which the academic study of national “literatures” was first institutionalized. The rise of the 
nation state and the study of national literatures are both symptoms of a need to impose 
new structures which would serve to legitimize and reassure people in their right to exist
1
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and their difference from other groups o f people. It is no simple coincidence that the same 
period saw intensive research into the “dark side” of the human psyche. The identity of an 
individual and the identity of a culture or nation are bound up in a specular relationship 
based on the relationship of self and other, each deffned in relation to the other. This 
relation is embodied within the individual in the relationship between consciousness and 
the “unconscious.” All over Europe, researchers were studying mental aberrations, and 
forming theories about the nature of human consciousness, with the goal of establishing a 
framework for understanding personality. The goal of all this research was to establish a 
solid basis for an answer to the question o f identity, to find the essence, core or kernel of 
being. The technical, political and economical changes in the West seemed to call into 
question previous systems of identification. The research into psychology and the violent 
consolidation of the nation state are symptoms of an identity crisis, a doubt about the 
possibility of a guarantee that we are born and remain unique individuals.
It is perhaps this anxiety about the integrity of the self that is at the root of the 
violence to be seen in the world today. Individuals and groups of people everywhere feel 
themselves threatened with dispersal or assimilation, with the loss of their specificity as 
individuals or as particular groups. The violence with which groups of people defend what 
they perceive as their inherent right to a certain territory belies the anxiety that the 
intermingling of cultures, religions or ethnic groups may lead to a situation o f dilution in 
which difference disappears.
This situation arose in part because of a crumbling of faith in religious and political 
institutions which were previously seen as monolithic, stable structures allowing individuals 
to situate themselves in human society, in space, and in time. The concern with 
representing human thought and consciousness in fiction is concurrent with this period in 
which the bases of human thought about the world and the self were in question.
Being and Time
Western literature and philosophy have long been preoccupied by the relationship 
of the concepts o f being and time. The doubt about the stability and subsistence of human
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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existence has been accompanied by a reconsideration of the concept of time. In £tudes sur 
le temps humain. Georges Poulet claims that the Christian in Medieval Europe had quite a 
different conception of time and o f his existence in time from that of modern man. The 
feeling of existence in the present, he says, did not precede the sense of his own duration:
“II ne se decouvrait pas d’abord dans le moment present, pour se concevoir ensuite existant 
dans le temps. Bien au contraire se sentir exister, cetait pour lui se sentir etre, et se sentir 
etre, c’dtait se sentir non pas changer, non pas devenir, non pas se succeder a soi-meme, 
mais se sentir subsister [.. .] Aussi n’est-ce pas en rermes d’instants independants et 
successifs que se concevait la relation des creatures au Createur.” “He did not first discover 
himself in the present moment in order to then conceive of himself existing in time. On the 
contrary, the sense of existence was the sense of being, and to feel oneself as being was not 
to feel oneself changing, becoming or succeeding oneself in time, it was rather to have a 
sense of permanence [. ..] Nor was it in terms of independent successive instants that the 
relationship of creatures to the creator was conceived.” The technological achievements of 
modern scientific practice have accelerated the pace of life in the industrialized West, with 
the effect of increasing the importance of the moment, focusing attention on time as a 
succession of instants.
But the faith in the permanence and stability of human existence that the Medieval 
Christian felt, was also accompanied by what Poulet calls a sense of the “profound lack of 
permanence” which characterizes human existence. “Le chretien du moyen age [.. .] s’il 
sentait sa propre permanence, il se trouvait concraint de sentir au meme titre son manque 
profond de permanence. II se sentait a la fbis, contradictoirement, un etre permanent et un 
etre temporel [ ...]  qui ne change jamais et [. ..] qui change toujours.1 “While he had a 
sense of his own permanence, the Christian of the Middle Ages had also to feel his 
profound lack of permanence. He felt himself at once, and in contradiction, a permanent 
being and a temporal being. [.. .] who never changes [...]  and who changes continually.” 
The sense of the mutability of earthly existence was counterbalanced by a belief in a
1 Georges Poulet. Etudes sur le temps humain. (Paris: Plon. 1949) i, iii. (my translation).
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spiritual time, oriented toward spriritual perfection, a faith in the linear nature of time, the 
progress of which brought the Christian closer to God.
Martin Heidegger has called one of the “essential phenomena” of the modern age: 
“the loss of the gods” or “a situation of indecision regarding God and the gods.”’ The 
increasing secularization of Western society, and the acceleration of cross-cultural 
exchanges with non-western traditions have also contributed to this tendency. One aspect 
of this “loss of the gpds” is the weakening of the sense of duration and subsistence, and o f 
the conception of time as a linear progression.
The historical moment at which this resistance was first manifested, the starting 
point for what is called the “modern” age is open to endless debate.'* Many historians point 
to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when a renewed interest in ancient Latin and 
Greek texts, in skeptic philosophies, brought about an increasing sense of the insignificance 
of man in the universe and cast doubt on the sense of the permanence of being. Rene 
Descartes’ attempts to establish a firm basis for human knowledge was in part a response to 
this skepticism and uncertainty.4 His Discours de la methode marked the emergence of 
modern science, based in the subject as self-presence, effectively the new point of reference. 
The Discours established a “world view:” Henceforth the world became the object of a 
scientific gaze. The eye of the scientist projects a ground plan of the world, upon which 
knowledge can be secured.5 The ultimate point of reference for scientific knowledge is the 
individual, the speaking subject, the “I” of Descartes’ “I think therefore I am.” It is this self­
knowing, autonomous subject who sees the world and is able to represent what he sees in a
2 The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trails. William Lovin. (New York: Garland.
1977) 117.
3 As Paul De Man has suggested, the terms ‘modem,” and ‘postmodern” belong to a positivist conception o f  
time as progress: ‘The notion of modernity is already very dubious: the notion of postmodernitv becomes a 
parody of the notion of modernity [ ...]  ilt strikes me as a very unmodem, a very old-fashioned, conservative 
concept of history, where history is seen as a succession” Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 120.
4 Fora more detailed discussion of the influence o f the Greek skeptics on Descartes, see Richard H. Popkin. 
The History of Skepticism from Erasm»« m f W m « .  (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1960).
5 Heidegger, 117.
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transparent, universal language. Cartesian science established the belief in humanity’s 
ability to fully explain the world.
Through Descartes, the “man of science” becomes the model for the West’s 
conception of selfhood, o f being self-knowledge, wholeness or presence.” The faith in 
human reason and the power of the human mind in seventeenth century Europe, and the 
subsequent technological and scientific explosion o f the next two centuries was made 
possible by the supposition that humans were capable of communicating clear, rational 
thought in a transparent language.
Jacques Derrida has argued that in Western philosophy identity, being, and 
meaning are ultimately guaranteed by reference to the logos, the word of God, which 
preceded, and called into being the world. In this view, the logos functions not only as 
origin, but as a “transcendental” signifier, linking human language to the world o f  essences 
or preconceived ideas (on the level of the signified, in Saussurian parlance), and 
guaranteeing the presence of meaning to language. The Platonic world of essence belief in 
this world of essences is a religious one, the equivalent of the of ideas. The logos is the link 
between incarnation and the transcendental, the spirit in the letter. It is the “word, made 
flesh.”
The crisis spoken of here is the realization o f the anti logical function of language, of 
opacity, its resistance to meaning. The resistance of meaning is correlative to the problem 
of identity. This crisis of being is thus also a crisis o f meaning, particularly about the 
meaning of such terms as consciousness, identity, and being. In his introduction to Being and 
Time. Heidegger has pointed out that being is “the most universal and the emptiest 
concept. As such it resists every attempt at definition.”7 To define is to identify. That which 
is undefinable is unknowable, including man. The ability to accurately define a concept 
presupposes that it is possible to establish absolute frame of reference and criteria with 
which to measure its accuracy. It ignores the contingency of meaning, its dependence on
” Jean-Paul Sartre's term for this concept is that of “being in itself* Tetre en soi."
Martin Heidegger Basic Writings. (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 4 1.
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conventions-that is to say, the consensus of a majority of designated experts, such as in an 
academic setting, where decisions of what is acceptable and unacceptable are made by peers, 
whose selection is dependent on committees. Thus the possibility of dissension and revision 
is built into such a system. The desire to establish absolutes is antithetical to such a 
structure.
In the nineteenth century, science turned its attention to the unreason which 
inhabits all human thought. One name eventually given, by psychoanalytical theory, to this 
unreason, was that of the “unconscious,” that “other” which inhabits the self, and which 
casts doubt on the stability and singularity of human thought and identity. In their positing 
of a split between conscious and unconscious processes, these theories effectively called into 
question the Cartesian model of subjectivity, as that of a self-knowing, unique, rational 
consciousness, while simultaneously asserting the power of scientific thought to unravel the 
mystery of the unconscious.
In the modern world, the meaning of being and the being of meaning, as essence, is 
threatened by relativistic forces. One of the most important events of the twentieth century 
was the publication of Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. But even Einstein had his 
totalitarian dream in his search for a “unified field theory.” Nevertheless the importance of 
relativity is not limited to the “hard” science o f  physics. The explosion in popularity of the 
internet is another example of the increased speed with which people from different 
cultures and different regions can communicate to each other. The play of voices and the 
ability to create an alter-ego in cyberspace, illustrate and accelerate what has always already 
been the case: that that phenomenon which we refer to as personality, the essence of 
personal identity itself, is the weaving of a text, the tracing of a relation in time and among 
shifting forces.
This ontological crisis also been reflected in fiction, particularly in the novel, in the 
various techniques by which writers from diverse backgrounds and cultures attempt to 
represent consciousness, particularly through a first person narrator. Ir could be argued that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the modern novel is, in a very large measure, a first-person novel.8 Where nineteenth- 
century realist narrative attempted to paint a generalized, objective, portrait of the world, as 
seen from the exterior, by an omniscient narrator, the twentieth-century novel has 
attempted to represent the “inner life” o f consciousness, to portray the world from the 
Limited, fallible point of view of a particular individual. In this it shares the realist aspiration 
to represent reality. The main difference which marks twentieth-century novels is that the 
world is no longer approached as an object to be known, but as a creation of the mind. The 
reliance on the unreliable first-person narrator emphasizes the subjective nature of reality. 
The integrity of that subject is, however, problematized by the inconsistence and 
unreliability of human thought. Ultimately, the very bases of human knowledge and 
judgment are called into question. This explains the instability of the narrative voice, as the 
modern novel ineluctably problematizes the status of its own narrative point of view.
8 This is the thesis of jean Rousset a propos the French modern novel: ‘Notre roman moderne, conune celui 
du XVIlie siede, est dans une trts large mesure un roman de la premiere personne.” ‘Our modem novel,lilce 
that of the eighteenth century is, in a very laige measure a first person novel.” The instability o f the pronoun 
‘I’ in many novels, says Rousset, betrays the uncertainty of the speaking subject about his own integrity: ‘Le 
jc se met en crise, en mtme temps que 1’unitd et la stability de la petsonne sont mises en question.” “The j 
undergoes a crisis at the moment that the unity and the stability of the person are questioned.” N irriw  
Romancier. « <ai «ir la nremfcre personne dans le roman. (Paris: J. Com, 1973) 9.36. My translation. It is 
one of my premises that this can be said of many modem novelists.
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Chapter 1: An Exhausted Subject? The Postage Stamp and the Cup o f Tea
There has been so much written about these two authors that the topics might seem 
to have already been so thoroughly “covered,” so exhausted, that there can be little 
intelligent left to say. What purpose could be served by adding to the enormous critical 
literature which each of these authors has inspired? These are the inevitable questions which 
plague anyone who proposes to study texts such as those I have chosen, or more generally, 
any o f the literary works which belong to what is often referred to as the “canon” o f 
Western Literature. This is all the more true for such white male authors as Proust and 
Faulkner. The choice to study either of these authors would have seemed natural two or 
three decades ago, but is hardly as innocent as it once may have seemed.
A consideration of the notion of the “exhaustibility” o f a given topic, or even of the 
potential exhaustion of writing itselfwould not be entirely inappropriate., since Faulkner 
stated that a major turning point in his writing career was the realization that he would 
never be able to exhaust the possibilities for writing about the world he imagined in 
Yoknapatawpha county: “Beginning with Sartoris I discovered that my own little postage 
stamp of native soil was worth writing about and that I would never live long enough to 
exhaust it.”’
The postage stamp as an image of an arbitrarily limited, almost insignificant space 
is meant to render all the more miraculous the proliferation of narrative devoted to it. The 
self-containment of the stamp may, however, be a misleading metaphor for Faulkner’s 
literary cosmos. Yoknapatawpha county, though perhaps small, is by no means as 
insignificant as Faulkner’s pseudo-attempt at self-effacement may have meant to suggest. 
With only the most tenuous of links to the outside-two roads, one heading north-south 
and the other heading east-west, a rail-line and a river, Jefferson is open to influences from 
Memphis, New Orleans, New York, Haiti and even Paris. Indeed, as at least one critic has
’ Faulkner’s remark is taken from an interview with Jean Stein which was originally published in The Paris 
Review in the Spring o f  19S6. republished in Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner 1926- 
1962. Ed. James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate. 1968. (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press. 1980) 
255. All further references to this volume will be noted parenthetically with the abbreviation LG.
8
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9attempted to suggest, it seems as though, in order to make up for his novel’s lack of 
narrative closure, Faulkner had to resort to time lines, encyclopedia-style character lists, and 
cartography in order to constitute his fictional universe as a complete, self-contained 
cosmos.10
Proust, too, limits the physical setting in which his characters evolve: a small village 
in the French countryside, a Normandy beach resort, and the exdusive worlds of the 
aristocracy and Parisian society. And as with the Yoknapatawpha saga, Proust’s novel is 
recognized as being the work of a lifetime, an effort which only culminated in the fourteen 
year period of intense writing which left him physically exhausted. A la recherche du temps 
perdu is a work which began as a polemical essay, mutated into a three volume novel and 
then ballooned into the eight volume, 3000 page opus we know today. Yet Proust also 
claimed to have written the beginning and the end at the same time, so that the bulk of the 
novel, roughly from A 1’ombre des ieunes filles en fleurs to Albertine disparue. was “filled 
in” afterwards. It is often understood that Proust did this because of his poor health, not 
knowing whether he would live long enough to complete his work. It is equally probable 
chat, unsure of whether he would be able to say all he wanted to (or perhaps realizing it was 
impossible) he had to posit an end-point, in order to know not only where he was headed, 
but that he would indeed arrive there at all.
If Proust felt an urgent need to bring his work to completion, Faulkner may have 
felt an opposing sense of urgency, in his financial obligations, to sustain his literary 
production. The very names Faulkner and Proust are associated by many with loquacity, 
with interminable syntax or a long-winded oratorical style—in short with their very inability 
to conclude." This very association can serve to close off the play of signification at work in
lu In his Bakhtinian reading, Philip M. Weinstein suggests that the map and chronology Faulkner added to 
later editions of Absalom.Ahsalnm! while seemingly seeking to contain the novel, reveal, in their conflicting 
and contradictory claims, “the unmastered dialogic restlessness o f the text." Faulkner’s Subject: A Cosmos No 
One Owns. Cambridge Studies in American Literature and Culture. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992) 97.
11 Stephen M. Ross links A b sa lo m . Absalom! to the tradition of southern oratory. According to Ross, “for the 
colloquial orator there can be no closure [ ...] , for there is no end to what he has to say." The various
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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their novels. It is nevertheless an open question as to what extent the “subject” of these 
novels is identifiable (and I am playing, for the moment, on the very ambiguity of the term 
subject:, the ambiguity which reigns whenever we speak of subjects, either the topic of a 
work or what we commonly tend to confuse with the terms individual or person). The 
works of these two authors are excellent examples of the “inflation” of the signifier.
What links the works of Faulkner and Proust more than anything is their use of 
narrative to illustrate, not so much defined characters, as the impossibility of arriving at any 
definitive description of character. They mobilize the workings of language, memory and 
perception to dramatize how consciousness continually (de)constructs itself in language. 
Both works bear witness to a crisis of identity which manifests itself in narrative, in the 
figure of narrating subjects, whether they be Proust’s “je,” the “psychic voices” of Benjy and 
Quentin in The Sound and the Furv. or the various storytellers in Absalom. Absalom!. In 
both novels, as they are usually understood, idiosyncratic narrative style is meant to 
represent the workings of an individual human consciousness, but these novels 
simultaneously challenge the very possibility of representation, and problematize identity as 
the stable, self-similar presence of consciousness to itself. It might equally be argued that 
the Proust’s work is a massively reiterated attempt to answer the question: “Who and where 
am I?” or that the narrators in Absalom, in attempting to answer the question “Who was 
Thomas Sutpen?” are driven inexorably back to the question “Who wants to know?” The 
storyteller is identified by the story he is telling, by the way he tells it; consciousness is no 
longer linked to an individual essence, but to the slipperiness of language.
Linguistics and the Subject
The field of modern linguistics, as a study of the production of meaning in 
language was another product of this period of crisis which, if anything, has intensified at 
the end of the twentieth century. These conflicts and crises are symptoms of an
narrators of the novel display “oratory’s essential discursive movement toward ever greater amplification." 
“Oratory and the dialogical in Absalom. Absalom!” in I n r r r r « m ia l i r y  in Faulkner, eds. Michel Gresset and 
Noel Polk (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 1985) 73 -127. See also Fiction's Inexhaustible Voice.
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epistemological crisis, a crisis about the nature of human knowledge. Modern epistemology 
is in many ways based on linguistics, and especially that form of structural linguistics which 
begins with Saussure’s Cours de linguistique penerale. Saussure attempted to show how 
meaning is not inherent in the word itself nor does it derive directly from a word’s 
historical, etymological source, but is a function of that word’s position within a system 
which is complete and self-sufficient at any given moment. That place is only defined by its 
difference from all the other elements in the system: “In language there are only differences 
without positive terms.”12
Jacques Lacan has pointed out that language as a system exists before the individual 
speaking subject. The subject needs language in order to constitute him or her self as 
subject, but language does not need any particular individual in order to be perpetuated as 
a system: “language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which each subject at a 
certain point in his mental development makes his entry into it.”13 The subject is “born 
into” a language, and his or her entry into the symbolic order of human society is equated 
with the entry into language, which begins before birth with the imposition of a proper 
name. The imposition of a name marks the entry of the child into the linguistic economy 
and the symbolic order.
The writer’s paradox is then to construct an individual subjectivity using the 
impersonal material of the linguistic system. More often than not this has meant altering 
the language, using it in unaccustomed ways in order to suggest the monstrous, 
inexpressible, inassimilable nature of the self in society. This is the solution proposed by 
Proust’s narrator in Le temps retrouve: The uniqueness of a truly great work of an 
expresses the “world” seen only by the particular anist who created it: “Par Pan seulement 
nous pouvons sonir de nous, savoir ce que voit un autre de cet univers qui n’est pas le
12 ..] dans la iangue il n’y a que des differences sans termes positifi." “[...] in language there are only 
differences without positive terms.” Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de linciiistique pfrferale. Paris: Payor, 1981 
(166).
13 Jacques Lacan. “The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud.'' Ecrits: A Selection. 
Trans. Alan Sheridon (New York: Norton, 1977) 146-177. p. 148.
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meme que le notre et done les paysages nous seraienr resces aussi inconnus que ceux qu’il
peut y avoir dans la lune” (TR 202) “Through are alone we are able to emerge from
ourselves, to know what another person seesof a universe which is not the same as our own
and of which, without art, the landscapes would remain as unknown to us as those that
may exist in the moon" (III: 932). Art, says Proust is our only “true” life. A great work of
art expresses that unique experience of the world, that difference from others which is
usually hidden by the conventions and habits of everyday life. Proust’s affirmation of the
power of art is mitigated, though, by the premise of a radical dichotomy between the life of
the artist himself and his work. This is exemplified by the figures o f Vinteuil and Bergotte
in the Recherche. The question o f art and originality is assimilable to the linguistic model
of speech and language-the former being a particular manifestation of the latter. The
unique work of art is a particular arrangement of elements which are common to a specific
medium: paint and canvas in the case of painting, rhythm and timbre in the case of music,
words on a page in the case of literature.
The problem with structuralist formulations of language may, however, be their
insistence on the “system” as something frozen and complete. It almost seems a positive
entity, a being in itself. It might be more useful in the context of the works here considered
to think of this system not as a fixed entity, but as an ongoing process. Language as a
system does not preceed its particular manifestation in speech or writing. It is rather a set of
generalized rules and common elements abstracted from the particular.
To define a word requires more words, which in turn must themselves be defined.
Meaning cannot exist apart from a context. This process is effectively infinite. There can be
no absolute value upon which it can come to rest, whether it be considered as the origin,
the logos or the system. Derrida describes this infinite process in these terms:
«Signifiant du signifiant» ddcrit [. . .] le mouvement du langage: dans son 
origine, certes, mais on pressent dijk qu’une origine dont la structure 
s’lpelle ainsi-signifiant de signifiant-s’emporte et s’efface elle-meme dans sa 
propre production. Le signify y fonctionne toujours d^ja comme un 
signifiant. La secondaritl qu’on croyait pouvoir reserver a 1’ecriture affecte 
tout signify en glndral, l’affecte toujours d£j&, e’est & dire &' entrie de jeu.
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Signifier o f a signifier describes the movement o f language in its origins, 
certainly, but one can already sense that an origin whose structure is thus 
designated—the signifier of a signifier-is carried away and erases itself in its 
very production. The signified always already functions as a signifier. The 
secondarity that was thought to be reserved for writing affects all signifieds; 
it always already affects them, as soon as the game begins.'4
This movement of language implies that there can be no final word to close off the process 
of identification. The absence of an absolute basis or center, a sort of “gold standard” for 
meaning to be guaranteed in language, what Derrida terms the logos, implies what he refers 
to as a kind of absolute inflation: “Cette inflation du signe «langage» est 1’inflation du signe 
lui-meme, I’inflation absolue, 1’inflation elle-meme,” “This inflation of the sign ‘language’ 
is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself"(15).
This potentially infinite process of linguistic identification, of naming, can appear 
to be fixed, (in dicitonaries, encyclopedia entries or legal records). Yet just as the “closed” 
system of language is set in motion by the flux of time, personal identity, dependent on 
contexts, necessarily changes when those contexts change. Thus in Proust, the profound 
transformation of French society caused by the Dreyfus affair changes, along with social 
“values,” the very identities o f the people involved. Proust refers to this phenomenon as a 
“social kaleidoscope.” It is this kaleidoscope, as an image of the perpetual reconfiguration of 
elements in the social fabric, which also suggests the inexhaustible nature of reading, and 
allows us to approach these novels from new perspectives, for as the values and assumptions 
of culture change, the ways we understand and interpret works of art and literature change 
as well.
The Subject of the Novel 
Gerard Genette suggests that it is possible to summarize the plot of A la Recherche 
du temps perdu in the simple sentence: “Marcel becomes a writer,” but this would be a 
gross reduction, worthy of Monty-Python’s All-England Summarize Proust Contest.15 It
14 Jacques Derrida, De ia grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967) 16 (my translation).
15 Genette suggests that it is possible to treat Proust’s novel, or any narrative, as “the development, monstrous 
as you like, given to a verbal locution, in the grammatical sense o f the term: the expansion of a verb. I'm
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remains very difficult to provide a simple answer to the questions “What is the work 
about?” What is its “point”? The attempt to answer these questions has occupied critics for 
nearly a century. More often than not, the answers depend more on the particular political 
or critical predispositions of the reader than on any kind of objective measure. Any such 
attempt must interrogate the basis of its own reading. Indeed, Proust’s narrator suggests 
that this is all one can do:
En realite, chaque lecteur est quand il lit le propre lecteur de soi-meme. 
L’ouvrage de l’ecrivain n’est qu’une espfcce d’instrument optique qu’il offre 
au lecteur afin de lui permettre de discerner ce que sans ce livre il n’eut 
peut-etre pas vu en soi-meme. La reconnaissance en soi-meme, par le 
lecteur, de ce que dit le livre, est la preuve de la verite de celui-ci, et vice 
versa, au moins dans une certaine measure, la difference entre les deux textes 
pouvant etre souvent impufee non a 1’auteur mais au lecteur. [. . .] le lecteur 
a besoin de lire d’une certaine fa^on pour bien lire; 1’auteur n ’a pas a sen 
offenser, mais au contraire a laisser la plus grande liberte au lecteur en lui 
disant: «Regardez vous-meme si vous voyez mieux avec ce verre-ci, avec 
celui-la, avec cet autre»16 (TR 217-18)
In reality every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self. The 
writer’s work is merely a kind of optical instrument which he offers to the 
reader to enable him to discern what, without this book, he would perhaps 
never have perceived in himself. And the recognition by the reader in his 
own self of what the book says is the proof of its veracity, the contrary also 
being true, at least to a certain extent, for the difference between the two 
texts may sometimes be imputed less to the author than to the reader. [. ..]
In order to read with understanding many readers require to read in their 
own particular fashion, and the author must not be indignant at this; on the 
contrary, he must leave the reader all possible liberty, saying to him: “Look
walking, Pierre has arrived, are [ ...]  minimal forms of narratives. On the other hand, the Odvssev or the 
Remembrance merely amplify (in the rhetorical sense of the term) enunciations such as Ulysses returns to 
Ithaca, or Marcel becomes a w riter' [‘Puisque tout recit—fut-il aussi dtendu et aussi complexe que la 
Recherche du temps perdu—est une production iinguistique assumant la relation d’un ou piusieurs 
evenement(s), il est peut-etre legitime de le trailer com me le deyeioppement. aussi monstrueux qu’on voudra, 
donne a une forme verbaie, au sens grammatical du termc: l'expansion d'un verbe. Je marche, Pierre est venu, 
sonr pour moi des formes minimales de recit. et inversement I’Qdysak. ou la Recherche ne font d’unc certaine 
maniere qu'ampiiher (au sens rhetorique) des enonces tels qu’ Ulysse rentre a Ithaqueou Marcel dement 
e'crivain.”j Girard Genette, Figures III (Paris: Seuil. 1972) 75- All further references to this text will be given 
parenthetciaily.
6 Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du temps perdu 8 vols. (Paris: Folio [Gallimard], 1987 - 1990). For 
convenience, all references to this novel will be to this edition, and will be noted parenthetically, with the 
following abbreviations to indicate specific volumes: S, Du cotl de chez Swann: JF, A I’ombre des ieuncs fillcs 
en flcurs: CGI. CGII, Le cote de Guermantes (I and II); SG. Sodome et Gomonhe: P, La prisonniere: AD. 
Albertine disparue: and TR, Le temps retrouve. All Enlish translations of Proust’s novel are from 
Remembrance of Things Past. Trans. C.K. Scon MoncriefF and Terence Kilmanin. 3 vols. New York: 
Random House, 1981, and will be noted parenthetically with volume and page numbers.
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for yourself, and cry whether you see best with this lens or that one or this 
other one” (III: 949)
Proust’s text here suggests a model of reading and interpretation in which the work ot art 
does not mainatin an independent self-contained life. It is dependent upon the recognition 
or mis-recognition of the reader, understood not simply as one who consumes the text, 
accepting or rejecting it as a complete, self-contained package. Proust acknowledges chat 
the reader is obliged to approach texts only with his experience and knowledge of language 
and culture, history and science, that is to say with other texts. As Barthes suggests: “Ce 
«moi» qui s’approche du texte est deja lui-meme une pluralite d’autres textes.” “This ‘self 
which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts.”17 To approach an 
understanding of the problem of narrative identity as represented in Proust and Faulkner, 
it helps to begin with the linguistic bases of subjectivity itself.
The use in psychology of the term “subject” demonstrates that field’s intimate 
dependence on linguistic considerations. For the term subject, stricdy speaking, must refer 
to the grammatical subject, and only by extension to the speaking (or writing) subject. The 
illusion of voice in narrative emerges from the use of the pronoun “I,” which, as Emile 
Benveniste points out, presupposes a communicative linguistic model based upon a 
relationship between “I” and “you.” These pronouns are referred to as “shifters,” since they 
continually shift referents in the context of a conversation. The pronound “je” refers to 
‘T’individu qui enonce la presente instance de discours contenant l’instance linguistique je,” 
“the individual uttering the present instance of speech containing the linguistic element 
“I.”1* The shifter’s critical dependence upon context is also a characteristic of human 
personality and identity.
17 “La subjectivity est une image pleine, dont on suppose que j'encombre le tatte, mais dont la plenitude, 
truqude, n’cst que le sillage de to us les codes qui me font, en sorte que ma subjectivity a la gdnyrality meme 
des sferotypes. L'objectivitd est un templissage du meme ordnc e’est un systeme imaginaire commc les autiesf 
. .  une image qui sen a me faire nommer avantageusement, a me faire connaitre, a me myconnaitre.” Roland 
Barthes, S/Z (Paris: Scuil, 1970) 16-17. (my translation). All further references to this text will be noted
, Probldmes de linguistique gyndrale 1 (Paris: Gallimard. 1966) 252.
parenthetically. 
Emile Benveniste
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The term voice suggests a presence, the source of the utterance, but the illusion of
voice is a phenomenon which is produced, and is therefore reproducible in language. It is
possible to assume the voice of another. Utterances are always susceptible to repetition
through quotation. The use of quotation marks is a convention meant to affirm presence,
to guarantee the intention of the source o f the enunciation, the person, in their absence.
The materiality of language, its inherent anonymity, its complete otherness with reference
to the individual, must be compensated by a whole series of contextual considerations
which serve to make language cohere with its “producer,” while simultaneously holding
them apart. It is not merely that speakers are to be responsible for their enunciations: the
rules which govern the use and ownership of certain utterances (the system of authorship,
of signatures, of ritual, as Pierce and Derrida have shown, serve to produce “successful”
speech acts), create the illusion that subjects produce language, but the opposite is equally
true. What writers have explored in twentieth-century literature is how language produces
subjects. From these two hypotheses it does not take long to conclude that language
produces language. The self-perpetuating mechanics of language seems indifferent to the
presence or absence of individual human beings.
The problematizing of human identity in these novels points to what Katherine
Hayles refers to, in her discussions of “postmodern” epistemology, as the “posthuman,”
evoking the mechanical production of cultural artifacts through “feedback loops”
When the essential components of human experience are denatured, they 
are not merely revealed as constructions. The human subject who stands as 
the putative source of experience is also deconstructed and then 
reconstructed in ways that fundamentally alter what it means to be human.
The postmodern anticipates and implies the posthuman.'9
In such a formulation the human subject becomes little more than a hypo these, a figure of 
language, constituted only as a function o f text or discourse. The Cartesian subject as self- 
knowledge and plenitude has disappeared as the anchor or origin of subjectivity, which can 
be thought of as the locus of the intersection of various, sometimes conflicting, voices.
” N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) 266.
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In narrative, the narrating subject might best be thought of in the same terms that 
Roland Barthes uses to describe the person, as a construction, a figure, the intersection of 
an impersonal network of signifiers or “a collection of traits” and their associated 
connotations, with a proper name, or, in the case of a first person narrator, the personal 
pronoun “ I .”20 The first-person narrators of many twentieth-century novels often do not 
function as substantial entities. The)' cease to be readable as coherent subjects, rather 
becoming anonymous, impossible empty signifiers, such as the narrator of Samuel Beckett’s 
Mollov. Beckett has simply taken the implications of Proustian discourse and gone further 
than anyone else (including perhaps Proust himself) in demonstrating the nothingness of 
human expression. This tendancy can be traced in much of twentieth century fiction, 
including the work of William Faulkner.
The Subject of Psychoanalysis
Freudian psychoanalysis is a narrative-based practice. It borrows many of its 
exemplary figures and terms from literature with the aim is of reconstituting a certain 
narrative of the patient’s life. Psychoanalysis can be thought of as the composition of an 
appropriate narrative of the self, an explanation of personality identity according to what 
Peter Brooks has called Freud’s “masterplot.” This masterplot, driven by desire toward the 
release of tension, demands the shortest possible route, one obeying a strict logico-temporal 
development. Using Roland Barthes’s description of the “readerly” text in S/Z. Brooks 
points out that meaning in the classical, or readerly text, “resides in full predication, 
completion of the codes in a ‘plenitude” of signification.”21 This point of culmination of 
traditional narrative is embodied in the deathbed scene so frequent in nineteenth century 
novels: “all such scenes offer the promise of a significant retrospect, a summing-up, the 
coming to completion of a fully predicated, and readable, sentence.” In this interpretation,
:o Roland Barthes. S/Z (Paris: Seuil, 1970) 101. All further refemces to this text will be noted parenthetically.
*' “ Beyond the Pleasure Principle constitutes Freud’s own masterplot, the essay where he lays out most fully a 
total scheme o f how life proceeds from beginning to end. [ . . .]  This inescapable middle is suggestive of the 
demonic repetition and return are perverse and difficult, interrupting simple movement forward." Peter 
Brooks. “Freud’s Masterplot." Reading for the Plot; Design and Intention in Narrative (New York: Knopf. 
1984) 96. 100. All further references to this text will be noted parenthetically.
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everything that delays or otherwise complicates or prolongs this progression is “deviant.” If 
this is the case, then it should come as no surprise that texts such as these provoke reactions 
of impatience or frustration on the part of many readers.
Narrative as Actions
The concept of narrative implies the relation of a series of actions rather than 
description. This conception of narrative may have come to us through the sixteenth 
century’s transposition of the classical unities of time, place and action from the theater to 
the novel. Though in practice authors have always produced works which stray from this 
ideal, such as Sterne’s Tristram Shandy or Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste. the works which 
comprise the canon of seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century literature have 
invariably obeyed this injunction: Rabelais, Cervantes, and Diderot were scorned by 
readers of “serious” literature, as were “minor” forms such as the epistolary novel. This 
model of good narrative is based upon a conception of history as chronology, as a linear 
progression in time.
The movement of time referred to as chronological is a linear movement in which 
time has only one dimension and one direction. In this view, the world has a beginning, a 
middle and an end. This has been the West’s conception of time since Genesis. Alphabetic 
writing is linear, since it cannot be taken in visually all at once the way a painting can. The 
linearity of narrative reinforces this conception of time, which has long dominated forms of 
European narrative, culminating in the novel as most people think of it, which reached its 
pinnacle of popularity in the nineteenth century, with realist writers such as Dickens and 
Balzac, Tolstoi and Zola. Taken this way, narrative implies a communicative act in which 
an action is communicated. In a novel there are often innumerable actions recounted.
Traditional realist fiction takes as its paradigm a narrative in which actions are 
recounted from beginning to end, in chronological order; the time of the narrative follows, 
as closely as is possible, the chronological evolution of the plot. What characterizes the
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modernity of Faulkner and Proust is the ways in which their novels undo this linearity in 
an attempt to imitate the constant accumulation and reinvention of memory.
For the French reader, the A la Recherche du temps perdu would be an excellent 
example of such a technique, as it undoes, on almost every page, the linearity which we 
commonly associate with time. Proust did more than any other to dispel the long held 
assumption that stories are to be told from beginning to end. So many different 
combinations are used, that Genette has employed Proust’s novel to illustrate a kind of 
encyclopedia of narrative techniques. His analyses of these techniques can be useful for 
reading Faulkner’s novel. Genette begins by distinguishing between “story” and “narrative” 
(“histoire” and “recit”)-the latter being the instance, or act of storytelling, and the former 
che story that is told. The “story” here can also be thought of as “plot.” The story must be 
abstracted from the narrative in order for inconsistencies between them to be perceived. A 
story is essentially to be defined as a series of  actions or events which are linked together in a 
narrative, by causality (logic), or chronology. There are, then, at least two layers of 
temporality which can be discussed in reference to a narrative: there is the story tim e-xht 
chronology or the plot, and the narrative or textual time-which refers, not to time, but to 
the amount of text it takes to tell the story, the space that the text occupies on the page.
The distinction between narrative and plot allows Genette to identify several 
possible variations on this discrepancy. An exact correlation between these two temporal 
orders is seldom achieved, though the best example o f what such correlation might look 
like might be the scene which often consists of dialogue. Genette distinguishes several 
variations on this basic paradigm, which he calls anaehronies, or discordances between these 
two temporal orders. When the amount of text devoted to the story decreases, the actions 
seem to accelerate. Years of events can be summarized in a single sentence. The ellipse he 
defines as an “infinite speed” where no text is devoted to a period of time. The text 
effectively “skips forward,” as if nothing significant had happened in the intervening time. 
Conversely, when the amount of text devoted to specific events increases, the story seems to
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slow down. The descriptive pause is a portion of text which does not relate any action 
whatsoever. The criticisms that early readers had for Proust’s novel often had to do with 
the number of pages he devoted to descriptions or what seemed to be insignificant actions, 
such as the narrator’s difficulty going to sleep in “Ouverture.”
Such passages are frequent in A la recherche, yet, as Gilles Deleuze points out, the 
story does indeed advance. This is what he insists upon when he states that the novel is “not 
turned toward the past, but toward the future and the progress of the narrator’s 
“apprenticeship.”” As Coindreau notes, “Proust [ ...]  nourished more on classical 
disciplines, accepts certain conventional restraints. Chronology, for example, inspires in 
him a respect that is unknown to Faulkner.”23 Such a judgment, is often useful in giving a 
first-time reader a sense of what the text is doing, but it is also an oversimplification, for the 
text moves continually into the past and into the future.24
Proust’s novel obeys a somewhat chronological progression, insofar as the hero can 
be seen to “grow up.”24 He is older in the latter volumes, but the steady progress of his 
development is not clearly indicated. There are no details given, for example, about his 
formal education. Instead, the narrator describes different placer. Combray, Paris and the 
Champs Elysees, Balbec, Venice, and Meseglise and Guermantes (Swann’s or the 
Guermantes’s way) at Combray. As the narrator revisits each locality, he gives an a-
~ In Proust ct Ics sipnes. Deleuze claims “L’oeuvre de Proust n’est pas tournee vers le passe et les decouvertes 
de la memoirc. mais vers le futur et ics progres de l'apprentissagc [.. .] le monde vacillc dans le courant de 
I’apprentissage [ .. .]  La Recherche est rythmde, non pas simplcment par les apporxs ou sddiments de la 
memoirc, mais par des series de deceptions discontinues" "Proust's work is not turned toward the past and the 
discoveries of memory, but toward the future and the progress of learning [ .. .]  the world vacillates in the 
learning process [ .. .]  the rhythm of the Rerherr-he is not simply due to the work or sedimentation of 
memory, but also by discontinuous series o f deceptions.” (35 -36).
23 ibid.
This is what Genette terms analepse and pnlepse In the analcpse, or flashback, the narrative returns to an 
event which is to have occurred previously in the story. The analcpse is a textual moment which is "out of 
place,” in which the narrative moves backwards in time to retell or recall a past event. A prolepse is an 
evocation of a event which is to come at a later point in the story-a flash forward.
” Throughout my text, when I will refer to the “hero” of A la Recherche du temps perdu, it will be to 
distinguish as the novel does, between the “young” protagonist and the "older” narrator who tells the story, 
although the coherence of these narrative persona is unstable, each being potentially subject to further 
subdivision and qualifications. The narrator who recounts the experience of the "petite maddeine” (for 
example) is not necessarily the same who has experienced the revelations of Le temps retrouvtL For a more 
systematic discussion of this problem see Marcel Muller, Les voix narratives dans La recherche du temps 
perdu’. 1965 (Geneva: Droz, 1983).
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chronological account of various events which took place at different moments over a 
period of years in each. Rather than following a plot, in the sense of a series of 
interconnected actions, Proust’s novel is more like a series of tableaus.
This is not to imply that there is not a definite diachronic narrative, a series of 
events which take place in the novel, in which we learn, for example, of the narrator’s 
family having moved into a new home, or, in Le temps retrouv^. that after two stays in a 
sanatorium, the hero revisits Paris after the First World War. Opposed to this linear 
movement of narrative is the a-chronological, paradigmatic, or descriptive practice of 
Marcel Proust, in which he develops the associations of multiple events with people and 
localities. The assocative axis o f  narrative has been associated ever since Proust with the 
workings of memory, but is not usually associated with realist narrative. In Proust’s novel 
the synchronic, or paradigmatic chain dominates the diachronic chain of the plot.
The first few pages of the novel are only the first of many reflections upon reading, 
and upon the boundaries between reality and imagination, sleep and waking. There are 
several full-length discussions o f the relationship between the waking state and that of 
sleeping and dreaming scattered throughout the novel. Many sections of the novel begin 
with the hero awakening in a new room after having made a voyage to Combray, to Paris, 
to Balbec, to Donci&res, to Tansonviile, or to Venice. The awakening sleeper is one of the 
recurring motifs which gives unity to the disparate scenes and episodes of the work as a 
whole. The temporal indeterminacy characteristic of such moments is accompanied by a 
fluidity of space.
Reflecting on the twilight world of semiconsciousness between sleep and waking, 
the narrator relates his perplexity at his inability to situate the physical space in which he 
lies, to place himself in the here and now: “quand je m’^ veillais au milieu de la nuit, comme 
j’ignorais ou je me trouvais, je ne savais meme pas au premier instant qui j etais” (S 5), 
“when I awoke in the middle o f the night, not knowing where I was, I could not even be 
sure at first who I was” (I: 5) Literally lost to the world, unable to correlate his memories to
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his presenc sense perceptions, he is adrift in the unmastered flow of memory and sensation: 
“but then the memory-not yet of the place in which I was, but of various other places 
where I had lived and might now very possibly be-would come like a rope let down from 
heaven to draw me up out of the abyss of not-being, from which I could never have escaped 
by myself* (I: 5 -6 ). The image of the rope let down from heaven qualifies the re- 
emergence of memory is a miraculous occurrence, independent of the will or effort to 
remember. It is a fortuitous occurrence, dependent not upon the self, but upon forces 
which seem to elude the processes of rational thought.
The hero’s loss o f consciousness of himself as self is induced in exemplary fashion 
by the acts of reading and dreaming. So deep is the narrator’s loss of self that, when he 
evokes his illusory identification with the novel he is reading, it is not with a character, bur 
with objects, works of art or history. What follows will further call into question the 
location as well as the time of the actions being described, and will link this uncertainty to 
the acts of dreaming and reading.
Thus this great novel originates, not in the epiphanic moment of involuntary 
memory, of fullness of meaning brought about by the taste of the famous petite madeleine, 
but in an experience of loss of self, and in the narrator’s subsequent attempts to reconstruct 
his sense of being, to localize his consciousness in space and time, by clearly distinguishing 
between memory and perception, self and other. As Leo Bersani has put it, Proust’s novel 
consists in a “massive-massively reiterated and illustrated—anxiety about an unidentifiable, 
perhaps unfindable particularity.”* The tide of Proust’s work A la recherche du temps 
perdu emphasizes the search not as a task to be completed, but as an ongoing process.
These texts are cases in the clinical sense of the term: texts which disobey or 
frustrate Freud’s “master plot.” As such they are, in the language of a normative model of 
narrative behavior, “pathological.” Their portrayal of a particular subjectivity is bound up 
in the attempt to create the monstrous inner narrative of the self, replete with all the
“ Leo Bersani .“Death and Literary Authority.” A New Histniy of French Literature, ed. Denis Hollier 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) 863.
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obsessions, manias and idiosyncratic behavior we commonly associate with eccentricity, 
chat is to say, with personality. Branding this kind of narrative as “pathological” is simply 
the consequence o f the Freudian model’s self-assertion as the norm. This model of narrative 
expectation is arguably based upon a particularly masculine version of desire and reading, 
thus excluding other forms, represented by texts just such as the ones I am discussing. Yet, 
as I hope to show, there is simultaneously at work in these novels, a formidable machine for 
producing narrative, one that seems to be inexhaustible and which absorbs all 
manifestations of novelty, and which continually frustrates all desire for completion or fully 
predicated actions.
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Chapter 2: Being and Nothingness in A la recherche du temps perdu
Proust's A la Recherche du temps perdu continues to fascinate us because it was 
among the first o f the twentieth century to explore this fragility o f  human identity and 
sense o f  self. The fragility o f the narrator’s sense o f  self is the principal theme of the 
novel. Although it could be read as realist novel, an intricate portrait o f bourgeois life in 
French society during the Belle Epoqe, inthe period roughly from 1870 to 1921, it is also 
a demonstration o f the precariousness, the nothingness of being. These two aspects of the 
narrative are not unrelated .Just as personality and being are fleeting, so too the concept of 
the nation as a unified entity is shown to be illusory.’ It is in the problematic identity and 
disunity o f the narrating subject that Proust’s novel ultimately calls into question the 
status of the nation.
In the opening lines o f the novel (which describe actions taking place much closer
to the end o f this quasi-circular narrative), the protagonist suffers from an unresolved and
unresolvable identity crisis, revealed in his bouts with insomnia. The very first word of
the novel is a reference to a period of time which is never clearly indicated.
Longtemps je me suis couchd de bonne heure. Parfbis, a peine ma bougie 
eteinte, mes yeux se fermaient si vice que je n ’avais pas le temps de me 
dire: «Je m ’endors.» Et, une demi-heure apres, la pensee qu’il dtait temps 
de chercher le sommeil m ’eveillair; je voulais poser le volume que je 
croyais avoir encore dans les mains et souffler ma lumi&re; je n ’avais pas 
cesse en dormant de faire des reflexions sur ce que je venais de lire, mais 
ces reflexions avaient pris un tour un peu particulier; il me semblait que 
j’etais moi-meme ce dont parlait l’ouvrage: une Iglise, un quatour, la 
rivalite de Francois Ier et de Charles Quint. (S 3)
For a long time I used to go to bed early. Sometimes, when I had put out 
my candle, my eyes would close so quickly that I had not even time to 
say ‘I’m going to sleep.’ And half an hour later the thought that it was 
time to go to sleep would awaken me; I would try to put away the book
______ which, I imagined, was still in my hands, and to blow out the light; I had
' This is the argument o f Leo Bersani: “La fragility du sens du moi [c’est] le theme principal de la vie de 
Marcel [...] tour entiere marquee par des episodes cruciaux qui mettenten relief une etonnante perte d’etre [..
.] la non-reconnaissance d ’un lieu [...] est ressentie comme un dchec de toured«fsignarinn. et plus 
do uloureusement encore, comme undchcc de la reconnaissance du moi.” “The fragility o f  his sense o f  self is 
the main theme in the life o f Marcel [...] altogether marked by crucial episodes which put into perspective an 
astonishinglossofbeing [...] the inability to recognizea place [...] is perceived as a failure o f  all designation, 
and more painfully yet, as a failure to recognize the self.” “Drfguisements du moiet an fragmentaire,” 
Recherche de Pro ust. Gerard Genette and Tzvetan Todorov. Eds. (Paris: Seuil, 1980) 16-17.
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been chinking all the time, while 1 was asleep, o f what I had just been 
reading, but my choughts had run into a channel of their own, until I 
myself seemed actually to have become the subject of my book: a church, 
a quartet, the rivalry between Francois I and Charles V. (I: 3)
Proust’s hero must first make a difficult discovery of himself in the present moment, and 
is at pains to relate that moment to his past and his possible future. He does not know 
where he is, and, as he indicates a few pages later, does not even know who he is. Neither 
does the reader. The vague “longtemps” here must be related to the moment of the 
revelation in the subsequent scene of the “petite madeleine.” This event, at which point 
the memories which will become the novel emerge, stands in an ambiguous relation to 
the hero’s final revelation at the Princess de Guermantes’ matinee in Le temps retrouve.
In the first part of “Combray” (S3 - 47) he is already an old man, having experienced 
most o f what will come in the novel, “II y avait d^ja bien des annees que, de Combray, 
tout ce que n ’ecait pas le theatre et le drame de mon coucher n’existaic plus pour moi” (S
44), “Many years had elapsed during which nothing of Combray, save what was 
comprised in the theatre and the drama of my going to bed there, had any existence for 
me” (I: 48). The hypothetical moment o f the novel’s composition would thus fall 
sometime after this moment at which everthing that is to come, most of the novels 
action, had already taken place, including the ultimate revelations at the Princess de 
Guermantes’s party.
The language of the Recherche expresses not the plenitude o f being as presence, 
but the absence or void with which the narrator is faced when he tries to call upon his 
experience and knowledge of the world. Narrative is a supplementary act which seeks to 
fill the chasm, to supply something which is missing, the memories which constitute the 
narrator’s identity.
The unreliability of human thought finallycalls into question the nature of 
existence. This is suggested in the “Ouverture,” in the narrator’s efforts to remember 
where he was upon waking. These opening pages demonstrate the fragility o f the 
narrator’s sense of self and the tenuous nature of the line separating consciousness and
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unconsciousness, and establish a tone of flux which will persist throughout the novel.
Even such absolute concepts as time and matter are called into question:
Peut-etre l’immobilite des choses autour de nous leur est-elle imposee par 
notre certitude que ce sont elles et non pas d ’autres, par I'immobilite de 
notre pens6e en face d’elles. Toujours est-il que, quand je me reveillais 
ainsi, mon esprit s’agitant pour chercher, sans y reussir, a savoir oil j etais, 
tout tournait autour de moi dans l’obscurit^, les choses, les pays, les 
annles. Mon corps, trop engourdi pour remuer, cherchait, d ’apres la 
forme de sa fatigue, a reperer la position de ses membres pour en induire 
la direction du mur, la place des meubles, pour reconstruire et pour 
nommer la demeure oil il se trouvait. Sa memoire, la memoire de ses 
cotes, de ses genoux, de ses epaules, lui presentait successivement 
plusieurs des chambres oil il avait dormi, tandis qu’autour de lui les murs 
invisibles, changeant de place selon la forme de la pi&ce imaginee, 
tourbillonnaient dans les tenfebres. Et avant meme que ma pensee, qui 
hesitait au seuil des temps et des formes, eut identifie le logis en 
rapprochant les circonstances, lui, - mon corps, - se rappelait pour chacun 
le genre du lit, la place des portes, la prise de jour des fenetres, l’exstence 
d’un couloir, avec la pensee que j’avais en m ’y endormant et que je 
retrouvais au reveil. (S 6)
Perhaps the immobility o f the things that surround us is forced upon 
them by our conviction that they are themselves and not anything else, by 
the immobility o f our conception of them. For it always happened that 
when I awoke like this, and my mind struggled in an unsuccessful 
attempt to discover where I was, everything revolved around me through 
the darkness: things, places, years. My body, still too heavy with sleep to 
move, would endeavor to construe from the pattern of its tiredness, the 
position of its various limbs, in order to deduce therefrom the direction 
of the wall, the location o f the furniture, to piece together and give a 
name to the house in which it lay. Its memory, the composite memory of 
its ribs, its knees, its shoulder-blades, offered it a whole series o f rooms in 
which it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen walls, shifting 
and adapting themselves to the shape o f each successive room that it 
remembered, whirled round it in the dark. And even before my brain, 
lingering in cogitation over when things had happened and what they had 
looked like, had reassembled the circumstances sufficiently to identify 
the room, it, my body, would recall from each room in succession, the 
style of the bed, the position of the doors, the angle at which the daylight 
came in at the windows, whether there was a passage outside, what I had 
had in my mind when I went to sleep and found there when I awoke. (I:
6 )
Here the narrator posits a split between conscious memory and a body memory, only
partially accessible to consciousness. The disconnection between body and mind results
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in the descab ilization of space and time, as the rooms spin around and adjust themselves 
to the posture o f the sleeper. The narrator’s memory o f himself is strongly linked to his 
present sense perceptions. He describes himself dreaming of a girl, o f the room in which 
he’s sleeping, as emanations o f the positions o f his thigh or arms.
What is poorly understood gives way to certainty, which is in turn revised, for the 
narrator is not yet awake. The image o f the room in which he sleeps lades away to be 
replaced by another, and then another: “Puis renaissait le souvenir d’une nouvelle 
attitude; le mur filait dans une autre direction: j’^ tais dans ma chambre chez Mme de 
Saint-Loup, a la campagne” (S 6 - 7). “Then the memory of a new position would spring 
up, and the wall would slide away in another direction; I was in my room in Mme de 
Saint-Loup’s house in the country” (I: 7). The narrator’s very body along with the 
physical space itself, are shown to be a constructs o f memory and imagination. It is che 
fragility o f this construct, the elusiveness o f memory, which gives his narrative its 
impetus. The narrative act will be an atempt to reestablish the relationship between mind 
and body, thought and reality.
The suggestion that the immobility o f matter is an illusion is one that would have 
seemed quite acceptable to Albert Einstein, who was developing his theories about the 
equivalence o f matter and energy at the same time that Proust was writing. If the 
invariability o f  the external world is dependent uponche immobility o f thought, Proust’s 
novel will demonstrate chat the variability o f the latter implies the changeability o f  the 
former.
In che image o f the waking narrator-hero, seeing first one and then another room 
from his past materialize around him, Proust offers a quick panorama of the work to 
come in the evocation o f the various bedrooms in which the narrator has slept: “j’^ rais a la 
campagne, chez mon grand-p&re, mon depuis bien des anndes [...] j’&ais chez Mme de 
Saint-Loup,” W hen, he is finally “folly awake,” the narrator spends the rest o f  the night 
trying to remember each place, and in so doing, announces the essential settings for the
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whole novel: “je passais la plus grande partie de la nuit a me rappeler notre vie d’autrefois, a 
Combray chez ma grande-tante, a Balbec, a Paris, a Doncieres, a Venise, ailleurs encore”
(9). The novel will eventually return to each these places, although through this 
announcement they are little more than proper names. Thus Proust establishes an 
imaginary topography which is litde more than a toponymy, but which will provide a 
“map” for the reader.
As he describes himself regaining consciousness, he describes the simultaneous 
presence o f different moments with a spatial analogy: “Un ho mme qui don tient en cercle 
autour de lui le fil des heures, l’ordre des annles et des mondes. 11 les consulte d’instinct en 
s’eveillant et y lit en une seconde le point de la terre qu’il occupe, le temps qui s’est ecoule 
jusqua son reveil: mais leurs rangs peuvent se meler, se rompre.” “When a man is asleep, he 
has in a circle round him the chain of the hours, the sequence of the years, the order of the 
heavenly host. Instinctively, when he awakes, he looks to these and in an instant reads off 
his own position on the eanh’s surface and the time that has elapsed during his slumbers; 
but this ordered procession is apt to grow confused, and to break its ranks” (I: 5). Proust’s 
whole novel is a demonstration of how the “ranks” of time can intertwine, or break off, 
how time has a geometry which is non-linear. Proustian narration takes its cue from the 
sleeper who “holds in a circle around himself the thread of the hours, the order of years and 
worlds.” In the images of the various rooms which the narrator has known and of which he 
will eventuallly tell, Proust assembles the various settings of which the reader will learn, 
into a tabelau, as the moments are superimposed, une upon the other. To say that narrative 
moments can be juxtaposed, or superimposed, is to apply a visual metaphor to the apparently 
linear. In L’espace proustien. Georges Poulet has pointed out the way in which Proust’s 
novel spatializes temporality by juxtaposing different moments: “ L’ceuvre de Proust est 
faite [ ...]  d’une slrie de scenes detachees, d&oup&s dans le trame du foel. [.. .] ce qui 
^tait temporel est main tenant &afe. Ainsi le temps cide la place k l’espace” “Proust’s work is
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made up [...]  of a series of decached scenes, cut out of the thread of the real. [...] chat 
which was temporal is now spread out. Thus time gives way to space”2*
Just as the waiting hero is unable to situate his place and time, it is virtually 
impossibile to determine the context, or to localize the spatio-temporal origin, of the 
narrating voice in the novel. When and where should we situate the narrator who says 
“Longtemps” or the one which tells of staying in a sanatorium in Le temps retrouvd? It is 
assumed that since he begins as if he were telling the story of his life, the gap between the 
narrating “je” and the young hero will eventually dose, but there remains, after che final 
reception at the Princess de Guermantes’ an unbreachable distance between the present of 
the narrator and the present of the narrated hero. The very structure of the narrative 
suggests the illusory nature of the present as the point of transition from what is not to 
what is no longer. The Proustian “Je” is a pronoun without referent, speaking from 
absence, not a presence but a language. As Muller points out, “here and now do not belong 
to the vocabulary of the Recherche.”29 When such words as “today” or “now” appear in the 
text, they refer sometimes to the present of the narration, sometimes to the hero’s present 
in the story, as if the narrator were reliving his past as another present. The “now” is 
constantly changing in the flux of memory and association. “Here” and “now” are, for all 
practical purposes, equivalent to “there” and “then.” The effect is to flatten time to a virtual 
present in the space of the text itsdf.
Proust’s project was ambitious. To unify it, he had to decide upon a form. He had
already made an unsuccessful attempt at a novel, and had begun an essay in the form of a
dialogue, but it wasn’t until he dedded to use a first person narrator that he found the 
3 Georges P»nU 1 V«pane prp|.«pfn rParif Gallimard, 1963) 129-30 (my translation).
“entre ie jour de la reception chez la princesse, et celui oil le Narrateur raconte cette reception, route une ere 
s'etend qui maintient entre le Hdros et le Narrateur un intervalle [infranchissable]. Si le Htiros rejoint le 
Narrateur, c’est a la fa^on d ’une asymptote: la distance qui les s^pare rend vers zdro; die ne s’annulera jamais.
[ ...]  Proust osdlie entre la-ias et fanou t, entre dm  et toujours. Id  et maintenant n’appartiennent pas au 
vocabulaire de La Recherche. '  (49-50, 86) ‘between the day of the princesses reception and the one on 
which the Narrator tells us o f that reception, there stretches a whole era which maintains between the Hero
and the Narrator an unbreachable interval. [__] If the Hero rejoins the Narrator, it is asymptotically: the
distance which separates them tends toward zero, but will never disappear. [ . . . ]  Proust oscillates between 
there and everywhere. between then and always. Here and now do not bdong to the vocabulary of the 
ficchadg’’ Marcel Muller, los Vnhr Narrra rives dans La Recherche du temps perdu. 1965 (Geneva: Droz.
1983) 86 (my translation). All further references to this text will be noted parenthetically.
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means to bring all o f these things together. Proust had to forgo an omniscient narrator in
order to dramatize the alternation of forgetfulness and remembrance, of “time lost” and
“time regained,” which would also serve to structure his great novel. As elusive as the
former proves to be, the narrative is propelled forward by the promise of the latter.
The narrator of A la Recherche du temps perdu is continually at pains to uncover
the depths of the human psyche, and, in doing so, he reveals as much through the structure
of his language as he does through his observations. Proust has it both ways, regaling his
passion for description and observation, while the narrator spends much time lamenting his
inability to observe and understand the people and things around him “always I was
incapable of seeing anything for which a desire had not already been roused in me by
something I had read, anything of which 1 had not myself traced in advance a sketch which
I wanted now to confront with reality” (III: 739). Each time he does this, however, his
sketch is revealed to be a fiction and the nature of reality remains forever hidden to him.
Nevertheless, Proust’s narrator goes to great effort to remember details of his observations.
The hero’s memories constitute the subtance of the novel, and thus the
preoccupation of the reader, but the style of the narration is also highly significant.
Proustian syntax has often been criticized for its incessant asides and parenthetical remarks,
but his sentences, while often quite long, seldom stray from the strict hierarchy of classical
syntax. Even with the “cascading” subordinate clauses referred to by Coindreau, Prousts’
phrases are usually grammatically and logically coherent.. Speaking of the “strange syntactic
qualities” of Proust’s language, Julia Kristeva notes that they are “uncharacteristic of
French” and “are thought to be closer to Latin, since the various components of Proust’s
sentences are separated by unusual distances:”
The Proustian sentence, which is binary yet expansive, incorporates many 
subordinate clauses that delay the closure o f the logical and syntactic 
totality, either by returning to preceding themes and linguistic items or by 
developing the themes and items contained in the sentence itself. What is 
more, Proust’s sentence contains indefinite interlocking parts that make its 
______ meaning difficult to discern.. .30
* Julia Kristeva Promt and the Sense o f Time, trans. Stephen Bann (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993)291.
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It is the delay of closure through the development o f the various subordinate clauses that 
crystallize the aesthetic of “involuntary memory’ in the Proustian sentence, forcing the 
reader to have to re-read, to return to the beginning of the sentence, to retrace the 
meandering paths of his thought.
Proust’s novel is often read as an exhaustive, even exasperating, portrayal o f the 
sometimes incoherent patterns of human thought. The narrator attempts to systematize 
and catalogue the intricate turns and twists of human thought—particularly in his analyses 
of jeafousy-Chaiies Swann’s jealous)' for Odette de Crdcy, and the hero’s jealousy for 
Albertine. What the text ultimately dramatizes is the fragility of consciousness. It 
demonstrates the chaos barely hidden beneath the illusion of structure, the inability of 
thought to be consistent, to cohere with itself over time.31 The difficulty of Proust’s style is 
perhaps an inevitable consequence of the attempt to represent the precariousness o f thought 
processes.
The Recherche stands in an ambiguous relationship to the genre of the 
autobiographical novel. For a first person recounting of the narrator’s own life, it tells us 
very little about him. What litde factual details we have can be briefly summarized. He 
seems to hail from a respectable bourgeois family. We learn in A 1’ombre des jeunes ftlles en 
fleurs that his father wishes him to study law and enter the diplomatic service, while the 
hero himself expresses his desire to become a great writer. The narrator as protagonist, 
however, seldom speaks, and even when he does, his words are seldom reported, it is rather 
the reactions of others that we are given. Gaeton Picon calls Proust’s narrator an “un je  
impenonnel“(“an impersonal I”), and “un miroir du monde,” (“a mirror of the world”).33 
Marcel Muller, too, calls Proust's narrator a “collector of images of the past” rather than an 
actual individual: “jamais les gouts ou les repugnances qui pourraient ddfinir sa personne ne
nous so nr precises,” “The tastes or repugnances which could define his person are never
11 Margaret E. Gray has argued that the narrative voice in the Recherche is [ .. .]  “usually read as the rich, 
interiorized almost obsessively analyzed experience [ .. .]  of a powerful subjectivity, that subjectivity is as 
contested as it is developed’ Postmodern Proust (10).
v Gaeton Picon, L'Usage de la lecture 111; Lecture de Proust (Paris: Mercure de France. 1963).
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precisely presented” (Muller 86). The narrator could be described as a kind of voyeur, an 
observer rather than as one who takes action, whose name is never given, and who rarely 
lets his own voice be heard.
Although (or because) the Recherche is from the beginning centered around the 
quest for personal identity by a narrator, he is the only character in the whole 3000 page 
novel who is almost never named. This peculiarity is all the more significant given the 
repeated long passages of the novel which discuss proper names: the chapters entitled 
“Nom de pays: le nom” and “Nom de pays: le pays,” or the discussions of the etymologies 
of place names by the Cure of Combray in Du cotd de chez Swann (103). and by professor 
Brichot in Sodome et Gomorrhe, 280, 316, 321). The narrator also takes great interest in 
the names of aristocratic families. The manifest importance of proper names in Proust’s 
novel has led Roland Barthes to postulate, perhaps somewhat excessively, that the 
establishment o f an onomasticon was the condition sine qua non which allowed the author 
to begin writing.33
His possible name is only mentioned as spoken to him by Albertine, the ultimate 
mysterious being in the novel. It is over a thousand pages into the novel, in an episode of 
La Prisonnifere. that the name “Marcel” is only conditionally suggested as a possible name 
for the narrator. Having installed Albertine in his parents’ apartment in Paris, he observes 
her sleeping. When she wakes, she speaks his name: “Elle retrouvait la parole, elle disait: 
«Mon» ou mon «cheri», suivi l’un ou l’autre de mon nom de bapt&me, ce qui, en donnant 
au narrateur le m£me prdnom de l’auteur de ce livre, eut fait:«Mon Marcel**, «Mon chdri
’’ Barthes argues that the proper names of the Recherche work as infinitely explotable signifiers: '‘Comme 
signe le Nom propre s’offrc i  une exploration a un ddchifFrement.’' “As a sign the proper name offers itself to 
exploration, to deciphering"] ‘si le Nom [ ...]  est un signe, c'cst un signe volumincux, un signe toujours gros 
d une epaisseur touffue de sens, qu’aucun usage ne vient reduire, apiadr [...]  Le nom est en effet caudysable\ 
on peut le remplir, le dilater, combler les interstices de son armature sdmique d’une infinitd de tajouts [...] 
C’est parce que le Nom propre s’oflTe a une catalyse d ’une richesse infinie, qu’ii est possible de dire que 
podtiquement, route la Recherche est sorti de quelques noms." ‘ if the Name is a sign, it is a voluminous one, 
always pregnant with a dense thickness of meaning, the use of which does not reduce or flatten out [ .. .]  the 
name can, in effect, be expanded, filled in, dilated; the chinks in its semiotic armature can be loaded with an 
infinity of additios. It is because the proper name offers itself to an infintdy rich expansion that it is possible 
to say that, poetically, all of the Rw W li> came out o f a few names" (‘Proust et les noms’ 125-28, my 
transladon).
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Marcel»” (P 67). The name is repeated for the second and last time a few pages further on, 
in an example of the kinds of notes Albertine would send the narrator to reassure him of 
her faithfulness (P 147). The general suspicion with which the narrator regards everything 
she tells him reflects on the reader’s ability to trust her word, even when she seems to be 
identifying the narrator/hero by name.
With no way of situating the narrating present, and no way to identify the narrator 
by any name other than the pronoun “je,” the narrating voice remains peculiarly 
anonymous, as if it were only by fully reconstructing the past that he could finally be 
present to himself or identify his contemporary surroundings. The Recherche is, however, 
among other things, a story of forgetfulness and a failure to understand people. It is no 
wonder then, that, in spite of the “revelation” in the final volume, a revelation which 
remains on the level of inarticulate perception, the prose of the book can only point toward 
an as yet to be written work which would incorporate the lessons learned from the 
involuntary memory. That A la recherche du temps perdu /rthat book Proust would not go 
so far as to say (TR 350-51).
Memory and Oblivion
The Recherche is a novel that is as much about forgetfulness as about memory. 
Before the awakening of the involuntary memory all the hero could recall about Combray 
were fragments, bits and pieces of memories: the magic lantern and his mother’s good night 
kiss, the little bell on the garden gate, Swann’s ritual visits, and being sent to bed. These 
images he likens to “cette sorte de pan lumineux, ddcoupl au milieu d’indistinctes tenebres 
[. ..] toujours vu it la meme heure, isoll de tout-ce qu’il pouvait y avoir autour, se 
ddtachant seul sur l’obscurite” (S 43-44), “this son of luminous panel, sharply defined 
against a vague and shadowy background [ ...] , seen always at the same evening hour, 
isolated from all that might have been around it, detached and solitary against the dark 
background” (I: 46 - 47). The voluntary memory is a frozen memory, one which screens as 
much as it reveals, thus distorting its object: “as though all Combray had consisted of but
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rwo floors joined by a slender staircase and as chough there had been no time there but
seven o ’clock at night” (I: 47). The Proustian hero demonstrates the frailty o f memory
through his inability toobserve and remeber. Conscious memory in the Recherche is
always faltering, always inadequate, demanding supplemental information. The moment
of involuntary memory is presented as a miracle, a moment o f plenitude in which “the
vicissitudes o f life had become indifferent to me” (I: 48).
What many commentators overlook is that even after the awakening of the
involuntary memory, and as they are evoked in the narrative, the events and characters of
the novel are fragmented, synthetic.34 The moment o f  epiphany in itself is an inarticulate
impression of recognition and unfamiliarity. Strange, yet intimately familiar, the joy felt
by the hero comes from himself. “II m avait aussitot rendu les vicissitudes de la vie
indifferences [ . . de la meme fa^on qu’opfcre 1’amour, en me remplissant d’une essence
precieuse: ou plutot cette essence n etait pas en moi, elle erair moi” (S 44) And at once
the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous [...] this
new sensation having had on me the effect which love has o f filling me with a precious
essence; or rather this essence was not in me it was me. (I: 48). This “precious essence”
emanating from within the self is nevertheless alien to the hero’s consciousness. It is
inexplicable, incompehensible.
Je pose la tasse et me tourne vers mon esprit. C ’est & lui de trouver la 
verife. Mais comment? Grave incertitude, toutes les fbis que l’esprit se sent 
d£pass^ par lui-meme; quand lui, le chercheur, est tout ensemble le pays 
obscur oil il doit chercher et ou tout son bagage ne lui sera de rien. 
Chercher? pas seulement: creer. II est en face de quelque chose qui nest 
pas encore et que seul il peut fealiser, puis faire entrer dans sa lumi&re. (S
45)
I put down the cup and examine my own mind. It alone can discover the 
truth. But how? W hat an abyss of uncertainty, whenever the mind feels 
overtaken by itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time the dark region
* I am referring here to Genette’s definition o f “synthetic narrative” in his discussion o f  the last scene in the 
novel: the Princess ofGuermantes s reception, “qui est presque constammenr traitde sur le mode itdratih ce 
n est pas led&oulement diachronique de la inception chez la princesse, dans la succession des tfvlnements qui 
la remplissent, qui commande la composition du texte, maisplutdt Enumeration d ’un certain nombrc de 
classes d occurrences, dont chacune symhetise plusieurs (fvenementsdispersesen fait tout au long de la 
•matinfe* [...JJ’appelleraice second type iteration interne ou synth/tisante"[...] (150).
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through which it must go seeking and where all its equipment will avail it 
nothing. Seek? More than that: create. It is face to face with something 
which does not yet exist, to which it alone can give reality and substance, 
which it alone can bring into the light of day. (I: 49)
The extreme effort the protagonist must make to understanding its origins and meaning
demonstrate the misrecognition, the misapprehension implicit in any conscious
understanding of oneself.35 It is only through great effort that he is able to plumb the
depths of its meaning and to give narrative form and consistency to what was only a
fleeting inarticulate sensation. The proustian moment always requires a supplementary act
of decipherment, which is equivalent to the act of writing. The search is in fact a creation.
Any pretense to truth must be qualified by the impossibility of objectivity when the subject
is indistinguishable from its object.
Proust’s equivalent of Faulkner’s postage stamp might well be the cup of tea in
which his protagonist dips the madeleine. It is from this tiny space that all of his novel is
said to emerge:
Et des que j’eus reconnu le gout du morceau de Madeleine trempe dans le 
tilleul que me donnait ma tante (quoique je ne susse pas encore et dusse 
remettre a bien plus tard de ddcouvrir pourquoi ce souvenir me rendait si 
heureux), aussitdt la vieille maison grise sur la rue, ou dtait sa chambre, vine 
comme un d^cor de theatre s’appliquer au petit pavillion, donnant sur le 
jardin, qu’on avait construit pour mes parents sur ses derri&res (ce pan 
tronque que seul j’avais revu jusque-la); et avec la maison, la ville, depuis le 
matin jusqu’au soir et par tous les temps, la Place ou on m’envoyait avant 
dejeuner, les rues ou j’allais faire des courses, les chemins qu’on prenait si le 
temps dtait beau. Et comme dans ce jeu oil les Japonais s’amusent & 
tremper dans un bol de porcelaine rempli d’eau, de petits morceaux de 
papier jusque-l<i indistincts qui, & peine y sont-ils plongds s’etirent, se 
contournent, se colorent, se difftrencient, deviennent des fleurs, des 
maisons, des personnages consistants et reconnaissables, de meme 
maintenant toutes les fleurs de notre jardin et celles du pare de M. Swann, 
et les nymphdas de la Vivonne, et les bonnes gens du village et leurs petits 
logis et l’eglise et tout Combray et ses environs, tout cela qui prend forme 
et solidite, est sorti, ville et jardins, de ma tasse de thd. (S 47)
And as soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine soaked 
in her decoction o f lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me 
(although I did not yet know and must long postpone the discovery of why
35 Or what a Lacanian might refer to as the absolute otherness o f  the unconscious.
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this memory made me so happy), immediately the old grey house upon the 
street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to attach itself to the 
little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built out behind it 
for my parents (the isolated segment which until that moment had been all 
that I could see); and with the house the town, from morning to night and 
in all weathers, the Square where I used to be sent before lunch, the streets 
along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was 
fine. As in the game wherein the Japanese amuse themselves by filling a 
porcelain bowl with water and steeping in it little pieces of paper which 
until then are without character or form, but, the moment they become 
wet, stretch and twist and take on colour and distinctive shape, become 
flowers or houses or people, solid and recognisible, so in that moment, all 
the flowers in our garden and in Mr. Swann’s park, and the water lilies on 
the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings and 
the parish church and the whole of Combray and its surroundings, taking 
shape and solidity, sprang into being, town and gardens alike, from my cup 
of tea. (I: 51)
It is not from the teacup itself, but from the hidden recesses, the black hole of memory that 
the narrator’s story emerges, across the span of time, through the resemblance of a sensor}' 
perception in the present to a forgotten one in the past. The involuntary memory in proust 
is not the narrative, but a moment which remains isolated, privileged, an “epiphany,” in 
which the subject expresses a sense of self-presence: “J’avais cesse de me sentir mediocre 
contingent mortel” (S 44). This sense of exhaltation is concurrent with the resurrection of 
the forgotten past in the guise of people and places. The narrator’s chance encounter with 
such sensations triggers what Proust calls “involuntary memory.” Out of the formlessness 
and insignificance of the “litde pieces of papier” or the empty teacup all of the beings and 
things which existed in the past are made present. This event happens unexpectedly, 
independently of the hero’s will. This involuntary memory is opposed to the conscious act 
of remembering, which pales in comparison, and could be thought of as a kind of 
forgetting.
As soon as the hero seeks to articulate the epiphanic moment and to intentionally 
examine the sensations of memory which it resurrects, the moment has passed: “Je pose la 
tasse et me tourne vers mon esprit. C’est a lui de trouver la verite, mais comment?” (S 45). 
The work of remembering is not merely a task of seeking out the truth from forgotten
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memories, he says, but a task of creation. The novel grows out of the desire to illuminate 
the “vague and shadow)' background,” to restore the narrative of reality'. It is a difficult, 
conscious effort, far removed from the involuntary memory’s moment of “epiphany.”
C’est ainsi que, pendant longtemps, quand, rdveille la nuit, je me 
ressouvenais de Combray, je n ’en revis jamais que cette sorte de pan 
lumineux, de'coupe au milieu d’indistinctes ten&bres, pareil a ceux que 
I’embrasement d’un feu de Bengale ou quelque projection electrique 
eclairent et sectionnent dans un edifice dont les autres parties restent 
plongees dans la nu it: a la base assez large, le petit salon, la salle a manger, 
l’amorce de l’allee obscure par oil arriverait M. Swann, 1’auteur inconscient 
de mes tristesses, le vestibule ou je m’acheminais vers la premiere marche de 
1’escalier, si cruel a monter, qui constituait a lui seul le tronc fort etroit de 
cette pyramide irrlguli&re ; et, au faite, ma chambre a coucher avec le petit 
couloir a porte vitree pour l’entree de maman ; en un mot, toujours vu a la 
meme heure, isole de tout ce qu’il pouvait y avoir autour, se detachanr seul 
sur 1’obscurite, le decor strictement necessaire (comme celui qu’on voit 
indique en tete des vieilles pieces pour les representations en province), au 
drame de mon deshabillage; comme si Combray n’avait consiste qu’en deux 
etages relies par un mince escalier, et comme s’il n’y avait jamais etl que 
sept heures du soir. A vrai dire, j’aurais pu repondre a qui m’eut interroge 
que Combray comprenait encore autre chose et existait a d’autres heures.
Mais comme ce que je m’en serais rappele m’eut ete fourni seulement par la 
memoire volontaire, la memoire de l’intelligence, et comme les 
renseignements qu’elle donne sur le passe ne conservent rien de lui, je 
n’aurais jamais eu envie de songer a ce reste de Combray. Tout cela etait en 
realite mon pour moi.
Mort a jamais ? C’etait possible.
II y a beaucoup de hasard en tout ceci, et un second hasard, celui de 
notre mon, souvent ne nous permet pas d’anendre longtemps les faveurs du 
premier. (S 43)
And so it was that, for a long time afterwards, when I lay awake at night 
and revived old memories of Combray, I saw no more of it than this son of 
luminous panel, sharply defined against a vague and shadowy background, 
like the panels which the glow of a Bengal light or a searchlight beam will 
cut out and illuminate in a building the other parts of which remain 
plunged in darkness: broad enough at its base, the little parlour, the dinig 
room, the opening of the dark path from which M. Swann, the unwitting 
author o f my sufferings, would emerge, the hall through which I would 
journey to the first step of that staircase, so painful to climb, which 
constituted, all by itself, the slender cone of this irregular pyramid; and, at 
the summit, my bedroom, with the little passage through whose glazed 
door Mamma would enter; in a word, seen always at the same evening 
hour, isolated from all its possible surroundings, detached and solitary 
against the dark background, the bare minimum of scenery necessary (like 
the decor one sees prescribed on the title-page of an old play, for its
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performance in the provinces) to the drama of my undressing; as though all 
Combray had consisted of but two floors joined by a slender staircase, and 
as though there had been no time there but seven o’clock at night. I must 
own that I could have assured any questioner that Combray did include 
other scenes and did exist at other hours than these. But since the facts 
which 1 should then have recalled would have been prompted only by 
voluntary memory, the memory of the intellect, and since the pictures 
which that kind of memory shows us preserve nothing o f the past itself, I 
should never have had any wish to ponder over this residue of Combray.
To me it was in reality all dead.
Permanently dead? Very possibly
There is a huge element of chance in these matters, and a second 
chance occurrence, that of our own death, often prevents us from awaiting 
for any length of time the favours of the first. (I: 4 6 -7 )
Here the memory of the intellect is equated with forgetting, with a kind of death. There is
a sense in which chance {le hasard) is equivalent to death, since it seems to negate the will
or efforts of the individual. So paramount a role does chance play in Proust’s novel that
often ic is capitalized. It is at once that which brings death, through the unexpected, and
that which brings life, awakening the hero from the slumber of the quoddien. The
involuntary memory, which the narrator claims to be more real than ordinary memory
(which is then more akin to fortgetting) is fundamentally dependent on forces beyond the
conscious control of the subject, on the chance encounter of an object which evokes it.
The narrator spends a great deal of textual time lamenting his inability to observe 
and understand the people and things around him. He details his obsessive desire for 
Gilberte Swann, Mme Swann, Madame de Guermantes and finally Alberune. He goes so 
far as to surrepddously follow Madame de Guermantes in her walks around Paris. In 
Proust the other is an enigma to be deciphered, but which continually frustrates all efforts 
to know. Interposed between the observer and the world is the mirror of language. The 
hero realizes this only in the final volume “j’dtais incapable de voir ce dont le dlsir n’avait 
pas ^te dveilld en moi par quelque lecture, ce dont je n’avais pas d’avance dessinl moi-meme 
le croquis que je de'sirais ensuite confronter avec la rfalitd” (TR 25), “Always I was 
incapable of seeing anything for which a desire had not already been roused in me by 
something I had read, anything of which I had not myself traced in advance a sketch which
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I wanted now to confront with reality” (III: 739). Each time he does this, however, his 
“sketch” is revealed to be false. Reality remains forever elusive, hidden to him.
This inability to know, to fully define one’s context becomes an inability to know 
oneself, and thus an inability to be. The narrator is the only character in the novel who is 
never specifically and explicitly named.36 Yet, the text spends much o f its time meditating 
on the significance of names: names of people and of places. This helps explain the hero’s 
fascination with the aristocracy, whose names signify both places and people. In the 
following chapters I will consider the role of the proper name in a discussion of Proust’s 
social kaleidoscope and o f Faulkner’s “epic” of the South, but first I will examine the way in 
which Faulkner’s novels attempt to represent thought throught the use of “stream of 
consciousness” techniques.
36 Marcel Muller calls Proust’s narrator a “possessor of the other”: “Avoir un nom, c'est toe  pour autrui cet
objet qu’autrui est pour nous [ . . . ] .  Si je n’a pas de nom et qu’en revanche les villes et ics toes sont avant tout 
leur nom, c’est que le rapport que ce je entteticnt avec autrui n’est pas tedproque [ .. .]  I’anonymat tcndrait [.
..]  a consacrer la prominence du Hdros sur I’autre” (17). "To have a name is to be for others that object that 
the other is for us [ ...] . If I has no name and on the contrary, cities and beings are before anything else their 
names, it is because the relationship that this I holds with others is not reciprocal [ . . .]  anonymity tends to 
consecrate the preeminence o f the hero over the other.” What I am arguing here would rather take the 
opposing position. The hero’s lack of a name marks the preeminence o f the world over him, his inability to 
distinguish self and other.
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Chapter 3: Identity and Consciousness in the Novels o f W illiam Faulkner
While Faulkner’s novels offer a portrait of a certain society, they are also studies in 
human psychology, most notably in his use of stream-of consciousness technique to portray 
the human psyche. Two of his major works, The Sound and the Furv. and Absalom. 
Absalom! attempt to represent the sometimes incoherent thoughts of their protagonists.
The former employs what is often referred to as the “stream of consciousness” technique, 
while the latter puts into play the voices of multiple storytellers in its attempt to retell the 
story of Thomas Sutpen. Whether it be through one narrator or many storytellers, 
Faulkner’s novels are studies in psychological processes, in the idiosyncratic ways that 
human minds work. As such, they share fundamental precepts with the work o f Proust.
It would be implausible to argue that Proust had no influence upon Faulkner, 
although there is little direct evidence of such in any of the Yoknapatawpha stories. The 
Recherche is certainly never named in the course o f Faulkner’s novels, but Faulkner was 
curious and attentive to developments in contintental literature. Michael Grimwood 
among others has noted that Faulkner displayed a definite “francophiiia,” which led him to 
take up residence in Paris in 1925.37
Andre Bleikasten suggests that most Faulkner criticism has ignored his connections 
with European writers, arguing that “Like all American novelists,” Faulkner is “a novelist 
of European descent. His many fathers include Cervantes, Scott, Balzac, Dickens, Flaubert, 
Dostoevsky, Hardy, Conrad, Mann, Joyce, and Proust, to mention only the novelists.”
(75). Bleikasten laments that most Anglo-American critics tend to ignore the importance of 
the international context of Faulkner’s work and reception, his relation to twentieth- 
century novelists from non-English-speaking countries: “Faulkner’s novels possess an 
enduring power beyond the culture out of which they arose and even beyond che language 
in which they were written, since most of their non-American readers know them only
57 “He went to France, at [friend Phil] Stone’s urging, because both considered ic the homeland of any writer”
(31).
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through translations.” If this were not the case, argues Bleikasten, Faulkner’s novels would 
never have gained so much recognition in France: “Did Faulkner’s novels not somehow 
exceed the occasion of their birth, how could they have won recognition in France and be 
admired by Malraux and Sartre (two writers on the left, neither of whom was an expert on 
the South) long before they were taken seriously in Faulkner’s own country?” (76).*
In a his discussion of Faulkner’s European connections, Bleikasten notes that 
“modern novelists all knew that there was no such thing as objective reality, only each 
individual’s sense of it. Hence their abiding fascination with consciousness, with the 
flickerings of subjective perception and the eddies of subjective experience—with what 
philosophers at the turn of the century like James, Bergson, and Bradley identified as 
‘stream of consciousness,’ ‘real duration,’ or ‘immediate experience.’”*
Finally, it is interesting to note what Faulkner himself said about his European 
influences. It is an interview he gave in 1952 which is at the origin of the present study. 
Speaking to Loic Bouvard, a French graduate student in political science at Princeton who 
had asked him about his opinion of France, Faulkner professed a love for France and the 
French people, although he qualified that admiration: “I greatly admire the French spirit, 
even though you do tend to ‘polish’ people too much. The French think too much, and in 
doing so, destroy something of man’s original flavor. Be careful of man in the abstract” 
(LG 72). This criticism of the alleged French penchant for abstract thought draws on a 
cliche in which the European intellectual is opposed to the “simplicity” or 
unpretentiousness of American a r t . As many critics have noted, Faulkner often pretended 
to be a simple farmer, but this stance was no more honest that his pretending to be a
*  “Faulkner From a European Perspective" in The Cambridge Companion to Faulkner. 75 - 95.
39 Bleikasten names twelve European authors whom he identifies along with Faulkner as “the major figures of 
Western fiction in the first half of our century.' These authors, he says “all bear witness to the increasing 
acceleration and complexification of the ‘inward turn’ taken by the novel since the late nineteenth century. 
Whether they adopted autobiographical modes or resorted to polytnodal or polyphonic arrangements, they all 
created sharply inreriorized fictional spaces, in which the reader was made to feel individual psyches at work." 
Andrf Bleikasten. “Faulkner from a European Perspective" in The Cambridge Companion to Faulkner, ed. 
Philip M. Weinstein. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 75 - 95.
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wounded World War 1 aviator. It is interesting, then, that in the interview, Fauikner went 
on to profess his admiration for an artist who is often accused of excessive analysis. Asked 
specifically about French writers, Faulkner had this to say about Marcel Proust: “I was 
influenced by Flaubert and by Balzac, whose way of writing everything bluntly with the 
stub of his pen I admire very much. And by Bergson, obviously. And I feel very close to 
Proust. After I had read A la Recherche du Temps Perdu I said ‘This is it!—and I wished I 
had written it myself (LG 72); but in another interview, at Nogano in 1955, Faulkner 
seems to deny the influence of Proust on his writing: “Proust I have read. The names I 
mentioned yesterday were the names of the men who I think influenced me. When I read 
Joyce and Proust it is possible that my career as a writer was already fixed, so that there was 
no chance for it to be influenced other than in the tricks of the trade, you might say” ( LG 
112).
It is doubtful to what extent an author’s comments about his own work can be used 
to judge that work, and Faulkner’s insistence that his career was already “fixed” when he 
read Proust hardly seems likely, but it is interesting to see here that Faulkner seems to 
attribute to these writers a possible “formal” influence in the “tricks o f the trade.” What 
Faulkner is implying here by “the tricks o f the trade” can only be guessed at, but the 
implication seems to be that these “tricks” would have more to do with the “mechanics” of 
writing novels more than the themes or ideas contained in them. Faulkner seeks here to 
deny any thematic connections, but such a denial remains suspect, and invites closer 
scrutiny.
What other connections could Faulkner have felt to this French author known for 
his obsessive descriptions and analyses? One answer to this question is, simply, their eflbrts 
to portray the complexity of human beings and their relations. They owe as much to the 
tradition of phenomenological realism, which seeks not to present an “objective” depiction 
of the real, but demonstrates the mind’s production of the real. James Joyce was one of 
Proust’s contemporaries who shared this concern with the representation of the
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phenomena of perception and thought, and Faulkner’s work also demonstrates its
indebtedness to Joyce, not only in the “stream of consciousness” technique which it 
employs, and which Joyce is famous for, but also in his use of names taken from Greek 
mythology.
In what has often been called an “epic” of the American South, William Faulkner 
portrays, a society confronted with its own failure and defeat. Edouard Glissant praises 
Faulkner’s novels as examplary of what he calls a poetics of relation, in which the perilous 
encounter between cultures is played out in closed space of the plantation system. What is 
at stake in this encounter is the integrity of an identity based upon exclusion of the other. 
Western civilization has always tended to marginalize or exclude the other in its attempt to 
affirm and legitimize a self-sufficient identity. The mechanism by which this society has 
always perpetuated its structures of dominance is the patriarchal system, in which lineage is 
meant to assure an unbroken orderly transferral of from one generation to another within 
the structure of the family tree. This might be one explanation for the longevity of many of 
the principal actors in the Old Testament. The missing names in the long lists of lineage 
are covered over by making one person live the equivalent of several generations.
The entire oeuvre of William Faulkner deals with the disintegration of the 
patriarchal family, and therefore, in a larger sense, with the collapse of western (European) 
social structure, brought about by the encounter betweeen different cultures in the 
southern United States, and by the traumatic event which was the Civil War. We will 
return to the cultural implications of Faulkner’s tragedy in our consideration of the role of 
the proper name and lineage, in a subsequent chapter.
Although William Faulkner purports to be telling about his region, his is also a 
“comedie humaine,” something that he acknowledged himself when he admitted his debt 
to Balzac (LG 72). These novels dramatize a crisis of identity which translates into a crisis 
of the means of identification, of the process of identification in language through the 
construction of narrative: the personal narrative of a speaking or writing subject, or the
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inner narrative of consciousness as manifested in language. The voice which emerges is 
precariously fragmented, a continual negotiation with chaos in the form of language, that is 
to say in the form of pure formality.
French Readings of Faulkner through Proust 
By the end o f the 1930s Faulkner had already gained recognition among European 
writers, and continues today to be widely read, most especially by third-world writers. The 
interest that Faulkner holds for international audiences is related to his use of narrative 
techniques familiar to non-Western traditions as much as to the themes raised by his texts. 
The most striking of these is the liberation of narrative from the exigencies of chronology, 
from the a narrative form based on a conception of time as linearity.
The French novelists and philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Andre Malraux were 
among the first to recognize the importance of Faulkner’s work, even before he gained the 
respect of many American readers. In introducing Faulkner to the French, Sartre found it 
quite logical to compare the two authors. In his preface to the French translation of The 
Sound and the Fury. Sartre saw obvious connections between Proust and Faulkner, in the 
ways they thematized what he saw as the essential existential problems of being and time. 
Like Faulkner, he criticized Proust for what he identified as his penchant for analysis, a trait 
which he identifies as stereotypically French:
Faulkner est un homme perdu et c’est parce qu’il se sent perdu qu’il risque, 
qu’il va jusqu’au bout de sa pensee. Proust est un classique et un Fran^ais: les 
Fran^ais se perdent a la petite semaine et ils finissent toujours par se 
retrouver. L’eloquence, le gout des idees claires, l’intellectualisme ont impose 
a Proust de garder au moins les apparences de la chronologie.
Faulkner is a man who is lost, and it is because he feels himself lost that he 
takes risks, following through to the consequences of his thought. Proust is a 
classical and a Frenchman: the French lose themselves weekly, and always end 
up finding themselves again. Eloquence, the taste for clear ideas, 
intellectualism all forced Proust to keep at least the appearance of 
chronology.*0
40 Situations I (77). My translation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
Sartre’s sensitivity to the chronological organization of Proust’s narrative belies his 
philosophical concerns with the concepts of being and time. The interdependence of these 
concepts is reflected even in the physical sciences of the twentieth century, in Einstein’s 
famous equation which equating mass with energy. Time and energy share one essential 
characteristic which are the concepts of movement or change, whereas the traditional idea of 
being implies permanence, stasis.
Sartre’s initial purpose was to alert French readers to the idiosyncrasies of 
Faulkner’s style: “Quand on lit Le Bruit et la Fureur. on est frappe d’abord par les 
bizarreries de la technique. Pourquoi Faulkner a-t-il casse le temps de son histoire et en a-t- 
il brouille les morceaux?” (70), “When one reads The Sound and the Furv. he is at first 
struck by the peculiarities of his technique. Why did Faulkner break up the time of his 
story and why did he mix up the pieces?” To present Faulkner’s difficulties to the French 
reader, Sartre refers to Marcel Proust’s novel:
Tel est le temps de Faulkner. Ne le reconnait-on pas? Ce present indicible et 
qui fait eau de toutes parts, ces brusques invasions du passd, cet ordre 
affectif, oppose a 1’ordre intellectuel et volontaire qui est chronologique 
mais qui manque la realite, ces souvenirs, hantises monstrueuses et 
discontinues, ces intermittences du coeur [. . .], ne retrouve-t-on pas le 
temps perdu et reconquis de Marcel Proust? (74)
Such is the time of Faulkner. Do we not recognize it? This unspeakable 
liquified present, these brusque invasions of the past, this affective order, 
opposed to the intellectual and voluntary order which is chronological but 
which lacks reality, these memories, monstrous hauntings and 
discontinuities, these intermittences of the heart [. . .], do we not here 
rediscover the time lost and reconquered of Marcel Proust?4'
What interested Sartre was the narrative point o f view represented by each novelist, and
their protagonists’s attitudes with respect to time.
In Sartoris. says Sartre, Faulkner always shows events when they have already taken
place, and in The Sound and the Fury, nothing happens, all has already happened:
II semble qu’on puisse comparer la vision du monde de Faulkner a celle 
d’un hommme assis dans une auto d&ouverte et qui regarde en arri&re. A
41 My translation.
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chaque instant des ombres surgissent k sa droite, a sa gauche, 
papillottements, tremblements ramises.. .  qui ne deviennent des arbres, des 
hommes, des voitures qu’un peu plus tard, avec le recul. Le passe y gagne 
une sorte de surrealite: ses contours sont durs et nets, immuables; le present, 
innomable et fugitif, se defend mal contre lui; il est plein de trous, et, par 
ces trous, les choses passes l’envahissent, fixes, immobiles, silencieuses 
comme des juges ou comme des regards . .  . Dans Sartoris, le passe s’appelait 
«les histoires», parce qu’il s’agissait de souvenirs familiaux et construits, 
parce que Faulkner n ’avait pas encore trouve sa technique. Dans Le Bruit et 
laFureur, il est plus individuel et plus indecis” (73).
Faulkner’s vision of the world seems comparable to that of a man seated in 
an open car and looking backwards. At each instant, formless shadows, 
flutterings, vague tremblings, and a kind of confetti of light appear to the 
right and to the left, but only with distance do they become trees, men, and 
automobiles. The past takes on a kind of superreality; its contours are firm 
and clear, unchangeable. The present, undefined and fleeting, is weak by 
comparison. It is full of holes, and the things of the past invade it through 
these holes-things that are fixed, immovable, silent as judges or stares. 
Faulkner’s monologues remind us of airplane flights replete with air 
pockets: at each pocket the hero’s consciousness “falls into the past” and 
then rises only to fall again. The present is not; it becomes; everything 
was.42
Salvation for Proust’s narrator, says Sartre, lies in the integral reappearance of the past. For 
Faulkner, on the other hand, the past is never lost-unfortunately—it is always there, as an 
obsession. While the narrator of La Recherche expresses nostalgia for, and a wish to 
recapture, a past which comes to him through works of art, Faulkner’s protagonists are 
haunted by an ever-present past which seems almost to negate the passage of time.
Faulkner, like Proust, was familiar with the teachings of Henri Bergson (if the 
author’s comments can be trusted, which is an entirely different problem). He seems to 
have embraced more wholeheartedly the theories of Bergson than Proust. In his 1952 
interview with Loic Bouvard he affirmed that “there isn’t any time.”
In fact I agree pretty much with Bergson’s theory of the fluidity of time.
There is only the present moment, in which I include both the past & the 
future, and that is eternity. In my opinion time can be shaped quite a bit by 
the artist; after all, man is never time’s slave. (LG 70)
42 “A Propos de Le Bruit et ia Fureurr La temporality chez Faulkner," Situations I (Paris: Galiimard, 1947) 70 
-81. English translation by George McMillan Reeves, from The time of William F au lkner- bv Maurice
Edgar Coindteau. (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971) 70.
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The artist may be capable of shaping time, but in Quentin Compson, Faulkner has 
portrayed a character who is obsessed with time’s passing.
Sartre groups Faulkner and Proust with other early twentieth-century novelists like 
James Joyce, Dos Passos, Andre Gide and Virginia Woolf. All of these authors, he says, 
attempted to “mutilate” time. He points out similarities between Proust and Faulkner in 
their attempts to present characters’ perceptions of the past, perceptions which do not 
follow strict (chrono)logical order, but which are instead based upon what he terms 
“affective constellations,” a few central themes around which “innumerable silent masses 
gravitate.”
Sartre admired Faulkner for having “decapitated” time. Faulkner’s characters, he 
said, have no future, because their consciousnesses are so fixed upon the past, which is 
omnipresent. The best example of this might be Quentin Compson: his “thoughts” on 
April 1910 are given to us in the past tense, as if he were remembering from a point in time 
either at or beyond the moment of his suicide. All of Faulkner’s art, says Sartre, is aimed at 
suggesting that Quentin’s interior monologues, and his last stroll, are already his suicide. 
“Quentin pense sa dernifcre journ^e au pass ,^ comme quelqu’un qui se souvient. Mais qui 
done se souvient, puisque les derni£res pensees du heros coincident a peu pres avec 
l’eclatement de sa memoire et son an&ntissement?” (Situations I 78) “Quentin thinks his 
last day in the past tense, as someone who remembers, but who could be remembering, 
since the last thoughts of the hero coincide more or less with the disruption of his memory 
and the cessation of his existence.” The future, says Sartre, no longer exists as a possibility 
for Faulkner’s characters: “ce n’est pas une entrepreise, e’est une fatalite; en perdant son 
caract&re de possible, il cesse d’exister au futur,” “it is not an undertaking; it is a fatality; in 
losing its character of possibility, it ceases to exist in the future.”
Elyane Dezon-Jones, sees reason to believe that Faulkner was influenced by Proust.
F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Thomas Wolfe and Jack Kerouac, she says, all took 
up Proust’s central theme, transforming the quest for lost time into a quest for a lost
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national continuity, a legitimizing historical consciousness. The heroes of the Lost and the 
Beat generations are all men situated in time “faced with its unacceptable irreversibility” 
(12). The Faulknerian character’s obsession with the past ias somtething at once 
irretrievably lost and inescapable is worth reading in contrast to the Proustian hero’s search 
for lost time.
Faulkner had a copy of Proust’s novel in his library, although this does not prove 
that he read it. Nor do the statements he gave in interviews prove anything, since Faulkner 
is notorious for telling tall tales about himself. It is rather through the discernable 
similarities in their texts that such inferences can be made. Richard P. Adams sees “strong 
internal evidence” indicating that Faulkner had indeed read at least part of Remembrance 
of things Past before he wrote The Sound and the Fury, since the latter novel displays “the 
same obsessive preoccupation with time, with memory and with change” as in Proust’s. 
There is no way of definitively answering the question of Proust’s influence on Faulkner, 
but this should not stop us from reading the second through the lenses provided by the 
former.
In each of these novels a protagonist is haunted by memories, or more precisely, 
memories come back to haunt them. The involuntary nature of memory is apparent in 
Faulkner as well as Proust. Although there have been numerous volumes written about 
each, there are surprisingly few foll'length studies devoted to both of these writers whose 
style, themes and approach bear some striking similarities. They deserve study together if 
for no other reason than that they are each considered by many critics to be “the greatest” 
twentiech-century novelists of their respective national cultures.
These authors present what might be styled a “poetics of consciousness” in which 
consciousness and remembering proceed not through orderly progression but by quantum 
shifts and sedimentation—the accumulation of connections and relationships between 
elements which are themselves merely positions on a network-a web of inter and 
intratextual shifters. The shifters are not confined to pronouns or adverbs such as “here,”
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“now,” “I,” “you” etc., but proper names themselves can shift referents. The change 
represented in society by the fall or rise in stature of different figures, of different families, 
is just one example of the ways in which time segments characters, in which time separates 
the name from presence or meaning.
“Perfidious Arabesques”
What Faulkner and Proust’s novels put to the forefront is the paths of their 
protagonists thoughts. Proust’s long periodic sentences are notorious for continually 
qualifying the status of their affirmations, by multiplying the possible alternatives of 
motivation and interpretation, until the status of the action or object itself is called into 
question. The language of Faulkner’s novels can also demonstrate certain stylistic excesses. 
Maurice Edgar Coindreau remarked o f the imbricated Faulknerian sentence that “His texts 
necessitate a sustained effort; the tangled sentences, interrupted by digressions and 
parentheses, [envelop] thought in perfidious arabesques”43
Coindreau’s remarks could apply equally well to Proustian syntax, the “perfidious 
arabesques” of Faulkner’s language, referred to by Coindreau, demonstrate the complex 
movement of thought. It is finally the status of perception and the possibility of arriving at 
a meaning which is problematized by this language of digression and continual deferral.
The reader is forced to go back, and reread so as to follow each and every diverging path. 
Proust makes every effort to provide the reader with a way out, no matter how circuitous a 
path he must take. For all their length and complexity, Proust’s sentences are almost always 
grammatically correct, though it is true that occasionally a sentence fails to reach its logical 
conclusion. In spite of the author’s occasional mistakes (such as the reappearance of 
characters who are supposed to have already died), Proust’s narrator is forever attempting to 
sort out the multiple threads of possibilities, the many layers of motivation and chance 
which he believes explain the actions o f others.
43 From Coindteau's “Note” to his French translation of Faulkner's short story ‘Afternoon of a Cow,” 
attributed to the pseudonymous ‘Ernest V. Trueblood” (‘L’Aprts-Midi d’une Vache, par Ernest V. 
Trueblood"). Translated by Grim wood (5).
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Perhaps the most striking examples of the way in cwhich Faulkner “mutilates” time 
in his narratives occur in The Sound and the Furv in which he makes ample use of the 
prolepse and analepse. The novel attempts to portray distinct personalities through the 
wavs in which they use language to segment and splice together perception. The “stream of 
consciousness” narrative style is characterized by abrupt unsignalled changes in the time 
and setting of the images and events it depicts. It is in the failure of such texts to clearly 
signal such movement that they are seen as representative o f conscious processes. Unlke in a 
storytelling situation, explanations and contexts do not need to be furnished, since such a 
technique is not aimed uniquely at telling a story, but at representing thought.
The novel is divided into four chapters, which are usually identified with the 
characters whose “points of view” they seem to represent, although Faulkner gave them, 
not tides, but dates: “April Seventh, 1928,” “June Second 1910,” “April Sixth 1928,” and 
“April Eighth 1928.” Each section would thus constitute a discrete span of time from the 
others. They are usually read as being four different “points of view,” four different versions 
of a story, as seen or experienced by four separate individuals.44 The first three chapters are 
distinct from the fourth, as they employ first person narrators to portray the intimate 
thoughts, the consciousness, of three different characters: the 33 year old “idiot,” Benjy, 
and his brothers, Quentin, and Jason. The fourth chapter is presented in an omniscient 
mode, although it is focused on their African American servant Dilsey, following her 
activities on the date in question. While the other three attempt to represent the thoughts, 
and thought patterns, of the three Compson brothers: Benjy, Quentin, and Jason, chapter 
four tells us Dilsey’s thoughts, rather than attempting to represent them. It is only the third 
and fourth chapters, Jason’s interior monologue and the omniscient last section, which 
remain squarely focused on the time frame set by their tides. Benjy’s attention frequendy
44 Point of view is another slippery concept, which, like the concepts o f voice, or style, posits a controlling 
subject, the eyc/I which sees and relates the story. The reliance on a first person narrator, represented by the 
pronoun “I” means that the concept o f point o f view is bound up with the concept of time, since the 
pronoun, as a “shifter” can only be defined through its context, its location in space and time. Faulkner's 
narrators are all strictly linked to specific places and times, but the past invades the present to such an extent 
thar ir is omnipresent, inescapable and quite often difficult to distinguish from the present.
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shifts from his consciousness of the present moment to his memories of ocher, similar 
moments. Quentin’s thoughts are likewise prone to such fluxes of perception and memory.
Very few of Faulkner’s characters live entirely in the present, and very few plan for 
the future (except perhaps Jason Compson), as they are continually immersed in images of 
the past. Benjy’s narrative is an example of an unchecked involuntary memory. He does 
not clearly distinguish between the present and the past, his memory and his existence in 
the present. The reader must make more of an effort to distinguish the temporal strata 
represented in Benjy’s narrative. Luster’s mention of Benjy’s age (“aint you something, 
thirty-three years old, going on that way” and the mention of his birthday cake, that allows 
the reader to isolate the “present,” identified by the tide of his section (“April Seventh, 
1928), from the memories.
Benjy Compson’s Involuntary Memory 
The most striking thing about Benjy and Quentin Compson’s sections of The 
Sound and the Fury is the discontinuity of their narratives. Benjy’s thoughts on April 
seventh, 1928 do not follow a logical order, from beginning to end, but jump from one 
moment to the other, from one image to another. The story of is not a chronology, but a 
juxtaposition of images, images which are sometimes motivated by an obvious similarity or 
association of perceptions, as when Benjy is crawling through the “broken place” at the 
limit of the Compson property, and snags himself. This past event is perhaps called to 
Benjy’s consciousness by the similarity of his sensation in the present to the memory of that 
sensation in the past. This is the definition of Proust’s involuntary memory. Benjy’s section 
of The Sound and the Furv is a good example of this kind of memory.45
Benjy’s point of view is characterized by chronological incoherence. His thoughts 
jump without warning from present percepdons to memories, and it is often difficult to 
distinguish between them. The tide of the section, “April Seventh 1928” indicates a
45 Dezon-Jones has called Benjy ‘une mo ire involontaire a (Ytac pur,” “an involuntary memory in its
purest form" (103).
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temporal reference which is not the starting point o f any particular story, but a day in the 
life of Benjy Compson. Its only immediate significance seems to be that it is the day of his 
thirty-third birthday. The chapter gives us his thoughts and perceptions during part of that 
day, and these thoughts include observations of things he sees and does as well as things he 
has seen and done. Frequendy, and without any warning or clear indication, his view turns 
from the present to the past, so that it is not always clear to the casual reader when these 
transitions take place.
Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them 
hitting. They were coming toward where the flag was and I went along the 
fence. Luster was hunting in the grass by the flower tree.
The first sentence presents the reader with incomplete information. An “I” is describing an
event to which he or she was witness, presumably on the date specified by the tide of the
chapter, although it could very well be that it is instead another date on which the I” is
telling this story, or both. A number of quesuons arise almost instantly; “Who is this T?”
Who are “they?” What are they hitting, where and why? In the traditional, or “Balzacian”
novel, the reader would expect an explanation, but these questions remained unanswered.
The reader of this first secdon is thus immediately disconcerted by their inability to make
sense of what is happening, and must immediately begin actively searching for clues as to
what is gong on. It is only after the next two sentences that the reader can divine that a
game of golf is being described. It is baffling in that the speaker’s interest is not, as might be
expected, the game or the golfers themselves, but their movements, for the acuons of the
golfers are described as events in and of themselves, rather than elements of a logical
process:
They took the flag out, and they were hitting. Then they put the flag back 
and they went to the table, and he hit and the other hit. Then they went 
on, and I went along the fence. Luster came away from the flower tree and 
we went along the fence and they stopped and we stopped and I looked 
through the fence while Luster was hunting in the grass.
“Here, caddie.” He hit. They went across the pasture. I held to the 
fence and watched them going away.
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“Listen at you, now.” Luster said. “Aim you something, thirty-three years 
old, going on that way. After I done went all the way to town to buy you 
that cake. Hush up that moaning. Aint you going to help me find that 
quarter so I can go to the show tonight.”
They were hitting little, across the pasture. I went back along the fence to 
where the flag was. It flapped on the bright grass and the trees.
“Come on.” Luster said. “We done looked there. They aint no more 
coming right now. Lets go down to the branch and find that quarter before 
them niggers finds it.”
It was red, flapping on the pasture. Then there was a bird slanting and 
tilting on it. Luster threw. The flag flapped on the bright grass and the trees.
I held to the fence.
“Shut up that moaning,” Luster said. “I cant make them come if they aint 
coming, can I. If you dont hush up, mammy aint going to have no birthday 
for you. If you dont hush, you know what I going to do. I going to eat that 
cake all up. Eat them candles, too. Eat all them thirty-three candles. Come 
on, let’s go down to the branch. I got to find my quarter. Maybe we can 
find one of they balls. Here. Here they is. Way over yonder. See.” He came 
to the fence and pointed his arm. “see them. They aint coming back here no 
more. Come on.”
We went along the fence and came to the garden fence, where our shadows 
were. My shadow was higher than Luster’s on the fence. We came to the 
broken place and went through it.
“Wait a minute.” Luster said. “You snagged on that nail again. Cant you 
never crawl through here without snagging on that nail.”
Caddy caught me and we crawled through. Uncle M aury said to not let 
anybody see us, se we better stoop over, Caddy said. Stoop over, Benjy. Like this, 
see. We stooped over and crossed the garden, where the flowers rasped and rattled 
against us. The ground was hard, we climbed the fence, where the pigs were 
gunting  and snuffing. I  expect they’re sorry because one ofthem got killed today,
Caddy said. The ground was hard, churned and knotted.
Keep your hands in your pockets, Caddy said. Or they’ll get froze. You don’t 
want your hands froze on Christmas, do you.
“It’s too cold out there.” Versh said. “You dont want to go out doors.” (2 -3)
The speaker displays a unique and limited vocabulary, since “Flower spaces” or “flower 
tree” are not conventional English terms. Their meaning is nevertheless comprehensible. 
The phrasing is simple and laconic “they stopped and we stopped.” The first proper name 
introduced is that of “Luster,” but the reader has no idea who this is or what his 
relationship is to the narrator. Benjy’s section lacks any explanatory passages. The reader is 
forced to make inferences and to supply the missing explanations. The first two sections of 
The Sound and the Furv thus fell into the category of what Roland Barthes calls “writerly” 
texts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
In spite of Benjy’s inability to dearly express himself, he is able to report verbatim 
the speech of others, which is dearly ddimited by quotation marks, and attributed to the 
speaker. He has no conception of golf as a game. All he sees is the activity at its most 
primitive level. His vocabulary does demonstrate an attempt at classifying and 
characterizing his perceptions according to a vocabulary which is particular to him : 
“hitting little” is his understanding of putting. Here again, the limited vocabulary'compels 
the reader to interpret or to dedpher a kind of code.
This may explain why the first two sections of the novel are often dted as being 
difficult to understand. Benjy is a thirty-three year old with the mind of a three year old. 
His narrative is characterized by a limited vocabulary, or an invented one, and an inability 
to distinguish between present and past sensations. The structure of his section mimics the 
overall structure of the novel. His thoughts switch unexpectedly between perception and 
memory, between present and past, to such an extent that it becomes very difficult for a 
reader to distinguish the “present” of the narration:
We went along the fence and came to the garden fence, where our shadows 
were My shadow was higher than Luster’s on the fence. We came to the 
broken place and went through it.
“Wait a minute.” Luster said. “You snagged on that nail again. Cant you 
never crawl through here without snagging on that nail.”
Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through. Uncle Maury said to not let 
anybody see us, so we better stoop over, Caddy said Stoop over, Benjy. Like this, 
see. We stooped over and crossed the garden where the flowers rasped and rattled 
against us. The ground was hard We climbed the fence, where the pigs were 
grunting and snuffing. (2 - 3)
This initial analepse is marked by italics, but such is not always the case in this novel.
Faulkner’s use of italics in this respect is far from systematic. The purpose of italics (as he
later explained it in response to a question asked by one of his students at the University of
Virginia), was only to alert the reader that such shifts are characteristic of Benjy’s thought:
“I had to use some method to indicate to the reader that this idiot had no sense of time.
That what happened to him ten years ago was just yesterday. The way I wanted to do it
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was to use different colored inks, but that would have cost so much, the publisher couldn’t 
undertake it.”*’
The temporal shift, when it is not marked by italics, is indicated only by the
unexplained change in setting and characters. Rather than Benjy following Luster along the
edge of the pasture in the summer, it is his sister Caddie who accompanies him across
frozen ground. Then the italics end, and in the next paragraph the setting has again
abruptly switched to the inside of a house, and someone named Versh speaks. While
Faulkner initially uses italics to alert the reader to such shifts, the change in setting,
mentions of colder weather and Christmas, or a sudden change in the names of his
guardians are sometimes the only signals of such a shift. The presence or absence of italics
remains inexplicable. They are ultimately the inexpressible remainder of Benjy’s difference,
his position outside of expression, of the linguistic economy.
The sight o f the candles on his birthday cake evokes another memory of fire:
“You cant blow out no candles” Luster said. “Watch me blow them out.”
He leaned down and puffed his face. The candles went away. I began to 
cry. “Hush.” Luster said. “Here. Look at the fire while I cuts this cake.”
I  could hear the clock, and I  could hear Caddy standing behind me, and I  could 
hear the roof. It's still raining Caddy said. I  hate rain. I  hate everything. And 
then her head came into my lap and she was crying, holding me, and /  began to 
cry. Then I  looked at the fire again and the bright, smooth shapes went again. I  
could hear the clock and the roof and Caddy.
I ate some cake. Luster’s hand came and took another piece. 1 could 
hear him eating. I looked at the fire.
Benjy’s thoughts lack any expressions of intentionality or emotions. His is a voice 
which simply observes and reports what it sees, as if it were disconnected from its own 
body, an impartial witness to its own actions. He is content merely to sit and watch the fire 
in the stove, until Luster closes the oven door:
A long piece of wire came across my shoulder. It went to the door, and then 
the fire went away. I began to cry.
“What you howling for now.” Luster said. “Look there.” The fire 
was there. I hushed. (69)
46 Faulkner in the University: Class Conferences at the Univeristv o f Virginia 1957 - 1958. eds. Joseph 
Blocncr and Frederick L. Gwynn (Charlottesville: University ofViiginia Press, 1959) 4. All Further references 
to chis text will be noted parenthetically with the abbreviation FIU.
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From Benjy’s point of view, things happen with no apparent warning or explanation: 
“Luster’s hand came and took another piece;” Things “go away” and “come back” 
inexplicably: “A long piece of wire came;” “the fire went away;” “I began to cry;” “I 
hushed” The speech and actions of the self are presented in the same tone of impartial 
observation. The “I” is not a willing, intentional participant in his environment, but an 
impartial observer. When he burns himself, Benjy repons without affect even the sound of 
his own wailing as if it were a detached object.
I put my hand to where the fire had been.
“Catch him.” Dilsey said. “Catch him back.”
My hand jerked back and I put it into my mouth and Dilsey caught 
me. I could still hear the clock between my voice. Dilsey reached back and 
hit Luster on the head. My voice was going loud every time.”
“Get that soda.” Dilsey said. She took my hand out of my mouth.
My voice went louder then and my hand tried to go back to my mouth, but 
Dilsey held it. Mv voice went loud. She sprinkled soda on my hand. (71 - 
72)
Affect can be inferred only from the images and memories which recur. Benjy begins to cry 
when he hears the golfer calling for his caddie. In the opening pages, his crying after 
hearing the word “caddie” can only be understood when we discover that the name of his 
sister is Candace, or “Caddy.” His feelings toward his sister are in no way distinguished 
from his feelings toward fire, which he likes to watch, and the disappearance of which 
causes his emotional outburst. In Benjy’s case, rather than emotion it would almost be 
suitable to speak of psyiological reaction.
Benjy’s response is the same when he recalls the sight of his mutilated genitalia in a 
mirror (after Jason has had him castrated):  ^I  got undressed and I  looked at myself, and I  
began to cry. Hush, Luster said. Looking for them aint going to do no good. They’re gone. You 
keep on like this, and we aint going have you no more birthday. He put my gown on. I  hushed” 
[. . .] (90). Benjy “remembers” his actions and the actions and words of others only in their 
most obvious outward appearance, but he is incapable of understanding the reasons for any 
of them, even those that are related to his affection for his sister, Caddy. Motivations are
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never mentioned, even in speculation, moreover, there is nothing to indicate that he is able 
to distinguish what is a memory from what is the present, ongoing, moment, and this is, 
then, the difficulty which the reader, too, will have. There is effectively no privileged frame 
of reference for making such distinctions
One of the motifs which distinguishes Benjy’s patterns of thought are the images 
which recur. It is his fixation upon certain details-shapes, colors and odors-which mark his 
difference, his particularity. He is particularly sensitive to odors. In the opening pages, he is 
not concerned with the game the men are plating, but by the movement. His attention is 
attracted by the flag flapping on the green, and the bird flying across his field o f vision, and 
he watches the actions the men accomplish: hit ball, sit at table, walk further. He is equally 
sensitive to the words of those closest to him, and notes them each in turn, demonstrating 
that our own deepest memories involve the language, the visions, of others.
The movement of Benjy around the remains of the Compson property, and the 
wandering of his thoughts from present to past, are mirrored in Quentin’s section of the 
same novel, where we follow him as he wanders around the Harvard campus and the 
surrounding countryside. His thoughts are also marked, although to a somewhat lesser 
extent, by this uncontrolled movement between various past moments and the present.
Quentin Compson: Temporal Consciousness 
The Sound and the Fury. As I lavdvinp. are Absalom. Ahsalnm? are considered by 
many to be the finest examples of Faulkner’s use of the stream of consciousness technique. 
These are the novels which problematize, more than any of his others, the stability of 
consciousness in their main narrating voices. Quentin Compson’s voice, in his section of 
The Sound and the Fury, might well be characterized as schizophrenic: It is full of the 
voices of others: his father, but also his mother, Caddy, Dalton Ames, Bland, and Shreve. 
Likewise, in Absalom, Absalom!, he is repeating tales that he has internalized, that he has 
heard from his father and Miss Rosa, who were also repeating second-hand information.
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The second section of The Sound and the Forv begins with an unidentified 
narrative voice which immediately establishes a precise temporal setting: “When the 
shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven and eight oclock and 
then I was in time again.” The mimetic voice establishes its focus upon the present 
moment, the now, by its concern with establishing a precise point of departure. The “now” 
here is established simultaneously as an already has been, since the verb is in the past tense: 
“it was [already] between seven and eight oclock.” It is the morning, yet symbolically it is 
not on sunlight but on the shadow that he focuses. Here, unlike in Proust, where much of 
the text is spent slowly suggesting the fuzzy continuum which connects sleep and waking, 
Quentin Compson snaps into time from the absolute other of consciousness, from the 
silence of “nodanguage” (a term Quentin uses in Absalom. Ahsalnm h, Sleep is a death for 
Quentin, and one which he spends much of his waking time dreaming about.
From the start he is fixated on the passing of time, and the beginning of his section 
of The Sound and the Furv is explicidy formulated in terms of an entry into time, as if 
time were a container, or a space from which one could escape. Quentin’s entry into time is 
also an entry into language, as it is the moment when his narrative begins.
When the shadow of the sash appeared on the curtains it was between seven 
and eight oclock and then I was in time again, hearing the watch. It was 
Grandfather’s and when Father gave it to me he said, Quentin, I give you 
the mausoleum of all hope and desire; it’s rather excruciating-ly apt that you 
will use it to gain the reducto absurdum of all human experience which can 
fit your individual needs no better than it fitted his or his father’s. I give it 
to you not that you may remember time, but that you might forget it now 
and then for a moment and not spend all your breath trying to conquer it.
Because no battle is ever won he said. They are not even fought. The field 
only reveals to man his own folly and despair, and victory is an illusion of 
philosophers and fools. (93)
His father’s voice is one of the most significant echoes in Quentin Compson’s thoughts on
June Second 1910. The gift of the grandfather’s timepiece is equivalent to a condemnation.
Mr. Compson’s advice to Quentin is, as John T. Irwin puts it, “hardly the kind of
exhortation to dare and accomplish great things that one would expect a father to give his
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son on graduation day.”47 Instead, his father’s words are a constant reminder that “no batde 
is ever won.”
If Faulkner believes that the artist can shape time, Mr. Compson’s words to 
Quentin are quite the opposite, and might explain why Quentin has no thoughts of being 
an artist. Quentin frequently recalls the cynical, defeatist attitude of his father: “bad health 
is the primary reason for all life. Created by disease, within putrefaction, into decay” (SF 52 
- 3) It is the repetition of these memories, of the father’s pronouncements, which betray 
their profound effect on Quentin, and explain his morbid obsession with the passing of 
time: “It’s always the idle habits you acquire which you will regret, Father said that: That 
Christ was not crucified: he was worn away by a minute clicking of little wheels” (94).
Mr. Jason Richmond Compson III, Quentin’s father, is described in the appendix 
to The Sound and the Furv as “bred for a lawyer,” [. . .] “a sort of privileged pseudo-Daniel 
Boone-Robinson Crusoe, who had not returned to juvenility because actually he had never 
left it,” who “sat all day long with a decanter of whiskey and a litter of dogeared Horaces 
and Livys and Catulluses, composing (it was said) caustic and satiric eulogies on both his 
dead and his living fellowtownsmen” (409 - 10). Mr. Compson is a figure of the artist as 
cynic, producing insignificant verse that no one will read. Miss Rosa Coldfield is another 
figure for the artist, producing an antiquated form that no one will read, as she is said to 
have written “over a thousand odes” to the defeated confederate soldier.
Quentin demonstrates his desire to escape time, to stop its flow, in his highly 
symbolic gesture of tearing the hands off of the watch his father gave him. His thoughts 
will reveal the reason for this wish: He is acutely aware of a sense of loss, and with the 
impossibile desire to restore or preserve something that is already gone. He is obsessed with
4 Irwin views Quentin’s relationship with his father in The Sound and the Furv as a form of role reversal . Ft
is Mr Compson’s failure as a hither, according to Irwin, embodied in his philosophy that “nothing is even
worth the changing of it," which obliges Quentin to assume the role o f the father in relation to his own
father, exhorting him to avenge his daughter’s honor: "As Mr. Compson’s hither was a failed general, so Mr
Compson is a failed lawyer-an alcoholic nihilist who revenges himself on his hither for that psychological
castration that has left him with the feeling that nothing can be done, by passing on to his son that same sense
of inescapable failure, defeat and impotence.’’ Doubling and Incest/Repetition and Revenge: A Speculative
Reading of Faulkner. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) 67-68.
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the idea of avenging his sister’s honor, and is haunted by the loss of the Compson estate for 
which he feels responsible, since his parents have sold the pasture so that he could spend a 
year at Harvard. For Quentin, as for Benjy and Marcel, the experience of time is above all 
the experience of loss.
In spite of his father’s words, or perhaps because of them, Quentin is obsessed with 
timepieces. As much as he seeks to forget about the passing of time, he remains keenly 
aware of it. He constandy notes the length of his shadow, the slanting light, and the 
chiming of the campus clocks. He passes a clock shop and stops in to inquire if any of the 
models on display has the correct time, and he is alert to the chiming of the campanile on 
the Harvard campus. He is even attentive to the attention that other people pay to their 
timepieces:
Shreve stood in the door, putting his collar on, his glasses glinting rosily, as 
though he had washed them with his face. “You taking a cut this 
morning?”
“Is it that late?”
He looked at his watch. “Bell in two minutes.” (95)
Quentin’s section of the novel is, as a whole, more coherent than Benjy’s, in that 
the “present” of the action is clearly established. This is due pardy to the fact that the 
action that takes place occurs in and around Cambridge, Massachusetts. Scenes consisung 
principally of dialogue, involving the members of the Harvard community, his roommate 
Shreve or the Kentuckian Gerald Bland, are more easily distinguished from the analepses 
involving Benjy, Caddy and Mr. Compson. When memories occur, though, they are less 
easily distinguished from one another, it is in these passages that Quentin’s section most 
closely resembles that of Benjy. A particularly illustrative moment of this occurs in his fight 
with fellow student Gerald Bland in Cambridge (183 - 203).
In an episode which transposes the trianguaiar relationship between Quendn,
Caddy and her lover, he befriends a litde girl whom he addresses as “sister.” The girl’s 
brother accuses Quentin o f kidnapping her. He is picked up from the sheriffs station by 
Mrs. Bland, with Gerald, Spoade and Shreve. As they ride in Mrs. Bland’s car, she begins
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talking about Gerald’s grandfather, and Quentin’s thoughts switch from the present 
moment to memories of the past
The narrative switches abrupdy from a mode in which dialogue is clearly marked, 
to a stream of consciousness technique, signaled by italics
“Did you ever drink perfume?” Spoade said, with one hand he could 
lifi her to his shoulder and run with her running Running.
“No Shreve said, running the beast with two backs and she blurred in 
the winking oars running the Swine ofEuboeleus running coupled within how 
many Caddy.
“Neither did I,” Spoade said. I  dont know too many (184)
As in the first section of the novel, the italics here are one signal that a flashback is 
occurring. The memory of earlier conversations are intermixed with images of Caddy and 
her lover, associated with the smell of honeysuckle. It is ultimately impossible to determine 
whether these are images that Quentin saw, or whether they are creations o f his overactive 
imagination, provoked by his conversation with Caddy about her lovers.
Caddy did you love them When they touched me I  died
one minute she was standing there the next he was yelling and pulling at
her dress they went into the hall and up the stairs (186)
Different moments are juxtaposed within the same line of text. Sentences are begun and
then interrupted by others, only to be resumed later in mid-phrase. This technique is
suggestive of a simultaneity of thought. Quentin seems to be remembering several events
and conversations simultaneously. Another significant characteristic of the stream of
consciousness technique, is the difficulty of determining the proper referent for pronouns.
In the above passage, it requires an effort on the part of the reader to determine to whom
the pronoun “he” refers. It is only through the reader’s familiarity with the behaviour of
Benjy Compson that this can be determined.
The encounter with Caddy’s lover is presented in a text marked by a lack of
punctuation and capitalization that might distinguish phrases and sentences from one
another. The reader is forced to rely entirely on the logical coherence of subject and verb:
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we reached the fence she crawled through I crawled through when I 
rose from stooping he was coming out of the trees into the grey toward us 
coming toward us tall and flat and still even moving like he was still she 
went to him
this is Quentin Im wet 1m wet all over you dont have to if you dont 
want to
their shadows one shadow her head rose it was above his on the sky 
higher their two heads
you dont have to if you dont want to
then not two heads the darkness smelled of rain of damp grass and 
leaves the grey light drizzling like rain the honeysuckle coming up in damp 
waves I could see her face a blur against his shoulder he held her in one arm 
like she was no bigger than a child he extended his hand 
glad to know you (SF 192)
In this passage, dialog is not clearly attributed to specific speakers. While it is apparently
Caddie who introduces Quentin to Dalton Ames, it is unclear who says “Im wet Im wet all
over.” This passage closely resembles the language of Benjy in its laconic syntax and in the
imagery of the two children moving about the Compson land, (“we reached the fence she
crawled through I crawled through”).
It is unclear what “you” dont have to do “if you dont want to.” The lack of 
punctuation or attribution of quotations are further characteristics of the stream of 
consciousness technique which make it difficult to attribute enunciations to characters. The 
inferiority of thought eliminates the need for such indications, and distinguishes it from 
narrative based on the communicative model of oral or written storytelling. This lack of 
punctuation continues for ten pages in which Quentin’s thoughts echo bits and pieces of 
conversations with Caddy about her pregnancy, and her lover, as well as Quentin’s meeting 
with, and his threats and his clumsy attempt to punch Dalton Ames. The text then returns 
to the “present” time frame, resuming on the afternoon of June 2, 1910. Quentin’s nose is 
bleeding, and Shreve asks him why he tried to hit Bland. This fight with Bland is a scene 
which is is presented only through Quentin’s subsequent re-living of it. Spoade has to tells 
Quentin what he has apparendy just lived though but of which he apparendy has no 
memory.
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“The first I knew was when you jumped up all of a sudden and said, ‘Did 
you ever have a sister? did you? and when he said No, you hit him. I 
noticed you kept on looking at him, but you didn’t seem to be paying 
any attention to what anybody was saying until you jumped up and asked 
him if he had any sisters.” (206)
That the flashbacks to conversations and images of Caddy are what as he attacked Bland,
Quentin seems to have been re-living an earlier encounters with Dalton Ames in Jefferson.
The question echoes the one he remembered asking Caddy’s lover after confronting him
and insisting that he leave town.
did you ever have a sister did you 
no but theyre all bitches
I hit him my open hand beat the impulse to shut it to his face his 
hand moved as fast as mine the cigarette went over the rail I swung with 
the other hand he caught it too before the cigarette reached the water he 
held both my wrists in the same hand his ocher hand flicked to his armpit 
under his coat behind him the sun slanted and a bird singing somewhere 
beyond the sun we looked at one another while the bird singing he turned 
my hands loose
look here (199)
The two identical questions also lead the reader to assume that Quentin was thinking about 
his confrontation with Caddy’s lover during his assault of Gerald Bland.
Though more clearly framed in the present thatn Beny’s narrative, the above 
example illustrates how Quentin does not live entirely in the present. In his fight with 
Gerald Bland, he re-lives a fight with Dalton Ames. Even in his fight with Ames, he is 
strangely attuned, not to what he is doing, but to the singing bird and the slanting sun.
Involuntary Memory and the Olfactory 
While there seems to be no overt involuntary memory mechanisms at work the way 
the sensation of a piece of cake dipped in tea, or the narrators’ stumbling on uneven paving 
stones brings to consciousness Marcel’s forgotten memories, Faulkner’s novels do seem to 
evoke an “involuntary” memory akin to Proust’s. In The Sound and the Furv. for example, 
Quentin and Benjy’s perceptions and memories of their sister Caddy are infused with the 
sensation of certain odors. Just as he is attentive to color and movement, Benjy is 
particularly sensitive to odors. He can “smell” Caddy’s sickness (75). Caddy and Quentin
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smell “like rain.” (80), and Caddy smells “like trees” (88). Benjy is upset when Caddy’s 
usual odor is altered by the perfume she was given by Dalton Ames.
Quentin’s memories of Caddy are likewise associated with the odor of 
honeysuckle,*® and in Absalom. Absalom! he is attentive to the smell of Mr. Compson’s 
cigar along with that of honeysuckle and the summer wisteria, which comes to be 
associated with the events narrated by his father and Miss Rosa. Miss Rosa expounds a 
theory of memory which bears a striking resemblance to Proust’s involuntary memory in its 
valuation of sense perception, particularly the olfactory as she too recalls her own “summer 
of wisteria.”
Once there was—Do you mark how the wistaria, sun-impacted on this wall here, 
distills and penetrates this room as though (light-unimpeded) by secret and 
attritive progress from mote to mote o f obscurity’s myriad componentsI That is 
the substance o f remembering-sense, sight, smelt the muscles with which we see 
and hear and feel—not mind, not thought: there is no such thing as memory: the 
brain recalls just what the muscles grope for: no more, no less: and its resultant 
sum is usually incorrect and false and worthy only ofthe name ofdream [. . .]
(AA 178)
Here as in Proust, sense perception is the catalyst of memory and has a very powerful 
influence on the nature of the memory evoked. The purely contingent presence of the odor 
during the initial experience, comes to stand for the memory in an essenital way, as 
metaphor.
Quentin’s thoughts are also heavily affected by his father’s words, and by odors, or 
by the memories of certain odors; but in contrast to Benjy, he is emotionally affected by 
those odors and those memories. Unlike Benjy, Quentin is able to reflect on his own non­
existence in the moment of involuntary recall, “where all tstable things become shadowy 
paradoxical:”
Benjy’s memories are completely involuntary, thus mechanical. He is not able to 
relate one moment to the other or to reflect on the existential status of the past. He has no
**(SF 160, 185, 186. 190, 191. 192, 193. 195. 210. 211)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
use for the past tense. His memories do not belong to him, when the past becomes present 
it copmpietely obliterates ail sense he might have of the present.
When it bloomed in the spring and it rained the smell was everywhere you 
didnt notice it so much at other times but when it rained the smell began 
to come into the house at twilight either it would rain more at twilight or 
there was something in the light itself but it always smelled strongest then 
until I would lie in bed thinking when will it stop when will it stop [. . .] 
Sometimes I could not put myself to sleep saying that over and over until 
after the honeysuckle got all mixed up in it the whole thing came to 
symbolize night and unrest I seemed to be lying neither asleep nor awake 
looking down a long corridor of grey halflight where all stable things had 
become shadowy paradoxical all I had done shadows all I had felt suffered 
taking visible form antic and perverse mocking without relevance inherent 
themselves with the denial of the significance they should have affirmed 
thinking I was I was not who was not who was not was not who. (SF 210- 
211)
Quentin postulates his existence here as a chiasmus of negation, in what might be called a 
“Proustian” moment, he expresses this lack of being in the nether-world of consciousness 
“neither asleep nor awake.” Since he is unable to fulfill the role he thinks he should have 
assumed as male heir to the Compson domain his actions are “without relevance,” and 
come back to “mock” him.
Just as he blames himself for his inability to defend the honor of his family by 
protecting the virginity of his sister, Quentin cannot come to terms with the violation of 
the land represented by the loss of the pasture. The Compson domain has been altered by 
the country club which has erected a fence and made the pasture into a golf course (where, 
in Benjy’s words, men “hit”). The “virgin” swampland which Thomas Sutpen is said to 
have “outraged” in Absalom. Absalom! is another figure for the loss of the values of the Old 
South in the impurity and senselessness of modern life.
Quentin’s narrative is cerebral and comtemplative, the episodes which he 
remembers all somehow involve his indecision and inability to act, to assume the role he 
envisions for himself of his sister’s protector, the role of the father. The character of 
Quentin Compson is Faulkner’s version of T.S. Eliot’s Prufrock, confronted with a state of 
affairs in which the code of honor which he wants to follow is no longer respected. At the
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end of Absalom. Absalom? he tells Shreve “I am older at twenty than a lot of people who 
have died” (AA469).
Existentialist Faulkner 
Lewis P. Simpson has argued that Faulkner’s work, like much of Southern literature 
from about 1920 to 1950, tends to suggest that “the process of the destruction of memory 
and history [.. .] cannot be halted” and that the “inauguration of any attempt to establish a 
new literary covenant with the past is futile and that the only meaningful covenant for the 
latter-day writer is one with the self on terms generally defined as existential.” The stream 
of consciousness technique, while seemingly revealing the “inner” thoughts of a character, 
explains nothing. The significance of images and words reflected in Quentin’s thoughts 
appears only in their repetition and juxtaposition, in the relationships which become 
decipherable in the phenomenon of consciousness.
Quentin’s section is marked by the repetitive or obsessive memories of the odor of 
honeysuckle, or the name of Caddy’s boyfriend, Dalton Ames, as he obsessively recalls his 
failure to defend her honor in his fight with the man he suspects to be the father of her 
child. The alternation of stream of consciousness techniques with more straightforward 
narrative and dialogue is similar to the technique used in Absalom. Ahsaloml As in 
Quentin’s section of The Sound and the Furv. there is a frame narrative in which consists 
of the events of the summer of 1909, in which Quentin listens to Miss Rosa and then Mr. 
Compson telling what they know of the Sutpen legend, and as in the former novel, 
passages in which speakers are clearly indicated by quotation marks and enunciations are 
specifically attributed to particular characters, alternate with long portions of text in which 
it is not entirely clear who is speaking.
Time and Memory in Absalom. Absalom!
It is a the desire for coherence and consistency which rivets Yoknapatawpha’s (and 
the reader’s) attention on the story of Thomas Sutpen and his children. As in Proust, the 
way the book is set up, nothing (or relatively litde) in fact “happens.” What happens is the
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act of narration itself, as it is taken up by first one, and then another character. The events 
are related have already happened. It is a question of constructing a stable, coherent, logical 
narrative out of disparate fragments which do not all make sense to the storytellers. There 
are a certain number of events which are well-known to them, and in later volumes 
Faulkner even provided a chronology to help the reader, but no one narrator is capable of 
telling it all. The text is continually coming and going between different moments in the 
Sutpen story as each of the narrators tries to make sense of them.
Absalom. Absalom? does not present itself as an autobiographical novel in the same 
way the Proust’s does. It does not make extensive use of first person narration, but the 
characters themselves engage in acts of narration. While the novel is chiefly concerned with 
Thomas Sutpen and his activities in Yoknapatawpha county, it is in many ways the story of 
a story, the story of its telling; In some brief passages, Faulkner shows us the thoughts of 
Quentin, as in the second chapter of The Sound and the Furv. but for the characters of 
Miss Rosa Coldfield, Mr. Compson, or Shreve, it is not so much their immediate 
perceptions which are portrayed, but the way the narrators speak the stories they tell, their 
emphasis or vocabulary, thus their use of language, which give clues as to the nature of 
their thought processes. What is portrayed are their different uses of language and signs.
Jean-Paul Sartre claims that “a novelistic technique always reveals the novelists’s 
metaphysics. The critic’s task is to grasp the latter before he can appreciate the latter.rvW The 
style o f Faulkner novels suggest personal identity through the idiosyncratic ways that 
thought perceives and organizes the world. The only way to gain access to this perception 
and organization is through language. This is the lesson that Faulkner seems to have 
gleaned from his own readings of Continental authors, including Proust.
The narrator of the Recherche is extremely attentive to the ways in which others 
use language. He takes pleasure in mocking Francoise s mispronunciations when, indignant
49 “one technique romanesque rcnvoie toujours a la mdtsphysique du romander. La tiche du critique est de 
d^gagercelle-ci avant d ’apprtdercelle-ia" (Situations 1.71).
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over the narrator’s feigned mocking attitude toward the death of his aunt: «Je ne sais pas 
m’esprimer», je triomphais de cet aveu avec un bon sens ironique et brutal digne du 
docteur Percepied, e si elle ajoutait: «Elle dtait tout de meme de la parent&se, il reste 
toujours le respect qu’on doit a la parent£se», je haussais les ^paules et je me disais: «Je suis 
bien bon de discuter avec une illetree qui fait des cuirs pareils” (S 152). “I dont know how 
to express myself,” I would gloat over her admission with an ironical and brutal comon sense 
worthy of Dr. Percepied; and if she went on: “all the same she was kith and kindle; there’s 
always the respect due to kindle,” I would shug my shoulders and say to myself “It’s really 
very good of me to discuss the matter with an illiterate old woman who makes such 
howlers” (I: 168).
Genette, in considering the use of language by various characters in Proust’s novel, 
notes that “just about all of them present at least sometimes erratic linguistic traits, faulty, 
dialectical or socially marked expressions, acquisitions or characteristic borrowings, misuses, 
mispronounciations or revealing ellipses. [.. .] none of them escapes, save perhaps for the 
hero himself, who speaks very little as such, and whose role is rather one of observation, 
apprenticeship and decipherment.”* Genette concludes that this stylistic autonomy does 
not finally constitute substantial, determined characters in the way previous realist authors 
did. Far from compensating the transitory psychology of their character, their language 
often accuetnuates and aggravates it.51 All of Proust’s characters are, like Aibertine, «etres 
de fuite» (202-03).Dezon-Jones concurs with Genette in her assessment that “with Proust 
the very notion o f the creation of novelistic characters with stable, fixed identities has 
disappeared in favor of the description of variable, impressionable consciences,” “avec
50 “i  peu prts tous pi&entent au mo ins a quelque moment quelque trait an tique de langage, tournuie 
fautive ou dialectale. ou sodalement maiqude, acquisition ou emprunt canctdriscque. gaffe, bourde ou lapsus 
revdateur, etc [ .. .]  aucun d eux n'echappe, si ce n’est peut-ctre le hdros lui-m£me, qui d’ailleurs parie fort 
>^eu comme tel et dont le rdle est plut6t d’observation, d’apprentissage et de d&hiftiement.” (201).
“1’autonomie stylistique [n'aboutit] pas chez Proust a la constitution de penotnuga substantids et 
determines au sens tdaliste du terme. On sait combien les «personnages» proustiens restent, ou piut6t 
deviennent au fil des pages de plus en plus inddfinissables. insaisissables, «4tres de fuitc», et [’incoherence de 
leur ccnduite en est dvidemment la raison essentiellc [ . . .]  mais la coherence hyperbolique de leur langage. 
loin de compenser cette evanescence psychologique, ne (ait bien souvent que I’accentuer et I’aggraver.” 
(Genette 202 - 03).
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Proust, la notion meme de creation de personnages de romans fixes, stables, s’effa^a au 
profit de la description de consciences variables et impressionables,” (25). This identity 
crisis is not limited to the narrator. It plagues all of the inhabitants o f the Proustian 
universe. In the case of Faulkner’s novels, she likewise affirms that “even more than 
characters, it is a series of temporal consciences” which are presented (100). Quentin 
Compson a good example of such a temporal consciousness.
In the Compson novels, Faulkner strictly delimits the time o f the narrative. We 
have already seen the precision with which Faulkner situates the narrative time in the four 
sections of The Sound and the Fury. In Absalom. Absalom? the time between Quentin’s 
first meeting with Miss Rosa Coldfield (the sister of Ellen Coldfield who was Sutpen’s wife 
in Yoknapatawpha county), and his final retelling of the story to Shreve McCannon is 
confined to a precise 9 month period in the Summer and Winter o f 1909, but the novel 
begins in medias rex, Quentin is rehearing a story that he already knew. As he is preparing 
to attend Harvard in the late summer of 1909, he is summoned by Miss Rosa Coldfield to 
listen to her tell her version of Sutpen’s story. In the early pages o f the novel, Quentin is at 
pains to discover why she has chosen him to listen to what seems to be her confession of 
complicity with this man.
Much of the first few chapters consist o f Quentin listening to the tale told first by 
Miss Rosa and then Mr. Compson, in Jefferson, while, in the latter half of the novel, 
Quentin reconstructs the story with Shreve in his Harvard dorm room. Mr Compson, Miss 
Rosa, Quentin and Shreve take their places in a lign of storytellers that begins with Sutpen 
himself, on the occasion of his discussion with Quentin’s grandfather, General Compson).
If the same story is told more than once, and by different storytellers, it is never twice told 
in quite the same way.
At the same time that Quentin, Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson are attempting to 
piece together the portrait of Thomas Sutpen, the language they use and the stories they tell 
oblige the reader to make inferences about their own identities. The way material is
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organized, the types of associations which structure the narrator's discourse are perceived to 
bear the traces of an individual consciousness, but any attempt to represent the workings of 
consciousness in narrative gives rise to all sorts of problems involving not only language, 
memory and sense perceptions, but also history, science and epistemology. It presupposes 
that language is capable of “representing” something other than itself, or that the term 
“consciousness” refers to some state of being or pattern of thought preexisting language, 
and that it could somehow be represented in language.
Voice, Voices
Michael Millgate argues that the narrative style o f the various narrators in Absalom. 
Absalom! is “more distinct than has usually been allowed,” and that “It is fair to speak of 
the story as having three main narrators. Miss Rosa Coldfield and Mr. Compson are 
narrators in their own right, projecting distinct interpretations” o f the Sutpen story which 
are “deeply colored by the relationship in which they stand to him and by their own 
particular qualities of character and personality.” Millgate distinguishes in Miss Rosa’s 
account “with its ‘demonizing’ and linguistic extravagance [. ..] the violence and verbal 
frenzy-action larger than life-size, language pushed beyond its proper limits-of decadent 
Jacobean drama” (153), whereas Mr. Compson, “much less involved, much cooler and 
more skeptical in his assessment of Sutpen and of the world at large, concentrates his 
attention on different aspects of the story and treats them in quite a different manner. He 
identifies Mr. Compson’s rhetoric with an “effete disenchantment: suggestive of the literary 
decadence of the fin  de siicle” with the “self-conscious estheticism of an Oscar Wilde or 
Beardsley (154). In accordance with his portrayal of the tale as a tragedy, Mr Compson 
insists that it was Sutpen’s pride which was his downfall, while Quentin will paradoxically 
attribute it to “innocence.” The way the story is told emphasizes the workings of memory 
and perception on the part of the Quentin as he is alternatively telling, listening to, or 
imagining, the story.
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While it is sometimes possible to associate certain rhetorical stances with Miss Rosa 
or Mr. Compson, at other times the various voices which narrate become indistinguishable 
one from another. N. Blake argues that the narrating voices tend to merge into one 
“overvoice:” “The voice, in Faulkner’s text, exists an an irrefutable overwhelming 
presence.” While admitting the possibility of distinguishing among the book’s various 
speakers, Blake cakes as his working hypothesis that all the narrators are “simply 
mouthpieces for a voice that is unique, singular and indivisible [ ...] . The voice is really 
anonymous” (Intertexrualitv 130). To speak of an omniscient narrator is misleading, for 
although there are passages of the text written in the third person which tell us, for 
example, what Quentin thinks and feels, “Whatever her reason for choosing him [ ...]  the 
getting to it, Quentin thought, was taking a long time” (AA 11), such passages are 
relatively few.
In the first paragraphs, we get a summary of the story in Quentin’s thoughts in 
which we see him internalizing the words of Rosa Coldfield:
he would seem to listen to two separate Quentins now—the Quentin 
Compson preparing for Harvard in the South, the deep South dead since 
1865 [. . .] and the Quentin Compson who was still too young to deserve 
yet to be a ghost [. . .] the two separate Quentins now talking to one 
another in the long silence of not people, in nodanguage, like this: It seems 
that this demon—his name was Sutpen-(Colonel Sutpen)—Colonel Sutpen, Who 
came out o f nowhere and without warning upon the land with a band o f 
strange niggers and built a plantation—(Tore violently a plantation. Miss Rosa 
Coldfield says)-tore violently. And married her sister Ellen and begot a son and 
a daughter which—(Without gentleness begot, Miss Rosa Coldfield says)-without 
gentleness. Which should have been the jewels o f his pride and the shield and 
comfort o f his old age, only-(Only they destroyed him or something or he 
destroyed them or something. And died)-and died. Without regret, Miss Rosa 
Coldfield says—(Save by her) Yes, save by her. (And by Quentin Compson) Yes.
And by Quentin Compson. (AA 5 -6 )
The multiple repetitions and corrections indicate the provisional nature of oral knowledge,
and give an indication of what is to follow: the different, sometimes conflicting, and
uldmately unverifiable stories about Thomas Supten’s family and plantation. The
condensed version o f the events of the Sutpen narrative is only the first of the many re-
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tellings in the novel. If Proustian narrative is characterized by the iterative mode, in which 
repeated events are summarized in one instance of narration, the narration o f Absalom. 
Absalom? is characterized by repetition. The same events will be the subject o f multiple 
tellings in the course of the novel.
In the logic of the Yoknapatawpha saga, this moment of splitting presages the 
fractured inner discourse of Quentin’s final day in The Sound and the Furv. Since the 
latter novel appeared first, the reader is in the position of Quentin himself, “listening [. . .] 
to one of the ghosts which had refused to lie still even longer than most had, telling him 
about old ghost-times” (AA 5). The splitting and doubling of the narrator, the listener and 
the characters in the story they are telling and being told sets up a play of mutually 
reflecting mirrors which cannot help but implicate the reader, much as the evocation of the 
insomniac hero reading in bed does in Proust’s initial paragraph.
Quentin has evidendy internalized the story being told by Miss Rosa, even before 
the reader has heard it. This passage displays a nearly schizophrenic splitting of Quentin’s 
thoughts, and the introduction of another, seemingly omniscient voice (“two separate 
Quentins now talking to one another”).
The second chapter of the novel begins in seemingly omniscient mode, telling of 
the “legend” o f Sutpen’s arrival in the county in the 1830’s. “He had apparendy come into 
town from the south—a man of about twenty-five as the town learned later, because at the 
time his age could not have been guessed” (35). The information being conveyed in this 
passage is communal. It is the limited, sometimes speculative knowledge pased along in the 
gossip among the inhabitants of Yoknapatawpha. Mid-way through this chapter, the text 
switches to direct quotation of Mr. Compson, who mil narrate the rest of the chapter to 
Quentin. The third-person narrator is deprived o f any status as “omniscient,” not only 
because it is mosdy absent, but also by what might be termed the relendessly “dialogical” or 
polyphonic nature of the text. There is a proliferation of voices in the novel, not just those 
of Miss Rosa Coldfield, Mr. Compson, or Shreve, but also the absent voices o f  Quentin’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
grandfather, and of other witnesses and townspeople who have over the years supplied 
various elements of the ongoing narrative. The “overvoice” in Absalom, Ahsalnm! is 
anonymous, displaying the communal nature of oral knowledge, and could be thought of 
as schizophrenic. In the latter half of the book, as Quentin and Shreve tell each other the 
story, Faulkner dramatizes the splicing together of different points of view in the ongoing 
process of narration. Rather than tending toward clarity of voice, the momentum of the 
narration drowns individual voices in a sea of dtiationality.
The coon-hunter Akers, who is said to have stumbled upon one of Sutpen’s “wild 
negroes” is a representative of one of many people of Jefferson who may have gotten some 
information about the man: “the men who would ride out to watch what was going on, 
wbo began to tell how Sutpen would take stand beside a game trail with the pistols and 
send the negroes in to drive the swamp like a pack of hounds [ ...] . There were many more 
than Akers, though the others were responsible citizens and landowners and so did not 
have to lurk about the camp at night” (AA 41) Thus nearly everything that is told about 
Sutpen is rooted in this communal story.
The community which perpetuates the Sutpen “legend” or the Sutpen “mystery” is 
the one which collectively produces the discourse. The principal speakers in the narration 
which occurs in the years 1909-1910 include the sole remaining “eyewitness” to some of 
the events, in the person of Rosa, as well as the descendants of Sutpen’s first (and seemingly 
unique) Yoknapatawpha county friend: General Compson. But information also comes 
from others, especially in the one section of the book where an unidentified third person 
narrator relates Thomas Sutpen’s arrival and first few years in Yoknapatawpha. There are 
several scattered witnesses to sightings of Sutpen, and a few rare occasions on which the 
entire town is witness to his actions. He makes brief taciturn appearances to court and 
marry Ellen Coldfield, but otherwise turns his back on the community. Living twelve miles 
away on Sutpen’s Hundred, all the town can know of him is innuendo. While the latter 
pan of this chapter, in quotes, is attributed to Mr. Compson, we may or may not attribute
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che first pan to him; the nature of the information remains more or less “communal,” 
therefore, as Faulkner might say, “apocryphal.”
The act of (re) telling the story to Shreve in the latter pan of the novel becomes a 
catalyst for Quentin’s involuntary loss of self, finally provoking a profound psychological 
identification with his father, and with Sutpen. The telling o f the story thus serves to efface 
all difference between its object and the various agents of its perpetuation. So strong is his 
identification with the figures in the Sutpen legend that, in the course of his storytelling 
sessions with Shreve in their Harvard dormitory, the acts o f reminiscence and narration 
trigger a vertiginous loss of identity, apparent in Quentin’s thoughts. He seems to lose his 
sense of being an individual in the process of storytelling, identifying with Henry Sutpen, 
or his father:
Yes, we are both Father. Or maybe Father and I  are both Shreve, maybe it took 
Father and me both to make Shreve or Shreve and me both to make Father or 
maybe Thomas Sutpen to make all o f us. (AA 326 - 27)
This doubling of the narrating subject is As Weinstein has noted (referring to John Irwin’s
study Doubling and Incest), “the process of vicarious identification is rampant. Rosa and
her identification with Judith and Charles’s courtship, Henry and his shifting triangular
identifications with Judith and with Bon (mergers in which the clarity of sexual difference
itself seems to dissolve), Sutpen’s identification with the planter in the big house, Wash
Jones’s identification with Sutpen, Quentin and Shreve’s identifications with Henry and
Charles; in each of these crossings an involuntary psychic merger takes place” [.. .].52
Why did Faulkner choose return to the character of Quentin Compson, first
introduced in his earlier novel, on the day of his suicide, in order to tell the story of
Thomas Sutpen, the uneducated man from Appalachia whose establishment of a plantation
and family in Yoknapatawpha County are the concern of the narrators? In interviews,
^Weinstein continues with an observation that is central to my argument: “Individual identity here remains 
poignantly incomplete [ ...]  Revising each finished version o f its characters’ identity with another version, the 
novel melts down whatever it has consolidated” [...] (93). This statement holds true as well for the continual 
revision at work in “Marcel’s ' story.
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Faulkner implied that he was merely looking for a mouthpiece to tell the story, and that the 
main character in Absalom. Absalom! was Sutpen, but it is also a novel about Quentin 
Compson, whose grandfather was Sutpen’s first Yoknapatawpha county friend. And in its 
intertextual relationship to The Sound and the Furv. the Sutpen story seems intimately 
related to the tragic end of the Compson Clan.
In a conference he gave in May, 1958 at the University of Virginia, Faulkner 
attributed an autobiographical function to storytelling when he was asked whether the 
Quentin Compson of Absalom. Absalom.1 was supposed to be the same character who 
appeared in The Sound and the Fury, “a man thinking about his own Compson family 
[and] his sister.” Faulkner responded that Quentin approached the Sutpen family “with the 
same opthalmia that he approached his own troubles” (FIU 274).
Faulkner said that Absalom. Absalom! was Sutpen’s story, despite the fact that 
Quentin is a central character in it,
it’s Sutpen’s story. But then, every time any character gets into a book, no 
matter how minor, he’s actually telling his biography-that’s all anyone ever 
does, he tells his own biography, talking about himself, in a thousand 
different terms, but himself. (FIU 275)
While Faulkner is ostensibly referring to the character of Quentin as a storyteller, his choice
of language invites an interpretation whereby every character in a narrative is to be read as a
figure for the author himself. Instead of saying “every time a character tells a story,”
Faulkner attributes the very constitution of characters as the establishment of so many
mirrors for the author.
If Absalom. Absalom! is, as Faulkner claimed, Surpen’s story, it is also the story of
Quentin Compson and William Faulkner. The exemplary nature of the Sutpen story is
suggested by Quentin, who postulates “it took Thomas Sutpen to make all of us.”
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Readers o f  The Sound and the Fury know that Quentin has no future, but 
continually re-lives the past. Sartre noted this in his comparison o f Proust and Faulkner: 
“It would seem that we can compare Faulkner’s vision of the world to that o f a man 
seated in a convertible facing backwards. At each moment shadows appear to his right 
and to his left [ ...]  which only a little while after become trees, men, cars, with 
distance.”53 The novel begins with Quentin “listening” to Miss Rosa Coldfield, but he is 
not listening. He has heard versions o f  the Sutpen story numerous times, he is more 
concerned with discovering why he must be subjected to ityet still again-.
It's because she wants it told he. thought so that people whom she w ill never 
see and whose names she will never hear and who have never heard her name 
nor seen her face w ill read it and know at last why God let us lose the war 
(AA 8).
Quentin’s conventions with his father subsequent to Rosa’s narrative are dramatized in 
the second and third chapters. He is concerned to know why she should have summoned 
him to accompany her to Sutpen’s hundred. Mr Compson suggests that perhaps she 
holds Quentin guilty by association, since his grandfather was Sutpen’s first friend in 
Yoknapatawpha county.
We learn that he has heard the story innumerable times. Later on, as he retells the 
story to Shreve his thoughts reveal his weariness at the incessant rehashing o f the same 
incidents in the story:
Am  I  going to have to hear it a ll again he thought I  am going to have to hear 
i t  a ll over again I  am already hearing it a ll over again I  am listening to it all 
over again I  shall have to never listen to anything else but this again forever so 
apparently not only a man never outlives his father but not even his fien d s 
and acquaintances do (AA 345 - 46)
53“I1 semblequ'on puisse comparer la vision du mondede Faulkner a celle d’un ho mm me assis dans une auto 
d&ouvetre et qui regarde en a mere. A chaq ue instant des ombres surgissenc a sa droite, a sa gauche, 
papillortements, rremblcmencstamisls [...} qui nedevienntdesaibres, deshommes,desvoituresqu’un peu 
plus tard, avec le recul. Le passdy gagne une sortede surtdalitd: ses contours sont duiset nets, immuablev, le 
present, innomable et fiigirif. re ddcnd mal contre tui; ilest plein de trous, et, par ces trous, les choses passes 
I'envahissent, fixes, immobiles, siicncieuses comme des juges ou comme des regards" (73 - 4)
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The very repetitiveness of Quentins thoughts suggests a static, unchanging story in 
which the same thing is continually repeated. His expression o f weariness with an act o f 
narration which is repeated over and over again in the book is simultaneously a 
commentary on the form of the novel itself. The repetition with difference of narrative 
suggests the infinity of possible interpretations and arrangements o f the scant pieces of 
the Sutpen puzzle, but also implies the futility of any attempt to artificially limit or 
master the flux of time and reality:
Maybe nothing ever happens once and is finished. Maybe happen is never 
once but like ripples maybe on water after the pebble sinks, the ripples 
moving on, spreading, the pool attached by a narrow umbilical water-cord to 
the next pool which the first pool feeds, has fed, did feed, let this second pool 
contain a different temperature o f water, a different molecularity o f having 
seen, fe lt, remembered, reflect in a different tone the infinite unchanging sky, 
it doesn't matter: that pebble's watery echo whose fa ll it did not even see 
moves across its surface too a t the original ripple-space, to the old ineradicable 
rhythm  (AA 326)
Quentin employs images here which evoke an infinitude o f potential or actual 
complexity, an infinite connectedness. It is significant that the images he chooses are 
precisely those inspiring the recent models of complex interactions hinted at by studies 
of fluid dynamics. The unlimited potential for dilation and revision inherent in narrative 
is a manifestation of what “fractal geometry” knows as infinite recursiveness. Likewise, 
the self-reflexivity and self-similarity of the mise en abyme is akin to the self- 
recursiveness and similarity among the many patterns found in natural systems and 
mimicked by models o f fluid dynamics.
As a result of his excursion to Sutpen’s Hundred with Miss Rosa, Quentin seems 
to be the beneficiary of supplemental information about Charles Bon s African-American 
blood. This supplemental knowledge allows Quentin to assume mastery of the narrative, 
thus taking the place of his father when he comes back to tell Mr. Compson what he 
found at the Sutpen place. Mr. Compson’s efforts are to resurrect the past through the
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voluntary act o f storytelling. He is frustrated by the difficulty o f  making a complete, 
coherent story out o f the fragments o f memories and narratives about Thomas Sutpen.
In Absalom it is remarkable that, although he provides the focus for the novel’s 
point of view, Quentin is the only one of the narrators who is unable to sustain the act o f 
narration. In the chapters in which he is the principle narrator, he is progressively 
interrupted by his Canadian roommate Shreve, who finally appropriates the story and 
tells it himself. Quentin’s inability to tell the story amounts to an inability to tell any 
story, his or anyone else’s, to the bankruptcy o f narrative discussed by Walter Benjamin 
in his essay “The Storyteller,” where he asserts that “today the communicability o f 
experience is decreasing” (86-87). Quentin’s ultimate inability to express himself is 
evident at the very end of the novel where, in response to Shreve’s question “Why do you 
hate the South?” all Quentin can do is rather obsessively deny this hatred: “/  dont. I  dont! 
I  dont hate it! I  dont hate itT  (AA 471). He remains powerless to assert his identity in 
anything other than a negative mode. It is the end of this novel which helps explain his 
disjointed narration in The Sound and the Furv.
Quentin’s efforts to establish a definitive version o f  the story are doomed to 
failure because o f the multiple and conflicting voices which feed his own discourse. The 
fracturing and dispersal o f the narrative voice also serves to suggest the different 
discourses which come together to structure consciousness. Quentin’s voice is situated at 
a nodal point between those o f his grandfather, his father, Rosa Coldfield, Thomas 
Sutpen, and the whole community of Jefferson, all ofwhom contribute, in one form or 
another, to the Sutpen legend, which is described as “part o f  his twenty years’ heritage.” 
We are told that “his very body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous defeated 
names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth” (AA 9). The “omniscient” 
narrator here makes explicit a symbolic level on which Quentin will serve as a 
representative o f the whole South, o f  the Confederacy, and eventually o f all mankind.
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If at times the various narrating voices are virtually indistinguishable from one 
another, at others the “individual” voices become fractured, as when, at the very 
beginning of Absalom. Absalom! Quentin’s consciousness splits itself into two voices 
which, carrying on a dialogue with himself, as he listens to Miss Rosa tell the Sutpen 
story, as if he had heard it already a thousand times. It is suggested that he has heard it 
for years, that it is part o f his “birthright,” his heritage. Yet the scene is supposed to be 
taking place on the afternoon that Quentin is summoned to hear the story for the first 
time. How are we to take this exchange between two nearly identical voices? Is it a flash- 
forward to a moment in time when Quentin will have heard the story in its entirety? The 
hesitant character o f the exchange, with its repetitions and corrections suggests the 
uncertainty o f the facts. Sutpen is not a man but a “grim ghost” haunting Rosa’s language 
“where a more fortunate one would have had a house” (AA 4).
Why does Sutpen not have a house? Why is he exiled into the world o f  endless 
discourse, of narration? For that is perhaps the ultimate question and the final irony for 
this man who so obstinately refused to speak. Sutpen’s appearances in the town o f 
Jefferson are marked by his silent passage.
So they would catch him, run him to earth, in the lounge between the 
supper table and his locked door to give him the opportunity to tell them 
who he was and where he came from and what he was up to, whereupon 
he would move gradually and steadily until his back came in contact with 
something-a post or a wall-and then stand there and tell them nothing 
whatever as pleasantly and courteously as a hotel clerk. (AA 38)
Sutpen refuses textuality at all turns, insisting only on his own “design,” (though we
cannot be sure if this is the way he puts it, since all we know o f him comes through the
townsfolk, the Compsons, or Miss Rosa). He refuses to supply a narrative of himself to
the townfolk who lie in wait for him so as to corner him and force him to talk, to tell
them who he is, where he comes from and what he’s up to.
If Sutpen avoids committing himself in conversation, it is because his singular
goal is to have the final word, the only word that matters. He intends to leave his “mark”
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through the perpetuation of his name by his children. Thus the imposition o f a name is a 
significant aspect o f his attempt at writing his own story. The other main way in which 
Sutpen attempts to control his story is through the tombstones which he has engraved, 
save for the dates and which he carries around with him during the war:
“He bought them himself,” M r Compson said “He bought the two o f 
them while the regiment was in Virginia, after Judith got word to him 
that her mother was dead. He ordered them from Italy, the best, the 
finest to be had-his wife’s complete and his with the date left blank: and 
this while on active service with an army which had [. . .] the highest 
mortality rate o f any before or since [. ..] .” (AA 236 - 37).
Quentin imagines the scene of the wagon accompanying Sutpen’s regiment with the two-
thousand pound stones:
that much bombastic and inert carven rock which for the next year was to 
be part o f the regiment, to follow it into Pennsylvania and be present at 
Gettysburg, moving behind the regiment in a wagon driven by the 
demon’s body servant through swamp and plain and mountain pass, the 
regiment moving no faster than the wagon could. (AA 237)
The stones come to represent Sutpen himself for the starving men o f the regiment, who
refer to them as Colonel and Mrs Colonel. This absurd process is literally an attempt by
Sutpen to control the final word, to possess closure and carry it around with him. He
would like to create his own monument, his own identity, independendy from the voices
of others. Ironically his taciturn nature and the seemingly inexplicable event o f  the son’s
renunciation of his birthright leaves him open to the speculation of innumerable others.
Throughout Faulkner’s novel, Mr. Compson, Miss Rosa, and Shreve, but 
especially Quentin, as well as the reader himself, are preoccupied with putting all the 
pieces o f the story together in order to make it whole, ordered and understandable. Each 
storyteller has a different approach to the characters and events, a different relationship 
to the story being told, and each version has its own blind spots. Mr. Compson’s story is 
influenced by his father s friendship with and knowledge about Sutpen; it is equally 
enriched by Mr. Compson’s education as a classicist, while Miss Rosa’s is filtered
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through her sister, Sutpen’s second wife, and through her own education as a woman in 
the rural South in the late nineteenth century. She characterizes Sutpen as a “demon,” 
while Mr. Compson prefers to see his as a victim of Fate.
Faulkner’s novels incorporate multiple voices in order to suggest the ways in 
which consciousness is dependent on the interplay of many different discourses, and that 
this interplay is an unstable, contingent, ever-changing process o f negotiation, involving 
repetition and revision. The narrators o f these novels, like Sutpen talking to Quentin s 
grandfather, are not talking about themselves, they’re just telling stories, but it is the 
ways in which they tell their stories which end up telling us about themselves.
In the Recherche the hero learns the cultural significance of appearances and 
gestures, of signs, and the role they play in constituting social and personal identites. As 
Proust demonstrated the power o f art to create the real for the young Marcel, in 
Faulkner’s novels, the internalization o f culturally determined systems o f representation 
is shown through the importance accorded to memories of others’ speech, of storytelling. 
In Proust’s novel the number o f discoursrve positions and their ideological over 
determinedness is more overtly presented, from the reactionary and anti-semitic 
positions o f the Parisian nobility, represented by the Guermantes, to the “Dreyfusism” of 
Bloch, from the medieval legends of the narrator’s youth, to Brichot’s etymologies. The 
assumption of such discursive stances serves to define individuals and nations, that is why 
the anti-semitic furor o f the Dreyfus affair became an issue o f national security, yet the 
arbitrariness o f such attitudes is demonstrated by the ease with which they are discarded 
and replaced.
That Basin de Guermantes is an anti-Dreyfusard seems to conform to the 
narrator’s image of him as a representative of one of the great aristocratic families of 
Paris, but in Sodome et Gomorrhe we learn that his colleagues are shocked by his sudden 
reversal o f position. By changing his position on this crucial issue, his figure undergoes a 
transformation in their eyes. This transformation is mediated by a theatrical, artistic
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milieu in which three “charming little women” convince him that there was never any 
evidence against him. Rather than by logic and reason, they sway him by charm and 
finally by decree “Les trois charmanres dames trouvaient qu’il n’allait pas assez vite et le 
rudoyaient un peu: «Mais au fond personne d’intelligent n ’a pu croire qu’il yeflt rien».
[ ...]  Le due etait rentrd k Paris dreyfusard enrag£.” Marcel concludes that many 
countries behave like such men o f sincerity, “beacoup de pays qu’on a laissls remplis de 
haine pour un peuple et qui, six mois apr&s, ont changd de sentiment et renverse leurs 
alliances” (SG 138). In the Recherche, the behavior o f individuals mirrors and prefigures 
the behavior o f governments and nations. The importance o f  the impersonal symbolic 
field of language is shown through the coercive power o f artistic and linguistic 
representation.
The frustration o f  the various speakers in Absalom. Ahsalom!. at their inability to 
fully understand the mystery o f the son’s renunciation o f  his birthright, flight, and 
eventual murder o f his sister’s fiance, or the murder o f the father by his own farm hand, 
is expressed by Mr. Compson, who laments: “It is just incredible. It just does not explain 
[...] We have a few old m outh-to-m outh tales; we exhume from old trunks and boxes 
and drawers letters without salutation or signature, in which men and women who once 
lived and breathed are now merely initials or nicknames out o f some now 
incomprehensible affection which sound to us like Sanskrit or Choctaw” (124). The 
impassioned attempts o f the narrators to understand the mystery of the man named 
Sutpen is here likened to the attempt to decipher a difficult language. The choice o f  
Sanskrit and Choctaw is interesting for a number o f reasons. Sanskrit is a written 
language while Choctaw is from an oral tradition, but both are also languages associated 
with non-Western traditions. These spiritual languages are opposed to the mysterious 
and sinister language o f Sutpen’s Haitian slaves, which Mr. Compson equates in their 
incomprehensibility.
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In Absalom. Absalom! as in The Sound and the Fury, the chronology, the link of 
causality has been broken, so the story cannot be told from beginning to end. It is not 
completely understood by the people o f Yoknapatawpha. All they have is the murky in- 
between o f unknown, known and inexplicable. The chronology o f the plot is scattered, 
dispersed throughout the narrative. As in Proust, the story is revealed episodically, and as 
each episode is evoked, the storyteller explores its relations to other episodes at other 
moments o f the protagonists’ lives. Michael Millgate has suggested that "one way o f 
looking at the book’s structure is to think o f  it as organized about a number o f  crucial 
moments o f recognition, truth, disillusion: Henry and his father in the library, Henry 
shooting Bon, Sutpen proposing to Rosa, Wash Jones murdering Sutpen-each moment 
presented in a kind o f tableau arrested at a particular point of time and held in 
suspension while it is looked at, approached from all sides, inspected as if it were itself an 
artifact, like that Grecian urn which Faulkner so often invoked elsewhere” (164).
While Proust’s novel presents itself as a kind o f autobiography, a first person 
recounting o f  the narrator’s own life, in A b sa lo m . Absalom! the narrators are concerned 
with someone else’s story: but the story of Thom as Sutpen also carries personal 
significance for Quentin Compson, just as Swann’s does for Marcel. This is especially 
evident in his retelling o f it, in the context o f  his Harvard Dorm room, to his Canadian 
roommate. We are told that Shreve’s request was not the first time that Quentin had 
been asked to describe or explain the South’s difference to other inhabitants o f  the 
Harvard community: “not Shreve’s first time, nobody’s first time in Cambridge since 
September: Tell about the South. What's it like there. What do they do there. Why do they 
live there? Why do they live at all?”(AA 218). The insistence of this line o f questioning 
indicates the exemplary status Quentin holds in Massachusetts as a representative o f  the 
South.
Shreve continually refers to Rosa as Q uentin’s “Aunt Rosa” and is repeatedly 
corrected. The vehemence with which Quentin denies her kinship belies the very real ties
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chat bind him to her, if only because they are neighbors in such a small Mississippi town. 
To Shreve, the Northerner, for whom Jefferson Mississippi is as imaginary as Paris or 
Haiti, they may as well be family. Quentin is thus called upon not only to explain life in 
the South, but to justify its very existence. The story ofThomas Sutpen thus becomes 
emblematic o f something fundamental, specific to Southern culture, which remains 
irreducible, some difference or remainder which eludes the comprehension o f even the 
native Southerner. As Shreve struggles to understand the South he mimics the desire o f 
the residents of Yoknapatawpha County themselves-Quentin, his father and Miss Rosa— 
in their struggle to understand the Sutpen story, and all o f these characters thus become 
stand-ins for the reader of the novel itself.
Wait. Listen. I’m not trying to be funny, smart. I just want to understand 
it if I can and I dont know how to say it better. Because it’s something 
my people haven’t got. Or if we have got it, it all happened long ago 
across the water and so now there aint anything to look at every day to 
remind us of it. We dont live among defeated grandfathers and freed 
slaves (or have I got it backward and was it your folks that are free and 
the niggers that lost?) and bullets in the dining room table and such, to be 
always reminding us to never forget. What is it? Something you live and 
breathe in like air? a kind o f vacuum filled with wraithlike and 
indomitable anger and pride and glory at and in happenings that 
occurred and ceased fifty years ago? A kind of entailed birthright father 
and son and father and son o f  never forgiving General Sherman, so that 
forevermore as long as your childrens’ children produce children you 
wont be anything but a descendant o f  a long line o f colonels killed in 
Pickett’s charge at Manassas?
“Gettysburg,” Quentin said. “You cant understand it. You would 
have to be bom there.”(AA 450 - 451)
Quentin subsequently admits to Shreve that perhaps he doesn’t understand it himself
after all. It is only Shreve, the outsider, who must explain the significance o f  his story to
Quentin.
In the context of the novel, this “remainder,” or this difference specific o f 
Southern culture, is the difference of Southern culture to itself-its irreducible remainder, 
the one which it would like to suppress and eliminate, namely, its intimate relationship to 
Afro-American culture.
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The story they are telling involves several well-defined temporal strata, going
back as far as Sutpen’s boyhood encounter with a slave at the door o f a plantation house
in Virginia, His appearance in Jefferson in 1833, and, in-between, the story of his
renunciation of his first wife and the loss of her father’s plantation to a slave revolt in
Haiti. These and other episodes constitute the Sutpen narrative, but there are large gaps
in this story. These gaps contribute in no small measure to the Sutpen mystery and
constitute a large part of the novel’s preoccupations.
There are resemblances between the descriptions o f the settings, of the contexts
in which the story is told. Despite the obvious differences in climate and temperature,
they are all described in terms o f stillness and death:
From a little after two oclock until almost sundown o f the long still hot 
weary dead September afternoon they sat in what Miss Coldfield still 
called the office because her father had called it that-a dim hot airless 
room with the blinds all closed and fastened for forty-three summers 
because when she was a girl someone had believed that light and moving 
air carried heat and that dark was always cooler, and which (as the sun 
shone fuller and fuller on that side of the house) became latticed with 
yellow slashes full o f  dust motes which Quentin thought o f  as being 
flecks of the dead old dried paint itself blown inward from the scaling 
blinds as wind might have blown them. (AA 3)
The Harvard dormitory room in which Quentin and Shreve rehash the Sutpen story is
similarly portrayed:
the two of them not moving except to breathe, Both young, bom both 
within the same year: the one in Alberta, the other in Mississippi, born half 
a continent apart yet joined, connected after a fashion in a son o f 
geographical transubstantiation by that Continental Trough, that River 
that runs not only through the physical land [. ..] (AA 322)
It is a letter from his father which also brings the memories o f the sensations of that
summer into the Massachusetts winter:
Then on the table before Quentin, lying on the open text book beneath 
the lamp, the white oblongs o f  envelope, the familiar blurred mechanical 
Jefferson Jan 10 1910 Miss and then, opened, the M y dear son in his 
father’s sloped fine hand out o f that dead dusty summer where he had 
prepared for Harvard so that his father’s hand could lie on a strange 
lamp-lit table in Cambridge; that dead summer twilight-the wisteria, the
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cigar-smell, the fireflies-attenuated up from Mississippi and into this 
strange room, across this strange iron New England snow. (AA 217)
In Absalom, Absalom! the narrators are all concerned with restoring memory, and thus of
overcoming time. The novel is, from the beginning, cast in the fading light o f
remembrance (“From a little after two oclock until almost sundown of the long still hot
weary dead September afternoon"). The stillness o f the scene in Rosa Coldfield’s father s
office, and the slow fade o f  the summer afternoon comments ironically on the
immobility of Faulkner’s prose, in which the action, the verb itself, seems never to come.
“From a little after two oclock until almost sundown o f the long still hot weary dead
September afternoon” action is never fully predicated, instead being continually impeded
by the interminable description and accumulation o f  adjectives (“long still hot weary”).
When the reader finally reaches the verb, it is not action, but stasis, as “they sat.” Such
language is characteristic o f  “decadent” literature, in which the hero spends long periods
in contemplation unable or unwilling to act. Such novels, then devote large passages o f
text to descriptions. Description is, to be sure, a necessary technique of realist fiction, in
which a detailed setting conveys the necessary foundation, setting the scene for the
novel’s action. But there is little action in Absalom. Absalom!, at least at the first diegetic
level o f Miss Rosa, Quentin and Mr. Compson’s narrative acts. The stasis o f the narrative
illustrates the inability o f the characters to overcome time, to “get past” the facts o f
Sutpen’s story, and to overcome the weight o f Southern history.
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Chapter 4: The Social Kaleidoscope
This question posed by Proust’s narrator about the possibility of immortality 
(“mort a jamais?”), is the ultimate question about identity, whether or not there is some 
immutable core, a soul or an essence which might survive the ultimate demise o f the 
individual. In patriarchal society the perpetuation o f the father’s name is meant to 
guarantee a kind o f immortality, but Proust’s novel takes as one o f its themes the 
mobility o f the proper name, from one family to another, from one person to another. 
The narrator is intrigued by names, and especially by old aristocratic names, especially if 
they are mentioned in works of art or literature.
The decline o f the French nobility is one o f the major sociological themes o f the 
novel. The narrator is initiated into the life o f Parisian aristocracy through a series of 
receptions, at the salons of the Duchess o f Guermantes, Mme Verdurin and finally the 
Princess of Guermantes in Le temps retrouvd. The rise to eminence o f Mme de Verdurin, 
a simple bourgeoise is accomplished through a fortuitous alliance which makes her the 
new Princess o f  G uermantes. This movement is seen as part of a continual change which 
the narrator refers to as the “social kaleidoscope.”
Although the narrative seems to set out to tell the story of an individual, the 
“individual” is continuously shown to be inhabited by a multitude o f  selves. The 
Recherche seeks at times to catalog this multitude, to depict the different “worlds” 
which the hero frequents, but it also shows that what is usually thought o f as the 
individual incorporates thoughts, experiences and lessons learned from diverse sources. 
The portrait o f  French society of the Belle £poque in the Recherche is inextricably 
related to the portrayal of being, a particular being in a particular place and time. To tell 
the story of the self, then, an entire universe must be established, incorporating the 
multiple worlds which make up the self. The novel begins with the narrator’s naive view 
of a society segmented and held apart in rigid hierarchies, and ends with the ultimate 
discovery o f  the fluidity o f ranks and values.
87
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The overestimation o f the proper name is characteristic of Proust’s naive hero. 
The narrator’s first reflections on the power o f words involves a proper name: that of the 
local aristocratic family, the Guermantes.54 As with many o f the characters and places in 
the novel, the first thing that the hero knows is a name or an image, a representation, 
which then becomes the object o f speculation and imagination. The affective power that 
this name will have for the hero can be traced back to the troubling projections of the 
magic lantern placed in his childhood bedroom. The superimposition o f its images on 
the walls o f his room, like the illusions o f the dream states described in the opening 
pages, substitutes, “a 1’opacite des murs d’impalpables irisations, de sumaturelles 
apparitions multicolores, oil des ldgendes Itaient dlpeintes comme dans un vitrail 
vacillant et momentanl” (S 9), "it substituted for the opaquenss o f my walls an 
impalpable iridescence, supernatural phenomena of many colors, in which legends were 
depicted as on a shifting and transitory window” (I: 9).
The projections of his magic lantern represent Genevi&ve de Brabant, ancestor of 
the present day Duchesse de Guermantes, standing on a moor in front o f her castle, "lost 
in contemplation,” unaware of the approach o f Golo "filled with an infamous design.” 
The suggestive power that names hold for the hero is due in part to their sound. The 
name Brabant suggests the golden color of the castle and landscape to the young hero 
even before he saw them. "Le chateau et la lande Itaient jaunes et je n avals pas attendu de 
les voir pour connaitre leur couleur car, avant les verres du chassis, la sonorird mordorde 
du nom de Brabant me 1’avait montrd avec evidence” (S 9) “The castle and the moor
54 Roland Barthes has pointed out a major symbolic structure of the Recherche in the opposition o f the long 
vowel endings o f  prestigious names like Guermantes, Laumes and Agrigente, to the short, abrupt endings of 
names such as Verdurin, Cottard and Lcgiandin (132). Serge Dubrouvsky claims that this is an example of 
Proust’s ‘reactionary” side: “C ’est toute l’«histoire de France* qu on saisit dans le vocable Guermantes, 
comme toute la vuigaritd juive dans Blachou le porte-i-faux dans Swann. snob et dreyfiisard. dont le nom se 
prononce de 2 inanities. La surestimation du Nom est un choix iddologique, oil se Ihne le c6tt 
«reactionnaiie» de Proust.” We shouldn’t forget, however that the hero is depicted as naive, not yet having 
benefirted from the lessons oftime and not yet having experienced the nevelation ofLe temps retro uvt. This is 
the essential difference to be diawn between the ”heto” and the ‘namtor.”
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were yellow, bur I could cell their colour without waiting to see them, for before the 
slides made their appearance the old-gold sonorous name o f Brabant had given me an 
unmistakable clue” (I: 10). The aristocratic families o f the Recherche are fascinating to 
the narrator above all because o f their names, they are the counts o f Combray, possessing 
Co mb ray in the middle o f their names “First among the citizens o f Combray” they are 
the only ones who do not live there (S 170). Altghough they don’t have a house there, 
they are everywhere.
In his initai encounter with representation, it is the unsettling intrusion o f mystery 
and otherness, of death, which interrupts the anesthetizing influence o f habit, o f 
familiarity and brings the hero painfully to life, returning thought and sensation.
Certes je leur trouvais du charme k. ces brillantes projections qui 
sem blaient Imaner d ’un passl m&ovingien et promenaient autour de moi 
des reflets d ’histoire si anciens. Mais je ne peux dire quel malaise me 
causaic pourtant cette intrusion du myst&re et de la beautl dans une 
chambre que j’avais fini par remplir de mon moi au point de ne pas faire 
plus attention a elle qu’i  lui-meme. L’influence anesth&iante de 1’habitude 
ayant cess£, je me mettais a penser, a sentir, chosessi crisces. (S 10)
And, indeed, I found plenty o f charm in these bright projections, which 
seemed co emanate horn a Merovingian past and shed around me the 
reflections o f such ancient history. But I cannot express the discomfort I 
felt at this intrusion o f  mystery and beauty into a room which I had 
succeeded in filling with my own personality until I thought no more of it 
than o f myself. The anesthetic effect o f habit being destroyed, I would 
begin to think-and to feel-such melancholy things. (I: 10-11)
The importance of historical Actions in the formations o f the young hero’s sense o f social
values and identities can be seen in this legend which the hero internalizes and learns to
associate with the Due and Duchesse de Guermantes. The room here is the equivalent o f
the hero’s self-an empty space onto which history is projected. Unlike the older narrator,
awakening from slumber in a room he cannot identify, the young hero does not have to
isolate his surroundings from memories, but from superimposed images and
“Merovingian tales.” They become part of his own memories, thus part o f his childhood.
The tale of Genevi&ve de Brabant is a legend of persecuted innocence in the hagiographic
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vein. The image o f  the persecuted female is clearly associated with his mother: “que les 
malheurs de Genevieve de Brabant me rendaient plus ch£re, tandis que les crimes de 
Golo me faisaient examiner ma propre conscience avec plus de scrupules” (S 10), “whom 
the misfortues of Genevieve de Brabant had made all the dearer to me, just as the crimes 
of Golo had driven me to a more than ordinarily scrupulous examination o f my own 
conscience” (I: 11). He learns to associate the figures in the magic lantern with the 
“intrusion of mystery and beauty” into his room/self. It comes as no surprise then that 
the hero should project these same images onto the “real” Duke and Duchess o f 
Guermantes once he has learned that they are also dukes of Brabant. Most significantly, 
his infatuation with the Duchesse is the first movement in the continual metonymic 
displacement o f his desire for his mother onto other female figures, including Mme 
Swann, Mile de Stermaria, and Albertine.
The hero’s fascination with nobility and with the Merovingian past, a 
romanticized image o f the French ancien regime, idealizes the aristocracy as embodying 
something essentially French. His desire is to possess the key to the mystery o f what he 
wants to think o f as the innate charm and desirability o f the Guermantes. This mystery is 
embodied, or so he thinks, in the quasi-magical power o f the name. In some essence 
which it embodies or distills, and will play a role in his desire for the Duchesse.
Their castle becomes for him the unattainable goal o f his childhood walks:
jamais non plus nous ne pflmes pousser jusqu’au terme que j’eusse rant 
souhaife d'atteindre, jusqu'ik Guermantes. Je savais que la residaient des 
chatelains, le due et la duchesse de Guermantes, je savais qu’ils Itaient des 
personnages feels et actuellement existants, mais chaquefois que je pensais 
a eux, je me les repfesentais tan tot en tapisserie [. . .] tantot de nuances 
changeantes [. . .] tantot tout a fait impalpables comme 1’image de 
Genevieve de Brabant [. . .] que la lanterne magique promenait sur les 
rideaux de ma chambre [. . .] enfin toujours enveloppes du mysfere des 
temps nferovingienset baignant comme dans un coucherde soliel dans la 
lumi&re orangle qui emane de cette syllabe «antes». (S 169)
Nor could we ever get as far as that other goal which I so longed to reach, 
Guermantes itself. I knew that it was the residence o f the Due and
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Duchesse de Guermantes, I knew that they were real personages who did 
actually exist, but whenever I thought about them I pictured them either 
in tapestry, like the Comptesse de Guermantes in the “Coronation o f 
Esther, which hung in our church, or else in iridescent colors [. ..] or again 
altogether impalpable, like the image o f  Genevieve de Brabant, ancestress 
o f the Guermantes family, which the magic lantern sent wandering over 
the curtains o f my room or flung aloft upon the ceiling-in short, 
invariably wrapped in the mystery o f the Merovingien age and bathed, as 
in a sunset, in the amber light which glowed from the resounding syllable 
“antes.” 0: 187)
The existence o f these idealized beings so close to Combray surprises him, and is one of 
the hero’s first lessons in the fallability o f his own perceptions when the sight o f the real 
duchess conflicts with the image the hero had previously associated with the name 
Guermantes. He is at first unable to reconcile his imagined representation o f the Duchess 
with the flesh and blood woman before him:
Ma deception etait grande. Elle provenait de ce que je n’avais jamais pris 
garde quand je pensais a Mme de Guermantes, que je me la repr&entais 
avec les couleurs d ’une tapisserie ou d’un vitrail, dans un autre si&de, 
d’une autre mati&re quele reste des personnesvivantes. (S 172)
My disappointment was immense. It arose from my not having borne in 
mind, when I thought of Mme de Guermantes, that I was picturing her to 
myself in the colours of a tapestry or a staimed glasswindow, as living in 
another century, as being o f another substance than the rest o f the human 
race. (I: 190 - 91)
In order to get over this deception he recalls to himself the stories he has absorbed, which 
tell of the Guermantes’ illustrious ancestors:
«Glorieux d&s avant Charlemagne, les Guermantes avaient le droit de vie 
et de mort sur leurs vassaux; la duchesse de Guermantes descend de 
Genevi&ve de Brabant. Elle ne connait, ni ne consentirait a connaitre 
aucunedes personnesqui sont ici.<> (S 173).
“Great and glorious before the days o f Charlemegne, the Guermantes had 
the right o f  life and death over their vassals; the Duchesse de Guermantes 
descends from Genevieve de Brabant. She does not know, nor would she 
consent to know, any of the people who are here today.” (I: 192)
The young Marcel tries desperately to reconcile his illusory image o f what the Duchess
ought to look like with the reality o f the person present before him. In a characteristic
move, he projects his image of the Duchess onto the face he sees before him, thus
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shrinking from the flesh and blood truths of lived reality, or rather, appropriating them 
to his narrative version of it. This move prefigures the one at the end o f the novel when 
Marcel will finally leave the world, go into his room and begin writing.” The same terms, 
“une grande deception,” are used to describe the hero’s first experience o f a theatrical 
performance by the great actress “La Berma” in A 1’ombre des ieunes filles en fleurs (17).
Much later on in the novel, he will learn one of the scandalous secrets o f the 
Guermantes: that they are just as much German no bilit)' as they are French. This 
discovery, along with the decline in fashionableness of the Duchesse de Guermantes, 
contribute significantly to the loss o f prestige of the maison de Guermantes in the hero’s 
eyes. His disillusion with regard to the passing of what had seemed to be immutable 
values contributes as much as anything to his eventual stay in a sanatorium in Le temps 
rerrouve. The narrator’s discovery o f a path at Combray which connects what he had 
thought to be separate realms, the “co d  de Mesdglise” and the “cote de Guermantes,” 
equally destroys the reassuring symmetry o f the two opposing sides which corresponds to 
the young hero’s naive belief in the clear-cut separation between good and evil, and 
between the aristocracy and the rest o f society.
The Pastoral Tradition
Another link which can be seen between the lost time o f Marcel Proust and the 
obsession with the past of Faulkner’s narrators is the sense o f loss expressed in both 
authors as a longing for an idealized past embodied as a rural or agrarian ideal. Lewis 
Simpson and Michael Grimwood have both discussed Faulkner’s links with the pastoral 
tradition: “insofar as he typically chose to write about people who worked with their 
hands rather than with their minds,” says Grimwood, “he was a pastoralist. For 
pastoralism has always thrived on the infatuation of intellectuals and artists with the 
imagined joys of physical labor.” While the Sutpen and the Compson families could
55 This is also a figure for the flesh and blood novelist, who spent the last decade ofhis life enclosed in a cork- 
lined room.
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hardly be called representatives of pastoral values, the loss o f  the Compson pasture and 
the violence which is said to have been inflicted upon the land by Sutpen are examples o f  
how Faulkner’s novels dramatize a sense o f loss or transgression which plagues the 
intellectual Quentin.
Sutpen’s fate, or punishment, was perhaps sealed by the way he “violently tore” 
his plantation from the “virginal” swampland. The building o f the Sutpen plantation is 
thus described as a rape o f the land. His acquisition o f the property is likewise said to 
have been the fruit o f some secretive, underhanded deals.
Sutpen’s appearance in Yoknapatawpha is all the more sinister to the inhabitants 
o f Jefferson because of the presence o f Haitian slaves with whom Sutpen works side by 
side, caked in mud to ward off mosquitoes: “[...] the negroes could speak no English 
yet and doubtless there were more than Akers who did not know that the language in 
which they and Sutpen communicated was a sort o f  French and not some dark and fatal 
tongue of their own” (36). The slaves themselves seem to have been focus of much 
speculation among Yoknapatawpha citizens. This is due in no small measure to Sutpen’s 
promiscuity with them. He joins them in the physical labor, plastering himself with mud 
to avoid mosquitos just as they do, and boxing with them.
In The Sound and the Furv. Quentin’s thoughts reveal a sense of guilt about the 
loss of the land in exchange for his one year at the university (95,116, 127, 154). The 
literal loss of the pasture is symbolic o f the loss of values associated with the Old South. 
The sale of the Compson pasture enables Quentin to leave the agrarian south for 
intellectual pursuits at Harvard.
Pastoral Proust
Proust’s novel could also be read in its relationship to the pastoral tradition. One 
o f the fundamental oppositions in Proust’s novel is between the values associated with the 
country, with life in the provinces, and those displayed in the more cosmopolitan circles 
o f the Parisian salon socity. In “Combray,” his grandmother extolls the virtues o f nature,
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and encourages the young child to engage in physical activities which his feeble health 
precludes. The hero remembers being read “Francois le champi,” a novel whose 
characters and themes deal with rustic life.
As Paul De Man has pointed out in his analysis o f the reading scene in Du cote 
de chez Swann, the tension between these two realms forms the central conflict in the 
young Marcel’s life. This can be seen in his desire to claim for his intellectual activities, 
reading and writing, the values ascribed by his grandmother to exercise, and country air. 
DeMan discusses this in depth in his Allegories o f  Reading: “the confinement to the 
obscure, private existence of inward retreat turns out to be a highly effective strategy for 
the retrieval o f all that seemed to have been sacrificed. The text asserts the possibility o f 
recuperating, by an act o f reading, all that the inner contemplation had discarded, the 
opposites o f all the virtues necessary to its well-being: the warmth o f the sun, its light and 
even the activity that the restful immobility seemed to have definitively eliminated” (59- 
60). The pastoral virtues associated with the warmth and light of the sun are associated 
with the bourgeois ideal o f activity, that is to say industry.
The narrator describes himself as forever fantasizing about young peasant women, 
whether they be milkmaids spied from a train window, or the chambermaid o f  the 
Baroness Putbus. The desire for pastoral virtues, like search for lost time, is a quest for a 
lost paradise. One o f  the major concerns o f Proust’s narrator is loss: the loss o f his 
grandmother, of Albertine, of his own memories, and finally, the loss o f his sense o f loss 
in the slow progression o f forgetfulness which he traces in Albertine disparue. In Le 
temps retrouve. the narrator is forced to conclude that “les vrais paradis sont les paradis 
qu’on a perdus” “the true paradises are those which have been lost” (177).
In Faulkner’s novels, the character’s obsession with the past, their inability to let it 
die projects an image o f the antebellum South as a pre-lapsarian paradisee. The Sound 
and the Furv reveals that one o f the thoughts which is at the root of Quentin’s inner 
conflicts is that of the pasture which his idiot brother loved and which was sold so he
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could spend one year at Harvard. Quentin’s going o ff to Harvard represents a turning 
away from the Southern heritage. This is driven home in Absalom by his relationship to 
his Canadian roommate at Harvard. The South here is literally recontextualized, as 
Quentin’s new context changes the nature o f his relationship to the Northern other and 
to the other in general.
The reader has seen in The Sound and the Furv. that Quentin is hounded by the 
thought that he has a duty which he cannot fulfill. His thoughts return incessantly to his 
sister Caddy, and thus his family’s honor, and his failed attempt to fight Dalton Ames, 
whom he perceived as having befouled that honor. Quentin is obsessed by the need to 
follow a code o f honor, but is unable to act. Some critics have speculated that this loss of 
power to act is attributable to the castrating effect o f  the Compson women, first Mrs 
Compson, then Caddy. This code of honor is a vestige of a value sytem which is no 
longer in effect.
Unlike the Proustian narrator, Quentin never shows any sign o f a desire for some 
kind of philosophical truth or conclusion. Instead, he seems merely to seek an end, relief 
from his obsessions, from his sense o f obligation to defend the honor of his sister, and 
from the oppressive past of Southern history. In A h sa lo m . Absalom! he is from the start, 
tired, weary o f hearing the same story over and over again.
During Proust’s lifetime the prestige and privileges of the aristocracy were being 
eroded, by educational and governmental systems based on merit or by social status 
based on wealth rather than birthright. The social status accorded to the former Mme 
Verdurin when she becomes the new Princesse de Guermantes, negates all the 
significance that the hero has invested in the aristocratic name. Gilles Deleuze has 
pointed out the emptiness of the gestures and signs emitted in the Verdurin’s salon, 
which is portrayed almost as a cult, obeying a strict, if unspoken, code, with its rituals 
and its displays. Mme Verdurin is described as an accomplished actress and stage 
director as she emits signs which serve as signals for her “faithful” “rien de drole nest dit
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chez Mme Verdurin, et Mme Verdurin ne rir pas; mais Cotrard fait signe qu’il dit 
quelquechose de dr6le, Mme Verdurin fait signe quelle rit, et son signe est dmis si 
parfaitement que Monsieur Verdurin, pour ne pas etre inferieur, cherche a son tour une 
mimique appropriee” “Nothing funny is said in Mme Verdurin’s salon, and she doesn’t 
laugh; but Cottard indicates that he has said something funny, and Mme Verdurin 
displays signs o f laughter. Her sign is so perfectly promulgated that Monsieur Verdurin 
in turn seeks an appropriate mimicry so as to avoid seeming inferior.” In the bourgeois 
salon of the Verdurins, the sign “anticipe Faction comme la pensee, annule la pensle 
comme Faction, et se declare suffisant,” “anticipates action as it does thought, annuls 
them both, and declares itself sufficient.”56 The world o f the bourgeois salon is a world 
devoid of substance, an endless play o f  empty signifiers.
As Roland Barthes explains in his analysis of Balzac “Sarrasine:” “La difference qui 
oppose la socfefe feodale k la socfefe bourgeoise, Findice au signe est celle-ci: Findice a 
une origine, le signe n’en a pas; passer de Findice au signe, c ’est abolir la derniere (ou la 
premi&re) limite, Forigine, le fondement, la bufee, c’est entrer dans le proems illimife des 
equivalences, des representations que rien ne vient plus arreter, orienter, fixer consacrer” 
(S/Z 47). “T he difference which opposes feudal society to bourgeois society, the index to 
the sign, is this: the index has an origin; the sign does not. To move from the index to 
the sign is to abolish the last (or the first) limit, the origin, the foundation, the goal; it is 
to enter into the unlimited process o f equivalencies, of representations that nothing can 
any longer stop, orient or consacrate.” In the post-aristocratic world o f  French society, 
individual status could no longer be guaranteed by the family name. The naive hero’s 
belief in the magical power of names, and in the Recherche demonstrates that this was 
always already the case, even with the Guermantes, who owe as much allegiance to 
Germany as to France. The narrator ascribes Charius with “German” behavior (“une
56 Gilles Dcicuze, Proust et les sipnes. (Paris: PUF, 1986) 11 (my translation).
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maniere allemande,” SG 304). Madame de Cambremer ceils che hero that the 
Guermantes are half German, which she says explains why Saint Loup is a “dreyfiisard” 
(SG 480). This explains in part the Baron de Charlus’ sympathy for Germany in the first 
World Wan “il allait plus loin que ne pas souhaiter passionement la vicroire de la France, 
il souhairait plutot, sans se I’avouer, que I’Allemagne sinon triomphat, du mo ins ne fik 
pas ecrasee comme tout le monde le souhairait” (TR 80), “he went beyond not 
passionately desiring the victory o f France: he desired rather without admitting it to 
himself, that Germany should, if not triumph, at least not be crushed as everybody 
hoped she would be” (III: 797). We learn in the final volume that Charlus considers 
himelf German: “si longtemps apr&s la guerre, il g&nissait de la d^faite des Allemands, 
parmi lesquels il se comptait” (TR 171) “The war had long since ended, and still he 
groaned over the defeat of the Germans, among whose number he counted himself” (III: 
896).
The climax o f the novel coincides with the devaluation o f the name Guermantes, 
as the narrator discovers not only the change in individuals that time has wrought, but 
also that the salon of the Princesse o f Guermantes, once the beacon o f elegance in the 
Faubourg Saint Germain, is inhabited by “foreign bodies” which, in the past would have
been excluded:
ce milieu en la nature specifique duquel, definie par certaines affinites qui 
lui attiraienc tous les grands noms princiers de l’Europe et la repulsion qui 
eloignait d ’elle tout dllment non aristocratique, j’avais trouve comme un 
refuge materiel pour ce nom de Guermantes auquel il pr&cait sa derni&re 
realitd, ce milieu avait lui-meme subi dans sa constitution intime et que 
j’avais crue stable, une alteration prolbnde (TR 262)
this coterie, within che specific nature o f  which, delimited as it was by 
certain affinities that attracted to it all the great princely names o f Europe 
and by forces o f an opposite kind which repelled from it anything that 
was not aristocratic, I had found, I thought, a sort o f  corporeal refuge for 
the name Guermantes, this coterie which had seemed to confer upon that 
name its ultimate reality, had itself, in its innermost and as I had thought 
stable constitution, undergone a profound transformation” (III: 1000)
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The change in the constitution o f the Princesses salon is characteristic o f a tendency o f 
society as a whole: “Car ce que caractdrisait le plus cette socilte, c ’ltait sa prodigieuse 
aptitude au declassement” (TR 262).57 This “d&lassement” corresponds to the elevation 
of those who were previously excluded, and seems to split them into different people. 
This social change, says the narrator, is a phenomenon o f memory:
J’enrendais des gens qui auraient pourtant du savoir, dire en parlant de 
Bloch: «Le Bloch-Guermantes ? Le familier des Guermantes ?» Ces 
erreurs quiscindent une vie et, en en isolant le present, font de l’homme 
dont on parle un autre homme, un homme different, une creation de la 
veille, un homme qui n ’est que la condensation de ses habitudes actuelles 
(alors que lui porte en lui-meme la continuite de sa vie qui le relie au 
passe), ces erreurs dependent bien aussi du Temps, mais elles sont non un 
phdnom&nesocial, mais un phenomine de mdmoire. (TR 262)
And now, with reference to Bloch, even those who ought to have known 
better might be heard to inquire: T h e  Guermantes Bloch? The Bloch 
who is such a friend o f  the Guermantes? these errors which split a life in 
two and, by isolating his present from his past, turn some man whom one 
is talking about into another, a different man, a creation o f yesterday, a 
man who is no more than a condensation o f  his present habits (whereas 
the real man bears within himself an awareness, linking him to the past, o f  
the continuity o f his life), these errors, though they too, as I have said, are 
a result o f  the passage o f Time, are not a social phenomenon, but one o f 
memory. (Ill: 1011)
The shifting o f the proper name is equated by Proust himself as a usurpation o f property: 
T h e  succession o f a new individual to a name is melancholy, as is all succession, all 
usurpation o f property; and yet for ever and ever, without interruption, there would 
come, sweeping on, a flood o f new Princesses de Guermantes-or rather, centuries old, 
replaced from age to age by a series of different women, o f different actresses playing 
the same part” (III: 999).
In Le temps retrouv^ alliance, that is to say association, has displaced lineage as 
the organizing principle. Synchrony has displaced history (thus the difficulty many 
people have in reading Proust “for the plot”) and an identity based on relation to the
57 T h e  most characteristic aspect ofthis society was its prodigious aptitude for loss of class status" (My 
translation. This passage missing from the standard English translation).
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ocher must also displace an identity based on essence. When identity is based on a 
relationship to an other, it becomes necessary to define that other; hence the narrator’s 
efforts to exhaustively know others as the context for his own affirmation as self. As 
Bersani puts it: “The narrator insistently asks: how can /be? The question is generated by 
Marcel’s shattering discovery-or at least suspicion—that others are” (863). The failure o f 
this project o f knowing can be seen in che inconsistencies and lacuna of the narrative 
itself
Fractured Narrative 
Both on the level o f the signifier and on the level of the signified, in the style of 
the narration and the story which it tells: the text is much more fractured than it may 
appear. Many crucial events seem to be missing from the narrative. The advent o f the war 
in the final volume corresponds to one of the more noticeable gaps in the narration: an 
undefined period o f “several years” which the narrator spends “far from Paris in a 
sanatorium,” having completely renounced his desire to be a writer (TR 29; III: 743). In 
chis time, the hero has grown old, a fact which is as imperceptible to the reader as it is to 
him. It is only when he recognizes the aged faces o f the other invited guests at the 
matinee o f  the Princess o f Guermantes that he realizes that he to has grown old:
Alors moi qui depuis mon enfance, vivant au jour le jour et ayant re^u 
d ’ailieurs de moi-meme et des autres une impression definitive, je 
m’aper^us pour la premiere fois, d ’apr&s les metamorphoses qui setaient 
produites dans tous ces gens, du temps qui avait passe pour eux, ce qui 
me bouleversa par la revelation qu’il avait passe aussi pour moi” (TR 233)
So that at last I, who from childhood had lived from day to day and had 
received, o f myself and o f others, impressions which I regarded as 
definitive, became aware as I had never been before-by an inevitable 
inference from the metamorphoses which had taken place in all the 
people around m e-of the time which had passed for them, a notion 
which brought with it the overwhelming revelation that it had passed also 
for me. (Ill: 967)
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Once again, che narrator can only recognize himself in his image as reflected through 
others. This realization comes as a surprise for the reader, too, for there is very little in the 
novel to suggest the progress o f the narrator’s life.
Far from presenting a “whole picture” o f the narrator’s “lost time,” the novel 
leaves large gaps in che chronology o f the life. We know nothing o f  his formal education 
or employment. These gaps are especially evident in the final volume, where the “leaps 
ahead” in the story o f the hero’s life become increasingly larger, while the amount of text 
devoted to relatively small amounts o f  “story time” increases dramatically.58 The process 
of filling in those gaps is the very process o f remembering (or we might also say “of 
writing”).
Gerard Genette points out three possible relationships between plot and narrative, 
wherein events that happened once can be recounted once. This “singular” mode of 
discourse is che standard mode o f traditional narrative. Alternatively the same event can 
be recounted more than once, in a repetitive narrative mode. Finally, events which 
recurred more than once can be summarized in a single narrative instance. This is what 
Genette calls “iterative” discourse. In the traditional narrative, the iterative discursive 
elements are always subordinated to the singular. In Proust, this is reversed. Even the 
singular events, things which, according to verisimilitude, can only have happened once, 
are often presented in the imperfect. Genette calls this the “pseudo-iterative" and 
qualifies this as a particularly Proustian mode o f discourse.
The artificiality of a large part o f the memories recounted in the novel is manifest
in the way that characters are always caught in habitual postures or actions. The
dominance o f the imperfect tense demonstrates this. People are described as they “used
to” behave. The soirees of the Verdurins or the Duchesse de Guermantes are “synthetic”
narratives: amalgams o f many soirees spliced together by the flow o f  the text itself. Most
58 For the distinctions between “story rime," “textual time,” “plot,” and “narrative," see my discussion of 
Gerard Genette Figures HI (Paris: Seuil, 1972.) in the next chapter.
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of the actions are things that habitually happened. Even the intermittent anecdotes that 
the narrator recounts, introduced by “Une fois” and “une autre” which would seem to be 
unique events, accumulate and transform into exemplars o f  many similar repeated 
events, with a formulation such as: “ainsi chaque fois q u e .. . ”
The whole episode o f  “Un amour de Swann,” for example, begins with the basic 
temporal patterns o f habitual actions: It first establishes the rituals of behavior in the 
“petit noyau” o f the Verdurin clan, and opposes to it the irruption of inhabitual behavior 
when Odette introduces Swann: “cette annee-li, la demi-mondaine raconta a M. 
Verdurin qu’elle avait fait la connaissance dun homme charmant, M. Swann” (S 187- 
88), but soon the novelty is assimilated by the repetitive nature o f salon activities.
The opposition o f voluntary and involuntary memory is built around this 
alternation of habit and novelty. The things we can easily recall form only a “sort o f 
luminous panel, ” a tiny fragment o f an unknown whole. Gradually all novelty is 
converted into Habit. So crucial a role does the force o f habit play in his novel, that 
Proust often capitalizes the term. Order is preserved only by suppressing accidents and 
difference. Yet anomaly and difference continue to disrupt habit up to the very end o f 
the novel.
The narrator himself is engaged in an ongoing quest for unity: he describes 
himself as a young man in search o f some “great philosophical truth,” on which to base a 
novel, but this ideal forever eludes him. He must continually come to terms with things 
that are not as they (once) may have appeared to be. This is due in part to the 
inadequacies of his powers o f  observation, to the fallibility o f  human judgment and 
perception, as, for example, when he mistakes the signature on a letter from Gilberte to 
be that of Albertine, or in the little train leading to the Verdurin’s summer salon at la 
Raspeli^re, where he observes an old prostitute, whom he later discovers to have been not 
a prostitute, but the Princesse de Sherbatoff (SG 251, 285). But as Roland Barthes points
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out, the narrator’s dilemma can not simply be attributed to the “banal play of appearance 
and truth.”59
In the Recherche, human identity displays a chameleon-like quality which is 
demonstrated incessantly in the novel. At the beginning o f the second volume, we learn 
that Swann has acquired yet still another personality for the narrator: as the husband o f 
Odette. It is surprising and highly ironic that Swann has married Odette, because, at the 
end of the “Swann in love,” we learn that they have separated. Swann seemed to have 
realized his mistake falling for a girl who “wasn’t even his type.” (“il s’ecria en lui meme: 
«Dire que j’ai gachd des annees de ma vie, que j’ai voulu mourir, que j’ai eu mon plus 
grand amour, pour une femme qui ne me plaisait pas, qui n’dtait pas mon genreN,” S 
375) This unexpected and unexplained reversal by which Swann is suddenly Odette’s 
husband is only one example of a process of revision which is effectively never ending in 
Proust’s novel.
Swann is a double for the narrator in many ways, not only through the 
resemblance o f his jealousy for and suspicions about Odette, which foretells the narrator’s 
relationship to Albertine, but also because, like Swann, the narrator wants to be a writer. 
The narrator’s sense o f  himself is only established as a reflection of those around him. As 
he says in the first volume: “notre personnalite social est une creation de la pensee des 
autres” (S 19), “our social personality is a creation o f other people’s thoughts.”
Proustian characters are full o f surprises. The hero is continually forced to adjust 
his beliefs both to new circumstances and because o f his faulty observation. In the course 
of the novel transformations are apparent in almost all o f the major characters. They are 
not seen as gradually changing or evolving. They are abruptly and inexplicably 
discovered to be other than themselves. They are not one, but many.
59 Roland Barthes “Une id^ede recherche’’ in Recherche de Proust, eds. Gerard Genette and Ttvetan
T  odorov (Paris: Seuil. 1980) 35 - 36.
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The most exemplary figure in this respect is that of Albertine. The hero’s 
relationship to her is built around his need to unravel the mystery o f her desires.60 It is his 
desire for an exhaustive knowledge of her past and present activities that leads him to 
cloister her in his parents’ apartment. The only moment when the hero is able to enjoy 
the illusion o f truly possessing Albertine is when he observes her sleeping in his parents’ 
apartment. The death-like image of her immobile body, gives the illisuion that she can be 
completely grasped, completely possessed.
His suspicions about her life (her lives) away from him are never fully calmed. At 
every turn, he discovers a bewildering multiplicity of Albertines: “Hdlas! Albertine dtair 
plusieurs personnes,” (P 324) “Alas! Albertine was several persons in one” (III: 343). Even 
after she is gone, the narrator discovers that she is no less an «etre de fuite:»
Mais ce fut surtoutce fractionnement d’Albertine en de nombreuses parts, 
en de nombreusesAlbenines, quidtait son seul mode d ’existence en moi.
Des moments revinrent oil elle n’avait dtd que bonne, ou intelligente, ou 
serieuse, ou meme aimant plus que tout les sports. Et ce fractionnement, 
n’etait-il pas au fond juste qu’il me calmat? Car s’il n ’etait pas en Iui- 
meme quelque chose de reel, s’il tenait k la forme successive des heures oil 
elle m’etait apparue, forme qui restait celle de ma memoire, comme la 
courburedes projections de ma lanterne magique tenait k la courbure des 
verres colons, ne representait-il pas a sa maniere une verite bien objective 
celle-la, k savoir que chacun de nous n’est pas un, mais contient de 
nombreuses personnes qui n’ont pas toutes la meme valeur morale et que 
si 1’Albertine vicieuse avait existe, cela n’empechait pas qu’il y en eut eu 
dautres [. ..] (AD 110).
But it was above all that fragmentation of Albertine into many pans, into 
many Albertines, that was her sole mode o f existence in me. Moments 
recurred in which she had simply been kind, or intelligent, or serious, or 
even primarily addicted to spon. And was it not right, after all, that this 
fragmentation should soothe me? For if it was not in itself something real, 
if it arose from the continuously changing shape of the hours in which she 
had appeared to me, a shape which remained that of my memory as the 
curve o f the projections of my magic lantern depended on the curve of 
the coloured slides, did it not in its own way represent a truth, a 
thoroughly objective truth too, to wit, that none of us is single, that each
60 To Proust, “the ‘possession’ of someone loved is inseparable from an exhaustive knowledge o f their past and 
present.”). Humphries. The Otherness Within: Gnostic Readings in Marcel Proust. FlanneivO'Connor. 8c 
Francois Villon. (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1983) 11-
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o f us contains many persons who do not all have the same moral value, 
and that if a vicious Albertine had existed, it did not mean that there had 
not been others [. . .] (Ill: 540)
His suspicions about her are provoked by his projection onto her o f his own desires. The
multiplicity he perceives in Albertine mirrors his many selves: “ce qui me torturait a
imaginer chez Albertine, c etait mon propre ddsir perpetuel de plaire a de nouvelles
femmes [. ..] Comme il n’est de connaissance, on peut presque dire qu’il n’est de jalousie
que de soi meme” (P 371). “what it tortured me to imagine in Albertine was my own
perpetual desire to find favor with new women [...]. As there is no knowledge, one
might almost say that there is no jealousy, save of oneself’ (III: 392 - 93). The fleeting
nature o f Albertine implies the multiplicity and elusiveness o f the narrators own self-
knowledge.
Love and jealousy in Proust is synonymous with the desire to obtain an 
exhaustive knowledge o f all the points in time and space which the loved one has 
occupied. Thus jealousy is the ultimate figure for the undefinable nature o f the real:
C ’est un des pouvoirs de la jalousie de nous dlcouvrir combien la foalite 
des faits exterieurs et les sentiments de 1’ame sont quelque chose 
d’inconnu qui prete a mille suppositions. Nous croyons savoir exactement 
les choses, et ce que pensent les gens, pour la simple raison que nous ne 
nousen soucionspas. Mas dfes que nousavonsle desir de savoir, comme a 
le jaloux, alors c’est un vertigineux kaleidoscope oil nous ne distinguons 
plusrien. (AD 100)
It is one of the faculties o f jealousy to reveal to us the extent to which the 
reality o f external facts and the sentiments o f the heart are an unknown 
element which lends itself to endless suppositions. We imagine that we 
know exactly what things are and what people think, for the simple reason 
that we do not care about them. But as soon as we have a desire to know, 
as the jealous man has, then it becomes a dizzy kaleidoscope in which we 
can no longer distinguish anything. (Ill: 529)
The numerous contradictory images he has of Albertine, and the loss o f the ability to
trust his impressions ofwhat is real, reveal to him the indeterminacy of his own desires
and the multiplicity o f his own behavior:
Ce n’&ait pas Albertine seule qui n ’&ait qu’une succession de moments, 
c ’iftait aussi moi-meme. M on amour pour elle n’avait pas simple: k la
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curiosity de 1’inconnu s etait ajoutl un desir sensuel, et a un sentiment 
dune douceurpresquefamiiiaJe, tantot l’indifference, tantot une furieuse 
jalousie. Je n’lrais pas un seul homme, mais ie difill d’une armle 
composite oil il y avait selon le moment des passionls, des indifferents, 
des jaloux-des jaloux dont pas u n n ’ltait jaloux de la mime femme. (AD 
71).
It was not Albertine alone who was a succession o f moments, it was also 
myself. My love for her was not simple: to a curiousity about the 
unknown had been added a sensual desire, and to a feeling o f almost 
conjugal sweetness, at one moment indifference, at another a furious 
jealousy. I was not one man only, but as it were the march-past o f a 
composite army in which there were passionate men, indifferent men, 
jealous men—jealous men not one o f whom was jealous o f the same 
woman (III: 499)
Ironically, the calm he feels watching her sleep is not reproduced when he learns o f  her 
actual death. Jealousy, he learns, is not dependent on its object, on the external world, for 
ail of the jealous lover’s suspicions and suppositions emanate from himself.
Quand notre maitresse est vivante, une grande partie des pensles qui 
forment ce que nous appelons notre amour nous viennent pendant les 
heures ou elle n’est pas a cotl de nous. Ainsi Ton prend l’habitude d ’avoir 
pour objet de sa reverie un etre absent, et qui, mime s’il ne le reste que 
quelques heures, pendant ces heures-la n ’est qu’un souvenir. Aussi la mort 
ne change-t-elle pas grand-chose (AD 104).
When one’s mistress is alive, a large proportion o f the thoughts which 
form what one calls one’s love comes to one during the hours when she is 
not by one’s side. Thus one acquires the habit o f having as the object o f 
one’s musings an absent person, and one who, even if she remains absent 
for a few hours only, during those hours is no more than a memory.
Hence death does not make any great difference. (Ill: 534)
There is nothing unusual about this, he concludes, since the images of Albertine that he
had, came not from her, but from himself. He continues to act and think as if she were
still alive even after he learns o f her death in a horse-riding accident.
Accordingly, in the progress o f his forgetfulness after she has died the narrator
discovers that this oblivion implies a loss of the self.
Et comme dans les nouveaux espaces, encore non parcourus qui 
s’ltendaient devant moi, il n ’y aurait pas plus de traces de mon amour 
pour Albertine qu’il n ’y en avait eu dans les temps perdus que je venais de 
traverser, de mon amour pour ma grand’mlre, offrant une succession de 
plriodes sous lesquelles, aprls un certain intervalle, rien de ce qui soutenait
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
la precedante ne subsistait plus dans celle qui la suiviait, ma vie m’apparut 
comme quelque chose de si depourvu du support d ’un moi individuel 
identiqueet permanent” [...] (AD 173)
And as in the new spaces, as yet unexplored, which extended before me, 
there would be no more trace of my love for Albertine than there had 
been, in the time lost which I had just traversed, of my love for my 
grandmother, my life appeared to me-offering a succession of periods in 
which, after a certain interval, nothing of what had sustained the previous 
period survived in that which fbllowed-as something utterly devoid o f 
the support of an idndividual, identical and permanent self. (Ill: 607)
If the ability to forget implies a loss of self, it is because memory is the essence o f the self.
Without memory, there can be no narrative, and without narrative, there is no identity.
The question o f Albertines homosexuality, which so plagues Prousts hero,
further illustrates the undeflnable nature o f identity, for even sexual “identity” is
ephemeral. Commenting on Albertines “polymorphousseductiveness,”Julia Kristeva
notes that Proust “intends it to be universal. Each sex and each person (Albertine no less
than anyone else) would be a network of partitioned differences and adjacent
incompatibilites (a ‘Vinteuil’ side, a ‘hideous’ side). The whole person is unaware o f these
divisions, for in the final analysis this ‘whole’ person does not exist. He is nothing but
features and characteristics” (72).
The models of language and consciousness which emerge from Marcel Proust
and William Faulkner’s novels reveal an almost infinite potential for associations and
anecdotes; time is exploded into disparate fragments linked no longer by chronology
and logic, but by the fabric of association. Subjectivity is the building of a complex web
of intertextual references. But contexts can never be fixed. The narrator’s inability to
correctly observe and understand those around him can also be attributed to the ever-
changing nature o f his social context. But, as we have seen, the narrator ultimately
ascribes the flux of social values to the fluctuations o f  memory.
Our memories, and thus our knowledge o f who we are, of where we’ve been and
who we’ve known, is critically dependent on arbitrarily established initial conditions, one
of which is on the present o f our remembering. Proust’s hero discovers that the
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recurrence o f physical sensation is capable of triggering memory, but this effect is 
fundamentally a chance occurrence,61 and it is the ultimate chance occurrence, the 
unforeseeable event of our death which threatens any identity with annihilation, while at 
the same time seemingly fixing identity by closing the process o f recontextualization.
Being the story of a life, the narrator’s death is the moment towards which the 
text must inevitably point; yet this death is forever deferred by the circularity" of the 
novel: the end o f which corresponds to the moment when the narrator takes up the pen 
to begin writing. There is a Proustian logic in which writing is equivalent to a kind of 
death. As he finally begins to write, he describes the process o f writing as a “tiresome 
obligation:” “Cette idee de la mort s’installa definitivement en moi comme fait un 
amour,” (TR 349) “The idea of death took up permanent residence within me in the way 
that love sometimes does.” Why is writing here so linked to the idea o f death? The 
narrator’s great fear is that he will not have enough time to finish his work. Writing thus 
becomes a race against time, against. It is only death which can put an end to the 
perpetual becoming of the work: Tidee de mon oeuvre etait dans ma tete, toujours la 
meme, en perpetuel devenir,” “che idea of my work was inside my head, always the 
same, perpetually in process of becoming” (III: 1099-1100). This perpetual process of 
becoming is nothing more than what Rorty calls recontextualization.
Proust seeks to master and reveal the involuntary memory in the belief that it 
contains the essence of lost time. The narrator fetishizes the object which provokes the 
involuntary memory, so that this object symbolizes and makes present that past moment. 
The object thus becomes a link to the past. From its original chance association through 
proximity" (metonymy) to the events being remembered memory, the seemingly 
insignificant decor, the object stands now in a metaphorical relation, a relation of 
necessity, to memory. The object contains the essence o f that memory.
61 “II y a beaucoup dc hasard en tout ceci" (S 43).
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As noted above, Gilles Deleuze has characterized A la Recherche du temps perdu 
as a novel of “ apprentissage,” a bildungsroman which gives us a portrait o f  the education 
and formation of the central character. But the novel does very little to suggest growth or 
progress in the hero’s life either as an artist or as a respectable young man, and one o f the 
lessons that he will learn is clearly that o f the seemingly arbitrary variability of the 
phenomena of identity, personality, and social values. Proust’s narrator is never able to 
give a complete or coherent portrait o f other characters, because they are all capable of 
displaying heretofore unknown aspects or behavior at different times or in different 
contexts. At the beginning of A l’ombre des ieunes ftlles en fleurs. the narrator makes a 
remark that is echoed again and again throughout the novel: “il etait arrivee qu’au «fils 
Swann» et aussi au Swann du Jockey, 1’ancien ami de mes parents avait ajoute une 
personnalite nouvelle (et qui ne devait pas etre la derniere), celle de mari d’Odette” (3). 
“What had happened was that, to the original ‘young Swann’ and also to the Swann of 
the Jockey Club, our old friend had added a new personality (which was not to be his 
last), that o f Odette’s husband” (I: 465). The appearance o f a second, and even a third 
Charles Swann signals as much a long term transformation in the narrating subject as in 
the character of Swann; the sudden fashionableness of the salons o f  Odette Swann or 
Mme Verdurin, the transformation o f Charlus from the caricaturishly zealous 
representative of a patriarchal dynasty to a “an old queen” (“une vieille tame”), and the 
transformation of the entire social hierarchy after the Dreyfus affair and the war 
represent ever-accelerating, and ever more pronounced changes. The rapidity and the 
unpredictability' (that is to say, the arbitrariness) o f these changes demonstrate the lack of 
solid foundations for social identities, and values, and thus for any identity, including 
that of the narrator. His story can never be folly told, never exhausted, for the characters 
are continually modified as it progresses. Rather than having the details o f their 
personality' “filled in,” these characters are progressively “hollowed out,” emptied o f their
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consistency as individuals. The loquacity o f Proust’s narrator betrays 2 logophilia which is 
none other than a desire for completion, for consistency where none is possible.
In spite o f all his efforts to understand the hidden nature o f people and of art and 
to transcend time itself by the discover}" o f some great, hidden philosophical truth (S 
176-77) It is, instead, a nearly divine revelation, a deux ex machina that will break the 
camel's back of lost years with a flood of memories and revelations. The narrator does 
not build gradually his understanding of truth; instead it comes all at once, unexpectedly 
and unpredictably. It is the completely fortuitous events at the Princesse de 
Guermantes’s matinee, the involuntary memory awakened by his stumbling on the 
uneven paving stones o f their courtyard, a kind o f deux ex machina., which enables the 
narrator to begin writing, by freeing him from the necessity o f a telos.
A la recherche du temps perdu is a narrative governed by chance, and as such is 
emblematic of a general trend in twentieth-century thought to a reconsideration and 
revaluation ofcomplex or chaotic behavior in conscious and unconscious processes. What 
is put to the fore is its involuntary, mechanical or arbitrary functioning. The supreme 
effort of the will is inferior to the chance revelations o f  time..
In this Proust may well have been ahead o f his time, scientifically speaking. 
Researchers exploring the nature of the brain and human consciousness have come to 
conclude that, rather than being stored in some location of the brain, simply awaiting 
retrieval by consciousness, memory is akin more to dynamic interaction with 
consciousness. The normal human brain apparendy does not store fixed  memories.
Rather, a healthy human mind continually reinvents memories from sensations and 
feelings. Since much o f  what we consider to be our “identity” is bound up in our personal 
experiences and memories, it is clear then that “identification” is a contingent, ongoing 
process which only arbitrarily appears to be fixed. There are few exceptions to this rule. 
Though people who have suffered some forms of brain damage do exhibit fixed 
memories, this is because they are no longer capable o f  forming new ones.
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Nothing in Proust’s novel is ever definitive, including and especially personal 
identity as it is reconstructed by memory or narration. The ultimate example o f this in 
Proust’s novel is the hero’s obsession with Albertine, whom he sequesters in his parents 
apartment in order to know as much as possible about her daily activities, thoughts and 
desires. To his dismay what he discovers is that scrutiny only amplifies the mystery o f 
being. The closer one looks the more Albertines one can find. This does not mean, 
however that Proust is ready to completely abandon the quest. His opus is just such an 
effort. The lengths to which he went to unify and structure his novel display the 
Cartesian subject’s desire to master and overcome the chaos of his own patterns of 
thought. William Faulkner, writing two decades after Proust seems to have more readily 
assimilated the lessons illustrated in Proust’s novel. The link between these two authors is 
this attempt to represent the patterns of thought, an attempt which ultimately 
demonstrates the paradoxical nature of both representation and being.
Social Fluidity in Faulkner
The thing that Quentin has difficulty accepting is the realization o f the 
inevitability of such social promiscuity. It is this promiscuity which threatens the sanctity 
of the Compson family as well, since Quentin’s exposure to life at Harvard comes at the 
price of the Compson land. It is the promiscuity of Caddy which leads to Quentin’s 
obsession with virginity, and his frustrated desire to preserve and to violate that sanctity.
Quentin Compson’s world is divided into castes by several factors, including 
race, sex, money and class. As in Proust, the aristocracy, as represented by families such 
as the Compsons or the Guermantes, is in decline, as much from its own weaknesses as 
from the illegitimacy o f  their own pretentions. The difference in the world of 
Yoknapatawpha is that the Southern planter aristocracy wasn’t nearly as well-established. 
While the Civil War might be cited as the external reason for the downfall o f  the 
Southern aristocracy, their demise in Absalom. Absalom! and The Sound and the Furv is
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depicted as the result of the internal weaknesses and flaws of the Sutpen, Compson and 
Sartoris families.
The Proper Name
In Absalom. Absalom! Faulkner dramatizes the failure of the patriarchal system 
to be a guarantor o f identity, through the perpetuation of the proper name and the 
family property. While Sutpen is a self-made man, his “design” for his children is 
predicated upon their submission to his plan, the production of a male heir. Mr 
Compson claims that Sutpen named all o f his children.
Sutpen’s design includes the acquisition o f names. His marriage to Ellen is 
described by Mr Compson (in chapter II) as the result, not o f a romantic courtship, but 
o f a business deal consisting of the formal exchange of titles: “Miss Rosa was righter than 
she knew: he did want, not the anonymous wife and the anonymous children, but the 
two names, the stainless wife and the unimpeachable father-in-law, on the license, the 
patent. Yes the patent with a gold seal and red ribbons too if that had been practicable” 
(AA 59).
Mr. Compson’s insistance that Supen named all of his children himself seems 
incongruous with the choice of names. The origins that Sutpen ascribes to himself in the 
tale of his nomadic childhood in the Appalachian mountains o f Virginia seem hardly 
conducive to his aquisition of the education necessary to understand the significance of 
the names he chose. Mr Compson sees Sutpen’s choice o f name for his mulatto offspring 
as the mistake o f a semi-literate man:
Yes, Clytie was his daughter too: Clytemnestra. He named her 
himself. He named them all himself: all his own get and all the get o f  his 
wild niggers after the country began to assimilate them. [. . .] He named 
Clytie as he named them all, the one before Clytie and Henry and Judith 
even, with that same robust and sardonic temerity, naming with his own 
mouth his own ironic fecundity o f dragon’s teeth which with the two 
exceptions were girls. Only I have always liked to believe that he intended 
to name her Cassandra, prompted by some pure dramatic economy not 
only to beget but to designate the presiding augur of his own disaster,
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and that he just got the name wrong through a mistake natural in a man 
who must have almost taught himself to read). [. . .] (AA 73 - 74)
In naming his children he has chosen names from the Old Testament, such as
Judith, or names inspired by Greek mythology such as the Queen Clytemnestra, wife o f
Agamemnon, who led the Greeks against Troy. Mr. Compson claims that the name
Clytemnestra was a mistake, as he really meant to name her Cassandra, the slave and
prophetess of doom who is witness to the death and destruction in the house of Atreus.
So that Sutpen would have mistaken the queen for the servant. At the time of the Mr
Compson’s conversation with Quentin in the summerof 1910, Clytemnestra is the only
known remaining inhabitant o f Sutpen’s plantation.
Faulkner’s choice o f  names for these characters places their story in the context o f
Greek tragedy, a context in which Mr Compson explicitly places them. While Miss Rosa
depicts Sutpen as a demon, Mr Compson wants to see Sutpen as a tragic figure.: “And
what [Miss Rosa] saw then was just that ogre-face o f her childhood seen once and then
repeated at intervals [. . .], like the mask in Greeek tragedy interchangeable not only
from scene to scene but from accor to actor and behind which the events and occasions
took place without chronology or sequence” (AA 74).
Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha novels depict a breakdown in social hierarchies, in
which prestigious land owning families such as the Sarto rises and the Compsons are
supplanted by interlopers such as the Snopses, in which the South which must come to
terms with the intermingling o f cultures and races, with a generalized principle o f mixing,
creolization, or metissage. This principle ofcreolization is shown to have been already
present at the heart o f  the plantation system, in the fruit o f the slaveowner’s promiscuity,
but with the demise o f the Old South the sytstem of exclusion on which the institution
depended is unmasked.
In an action which mirrors Supen’s own repudiation o f his first wife and child,
Henry disavows his birthright and disappears (perhaps taking an assumed name?), thus
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undoing the father’s plan from within by abdicating his role as perpetuator of the family 
name. His murder o f Charles Bon at the gates of the Sutpen plantation is an extreme 
form o f the encounter in which the young Sutpen is refused entrance to the big house. 
The exclusion of the other is a demarcation of property through the denial of access to an 
outsider. In both cases, the outside is in one respect assimilable to the inside, since it is 
the young white boy who is refused entry to the white man’s mansion, and it is Sutpen’s 
son (Bon) who is excluded. The exclusion marks the other as other, instituting or 
affirming a defference against the danger of an improper mixing.
Bon’s exclusion from Sutpen’s Hundred is a is a denial o f incest in which Henry 
plays the role of his father in relation to the unrecognized son. It is thus also a symbolic 
act o f denial of paternity: It is Thomas Sutpen, the father, refusing to recognize his son.
In the words of Iidouard Glissant, “the novel suggests that, in the South, one might 
admit —conceive o f— incest, but not the intrusion of black blood which is nevertheless 
there.”62
Absalom. Absalom! tells o f a perversion of legitimacy and paternity. Sutpen 
repudiates his first wife and their child because he discovers that she was an octoroon. 
Though he has children by his slaves, the “design” that Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson 
attribute to him meant the birth of a white male heir who could perpetuate his name. 
Instead his child by the first marriage, Charles Bon, returns to court Sutpen’s daughter, 
Judith, from his second marriage. When Sutpen informs his legitimate son, Henry, of the 
twin threats of incest and miscegenation, the latter murders Bon at the gates of the 
plantation, repudiates his inheritance and disappears.
Sutpen’s own origins are unknown. The history o f  the family lines is blocked by 
the impossibility of finding the origin. Sutpen is a man who “appeared” in 
Yoknapatawpha County “out o f no discernible past” (9), and with “a name that none o f
62 “le roman suggercqu'on pourrait ici (dans leSud) ad meet re -concevoir-rinceste, mais non pas I'intrusion 
du sang noirquiest pouttant la." Fdouard Glissant. Po&ique de la Relation. (Paris: Gallimard, 1990) 70.
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them had ever heard, and origin and purpose which some of them were never to learn” 
(35). He tells General Compson of his ignorance about his own father’s origins.His 
attempts to found a lineage on the 100 acres of land he mysteriously acquired are ruined 
by the “mixing” of races and cultures, the perversion o f patriarchal lineage.
Absalom. Absalom! employs gossip, hearsay, speculation, a multiplicity of voices 
and a cyclical structure. The same events are recounted repeatedly, each time revealing 
new connections and details about the circumstances o f crucial episodes, such as the 
murder of Charles Bon by Henry Sutpen. The reader is informed of the major events 
almost from the very start o f the novel, so that the emphasis is not on the recounting of 
the action, but on the revelation o f facts, on speculation about the facts. The story too as 
it is told by first Rosa Coldfield, and then Quentin Compson’s father, is presented as 
something mysterious and inexplicable.
While much about the man remains a mystery to the inhabitants of Jefferson- 
even those such as Rosa Coldfield, who has family ties through his marriage to her sister- 
-Quentin and Mr. Compson are the beneficiaries o f supplemental information about 
Sutpen’s origins, thanks mostly to Quentin’s grandfather, General Compson, in whom 
the man seems to have confided a great deal. It is through General Compson that one of 
the earliest scenes in the novel, and thus perhaps a great deal of Supten’s motivation, is 
revealed. The pretext for this important revelation is the occasion of the French 
architect’s flight into the woods, first recounted in chapter II, but only elaborated by 
Quentin to Shreve in chapter VI (AA 219 - 56). This event further strengthens the 
association of the Compsons with Sutpen, since it was information that seems only to 
have been confided to General Compson:
“He told grandfather about it,” said Quentin, “that time when the 
architect escaped, tried to, tried to escape into the river bottom and go 
back to New Orleans or wherever it was, and he [. . .] sent word in to 
grandfather and some others and got his dogs and his wild niggers out 
and hunted the architect down and made him take earth in a cave under 
the river bank two days later” (AA 272).
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What Sutpen told Quentin’s grandfather on that night was o f his origins in the West 
Virginia mountains, and o f the origin ofhis plan to establish a plantation. According to 
Quentin, this plan grew out o f the child’s sudden realization ofhis family’s stature, which 
occurred in his early adolescence, during his family’s nomadic existence, moving from 
town to town, and back and forth from the mountains to the plains, with “niggers 
working in the fields while white men sat on fine horses and watched them, and more 
fine horses and men in fine clothes, with a different look in the face from mountain men 
about the tavern where the old man was not even allowed to come in by the front door 
and from which his mountain drinking manners got him ejected.“‘And the man was 
there who owned all the land and the niggers and apparently the white men who 
superintended the work, and who lived in the biggest house he had ever seen and who 
spent most of the afternoon (he told how he would creep up among the tangled 
shrubbery o f the lawn and lie hidden and watch the man) in a barrel stave hammock 
between two trees, with his shoes off, and a nigger who wore every day better clothes 
than he or his father and sisters had ever owned and ever expected to, who did nothing 
else but fan him and bring him drinks’” (AA 228).
The young man imagined himself no different from the white men on horses, 
until he was sent by his father to the big house of the plantation on which his family 
lived.
a boy either thirteen or fourteen, he didn’t know which, in garments his 
father had got from the plantation commissary and had worn out and 
which one o f the sisters had patched and cut down to fit him, and he was 
no more conscious o f his appearance in them or o f the possibility that 
anyone else would be than he was o f his skin, following the road and 
turning into the gate and following the drive [. . .] (AA 286)
His unconsciousness about the significance ofhis appearance in worn-out, second-hand 
garments is an ignorance about the significance o f such outward signs, about the way in
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which they mark him as different from the rich white man who he imagines will welcome 
him. This ignorance is postulated as an “innocence” by Quentin:
he told Grandfather how, before the monkey nigger who came to the 
door had finished saying what he said, he seemed to kind o f dissolve and 
a part o f him turn and rush back through the two years that they had 
lived there, like when you pass through a room fast and look at all the 
objects in it and you turn and go back through the room again and look 
at all the objects from the other side and you find out you had never seen 
them before (AA 286 - 87)
This encounter is described as a moment of clairty of vision in which the child’s
understanding ofhis own place in the social pecking order is altered, or rather, in
which the child first becomes aware o f the existence of a pecking order among
white men.
[. . .] he never even remembered what the nigger said, how it was the 
nigger told him, even before he had had time to say what he came for, 
never to come to that front door again but to go around to the back (AA 
290)
The rebuff which he suffers at the door of the big house is a moment o f revelation, in 
which the boy is introduced to the symbolic order ofsocial class. He sees himself for the 
first time, in the image reflected back to him by the servant’s reaction. The servant, 
taking the place of the absent proprietor o f the house, plays the role o f father, which the 
young man’s drunken father apparently is incapable of doing.
“He had never thought about his own hair or clothes or anybody else’s 
hair or clothes until he saw that monkey nigger, who through no doing o f 
his own happened to have had the felicity o f being housebred in 
Richmond maybe, looking-(“Or maybe even in Charleston,” Shreve 
breathed)”—at them and he never even remembered what the nigger said, 
how it was the nigger told him, even before he had had time to say what 
he came for, never to come to that front door again but to go around to 
the back” (AA 232)
This incident is told to by Sutpen to General Compson as a rationalization for his 
renunciation ofhis first wife in Haiti:
“that little boy who approached that door fifty years ago and was turned 
away, for whose vindication the whole plan was conceived and carried
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forward to the moment o f  this choice, this second choice devolving out 
o f that first one which in its turn was forced on me as the result of an 
agreement, an arrangement which I had entered in good faith, concealing 
nothing, while the other party or parties to it concealed from me the one 
very factor which would destroy the entire plan and design which I had 
been working toward (AA 274).
This crucial scene is not related in the early parts of the novel. Miss Rosa notably seems
to be ignorant of Sutpen’s background. As far as the rest of the inhabitants o f Jefferson
are concerned, Sutpen seems to have come out of nowhere.
The Precariousness of History 
In authors which are held up to be some kind of quintessential representative o f a 
“national” literature (and therefore o f a national identity) such as Marcel Proust or 
William Faulkner, these voices are over determined by the events, the names, and the 
social and political pressures and habits of people in particular places at particular times: 
the American South in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, or Paris and the 
French provinces at roughly the same time. But the great pride that many Frenchmen 
take in Proust, or the pride Americans (or Southerners) may take in Faulkner might well 
be attributed to their failure to have read these novels. Far from portraying some kind of 
essenrial national identity, these novels demonstrate the precariousness o f such 
constructions, their dependence on ever-changing contexts and ongoing processes of 
narration.
The notion of a purely mechanical process, itself indifferent to the contents of 
perception and memory, to a consciousnessor a personality which would function as 
individual essence, is central to this reading o f these two works. That is not to say that the 
contents are not important, but rather that their choice is somewhat arbitrary. The 
cognitive functioning of memory and perception, is at least just as important. Absalom. 
Absalom! is as much about the construction o f the narrative of the Sutpen family 
fortunes and its effect on the figure o f Quentin Compson as it is about Thomas Sutpen 
himself.
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What these novels demonstrate is the way in which time transforms beings, and 
how human perception impedes true “objective” knowledge of others—and therefore of 
the self-how in fact perception and consciousness must continually recontextualize time 
and character through constructions akin to never-ending narratives. The Proustian 
narrator’s attempts to give an adequate portrait o f the characters which people his world 
run up against the realization that “meme au point de vue des plus insignifiantes choses 
de la vie, nous ne sommes pas un tout materiellement constitue, identique pour tout le 
monde et dont chacun n’a qu a aller prendre connaissance comme d ’un cahier des 
charges ou d ’un testament; notre personnalite sociale est une creation de la pensee des 
autres,” “even from the point o f view o f the most insignificant things in life, we are not a 
materially constituted whole, identical for everybody and of whom one needs only be 
informed, as you’d look up information in a ledger or a will; our social personality is a 
creation oi other people’s thoughts” (18-19). In the logic of Proust’s novel, the unstable 
fluctuations o f consciousness and personality mirror a larger social instability'. It remains 
impossible to determine which came first, although the narrator of the Recherche 
postulates a general rule which would determine both. That law is instability itself; 
“intermittences.” A law, however, normally implies both something predictable and a 
proscription or command concerning intentions. But a law of intermittences obeys 
neither of these conditions. It does not pretend to proscribe behavior, and is virtually 
useless as a predictive tool. Such a rule would imply the breakdown o f  law and order.
In the attempt to represent consciousness as an unstable mechanism of narrative 
production, many novelists may well have long intuited what science has since attempted 
to formulate in more rigorous terms: As Margaret E. Gray notes* neurological studies 
seem to suggest that personal memory (or consciousness) is not normally fixed, but is 
instead continually modified, recast, rewritten. In A la Recherche du temps perdu, says 
Gray, “Narration as the knowledgeable display o f memory’s contents [. . .] might more
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properly be read £...] as the incessant invention and revision o f those contents.”63 She 
finds interdisciplinary support fora shift from the notion o f memory as fixed record to 
memory as ongoing invention:
At the ‘micro’ level, new developments in neurology imply that a 
mechanics of memory-the ceaseless reorganization o f material [. . .] 
through new relationships among mental maps are tantamount to the 
ongoing elaboration o f fictions. At the ‘macro’ level o f organization, one 
might cite historiographic arguments for the tropological structuring o f a 
historic past. The past, whether personal or historic, is increasingly 
formulated as a retrospective creation cast from the present.
Many readers have likewise noted Faulkner’s concern with the ongoing (re)writing of
history. In Absalom Absalom! he is equally concerned with the effects o f that continual
creation o f memory on the central narrator, Quentin Compson.
In a book presenting neurological studies o f the question of human consciousness
of self, Israel Rosenfield claims that consciousness is an ever-changing relation between
present sense perceptions and past memories. Consciousness takes place in time, and the
alteration o f any one aspect of memory or perception (e.g. partial brain damage, the loss
of a limb or o f a sense, such as eyesight) can radically change the nature o f  that
individual’s consciousness—to such an extent that we are led to affirm that s/he "is no
longer the same person.” This judgment is often based upon that person’s altered
behavior and, especially, his or her altered use o f language. Our use o f language is
intimately connected with who we are. Proust knew this; that is why he takes care to
remark each o f  his character’s idiosyncratic ways o f  expressing themselves, from the
maid Francoise’s bastardizations and mispronunciations to Dr. Cottard’s awkward,
exploratory use o f  cliches. Similarly, the (ab)uses o f language in literary texts can lead us
to affirm that the English of a Joyce or a Faulkner, or the French o f Rabelais or Cdine, is
no longer the same language. These authors have come to be identified with a certain
kind o f language. But an identity that is based in a certain style o f language is far
63Gray, Margaret E. Postmodern Proust. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).
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different from an identity based on an immutable, essential self. Questions about the 
status of the work of art or o f  the significance of style are ultimately both versions of the 
questions concerning the nature o f idenity.
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Chapter 5: The Role of Art: Mise en Abyme in Proust and Faulkner
One seemingly obvious difference between Faulkner’s novels and that of Proust is 
the degree to which the Recherche explicitly reflects upon the nature of itself as 
narrative, but Faulkner’s novels are also concerned with their status as narrative. The 
language of both of these novels is characterized by self-referentiality. Such, then, is 
consciousness, continually reflecting (upon) itself. The self-reflective moments in 
literature is known in French as a mise en abyme, a heraldic term whose use in reference 
to literature was first suggested by Andre Gide. Gide claimed to prize in literary texts a 
feature long recognized in pictural representation: that o f the mirror or “painting within a 
painting,” the reduplication in miniature of the work of art as a whole. Lucien 
Dallenbach’s book-length study o f the mise en abyme, is an attempt to isolate a technique 
recognized in many different art forms, including painting, sculpture, and literary texts. 
Dallenbach is at pains to categorize and define the various types of mises en abyme, and 
his efforts illustrate the diffiiculty o f strictly defining the term. A mise en abyme is 
essentially a pan of a work of art which reflects the act or the product o f artistic creation 
itself, and, by extension, its reception or interpretaton. It is usually understood as a 
smaller pan within a whole which bears a relation of similarity to the whole. It is, then, a 
representation of representation. Such a movement eventually negates the validity of 
representation altogether; negates the possibility of presenting anything. The assumed 
link between “reality” and the artistic rendering of that reality is called into question, as 
what is made obvious is the inability to retrace the route from a representation to that 
which is represented.
Dallenbach employs the linguistic distinctions of Roman Jakobson to distinguish 
three different kinds o f self-reflexivity according to whether a text points to the 
enunciated, the enunciation or the linguistic code itself, that is, to the content, the act o f 
composition, or the medium o f a work of art (“une reflexion est un enoncd qui renvoie a 
Tenoned, a lenonciation ou au code du rdcit”). The mise en abyme is characterized by
121
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the equivocal nature of its language. It continues to function in the story just as any other 
element, but it also takes on metatextual meaning, in which the work of an takes itself as 
its own theme (Dallenbach 62).
Part of the difficulty o f such a definition is the ambiguity o f the word “reflect.” 
A reflection can be anything from a detailed reproduction o f a work of art to an allusion 
to it or art in general. An allusion to or an image of its creator, or even to the act of 
artistic creation itself can also be considered mises en abyme. To reflect can also simply 
mean to meditate on or think about something. With so many connotations, is is no 
wonder that Gide sought another term to precisely describe what he aimed at in his 
works. The key notions of reproduction or repetition coupled with visibility or 
appearance to the eye or mind. The idea of a reflection is indissociable from that of the 
origin or source. Without a source there can be no reflection, or, in other words, a 
reflection must reflect something.
The self-reflective nature of writing can be seen in texts from nearly every period 
. Indeed, self-reflexivity seems to be the rule, rather than the exception. When one begins 
to seek out such moments of self-reflection, they can be found on almost every page of A 
la recherche du temps perdu. The text abounds in reflections of, and upon, the acts of 
writing, reading and artistic creation in the narrator’s discussions with other characters 
and in his own solitary reflections on literature, music, painting, theater, and the act o f 
reading. This is not surprising given the fact that the book concerns itself, in a large 
mesure, with a kind of “portrait o f the artist” as apprentice, a would be poet or novelist. 
The acts of composing, of reading or interpreting a work of art, as well as the artist and 
the object itself are put en abyme on nearly every page o f Proust’s novel. The analyses of 
Balzac and Bergotte’s writing styles, the pastiche of the Goncourt lournal. even the 
descriptions ofVinteuil’s music or of Elstir’s painting lead to the direct discussion o f 
aesthetic values which inevitably invite the reader to apply them to the novel he is 
reading. The narrator’s description of himself reading before falling asleep is an
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exploration o f the obscure boundaries between waking and sleep, fact and fantasy, which 
evokes the strange reciprocal relationship that exists between the dream world o f fiction, 
the world o f dreams, and the world o f intentional thought processes. There are several 
more passages specifically focused upon the act o f reading scattered throughout the 
novel. This culminates, in Le temps retrouve. with the hero’s realization that the 
difficulties he has in recognizing the people he once knew, at the Princesse de 
Guermantes’s party, is not unlike his inability to remember the stories of the characters in 
one of Bergotte’s novels:
Car je ne me rappelais plus bien ce qui etait arrive a ces personnages, ce 
qui ne les differenciaient d ’ailleurs pas des personnes qui se trouvaient cet 
apres-midi chez Mme de Guermantes et dont, pourplusieursau moins, la 
vie passee etait aussi vague pourmoi que si je 1’eusse lue dans un roman a 
demi oublie. Le prince d ’Agrigente avait-il fini par epouser Mile X ... ?
Ou plutot n’etait-ce pas le frere de Mile X ... qui avait du epouser la soeur 
du prince d’Agrigente ? Ou bien faisais-je une confusion avec une 
anceinne lecture ou un reve recent ? (TR 221)
For I no longer have any clear recollection o f  what happened to these 
characters, though in this respect they are scarcely to be distinguished 
from the men and women who were present this afternoon at Mme de 
Guermantes’s party and whose past life, in many cases at least, was as 
vague in my mind as if I had read it in a half-forgotten novel. The Prince 
d’Agrigente, for instance: had he ended by marrying Mile X-? O r was it 
rather the brother o f Mile X— who might have married the sister o f the 
Prince d’Agrigente? Or was I confusing it all with something that I had 
read long ago or recently dreamed. (Ill: 952)
In this passage, the existential status of reality is shown to reside on the same level o f
doubt or certainty as fictions or dreams.
Le reve etait encore un de ces faits de ma vie, qui m ’avait toujours le plus 
frappe, qui avait du le plus servir a me convaincre du caractere purement 
mental de la realite, et dont je ne dedaignerais pas 1’aide dans la 
compositionde mon oeuvre. (TR 221)
Dreams were another o f the facts o f my life which had always most 
profoundly impressed me and had done most to convince me o f the 
purely mental character o f reality, and in the composition o f my work I 
would not scorn their aid. (Ill: 952)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
On this view, the work of an creates the real, just as real human beings become Active
characters.
Proust multiplies the references to works of art and literature to such an extent, 
that one begins to find everywhere allusions to the problem of meaning, interpretation, 
intention and signs in general. The many passages in Sodome et Gomorrhe and La 
Prisonniere which relate the narrator's effo ns to research the gowns of Fortuny or the 
discussions o f passages in Balzac, which themselves are descriptions of texts, that is to say 
of textiles, woven fabrics, designed by human hands: the toilettes of the Princess de 
Cadignan are also some o f the many opportunities Proust uses as pretexts for discussions 
of aesthetics and artistic practice. Even a discussion o f  battlefield strategy with St.-Loup 
and his fellow soldiers during the narrator’s visit to the army base of Doncieres becomes 
a discussion of reading and interpretation: “He bien! par exemple, tout ce que vous iisez, 
je suppose, dans le recit d’un narrateur militaire, les plus petits faits, les plus petits 
evenements, ne sont que les signes d’une idee qu’il faut degager et qui souvent en 
recouvre d’autres, comme dans un palimpseste” (CGII 102; II, 108 - 09).
Saint-Loup goes on to elaborate a theory of hermeneutics which could very well 
serve as a reader’s guide for A la recherche du temps perdu: “De sorte que, si tu sais lire 
I’histoire militaire, ce qui est recit confus pour le commun des lecteurs est pour toi un 
enchainement aussi rationnel qu’un tableau pour 1’amateur qui sait regarderce que le 
personnage porte sur lui, tient dans les mains, tandis que le visiteur ahuri des musees se 
laisse etourdir et migrainer par de vagues couleurs. Mais, comme pour certains tableaux 
ou il ne suffit pas de remarquer que le personnage tient un calice, mais ou il faut savoir 
pourquoi le peintre lui a mis dans les mains un calice, ce qu’il symbolise par la, ces 
operations militaires, en dehors meme de leur but immediat, sont habituellement, dans 
1’esprit du general qui dirige la campagne, calquees sur des batailles plus anciennes qui 
sont, si tu veux, comme le passe, comme la bibliotheque, comme I’erudition, comme 
letymologie, comme 1’aristocratie des batailles nouvelles” (104). To the alert reader, this
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whole passage is a suggestion to look beyond the text, to read between the lines and 
discover a hidden order in the novel he is reading. It is the context of history, tradition 
and scholarship which provides the context. The image of a palimpsest is a literal 
rendering of the superimposition and dependence of the new upon the old, or as as T.S. 
Eliot might say, “Tradition and the Individual Talent.”
Proust’s entire novel also places itself en abyme when it takes as its subject the 
story o f its coming into being. While the narrator may be in search of lost time, the hero, 
his distant self, is shown to be forever on the lookout for some “great philosophical truth” 
upon which to base a novel (S 176 - 77). The narrator, reflecting back upon his youthful 
aspirations, invariably remembers the afflictions he felt at “not having the disposition for 
letters, and having to abandon the idea o f  ever becoming a writer.”
It is in Albertine Disparue that the hero finally succeeds in getting his work into 
print, but he ironically, and significantly, misrecognizes it as the work o f another:
“J’ouvris Le Figaro. Quel ennui! Justement le premier article avait le meme titre que celui 
que j’avais envoye et qui n'avait pas paru” (148).
Faulkner’s Self-reflective Text 
While fewer obvious references to art and literature can be discerned in 
Faulkner’s novel, it is significantly focused on the act of storytelling, which is emblematic 
of writing and reading simultaneously. Indeed, Miss Rosa suggests a future as a writer to 
Quentin in her first interview with the boy on the second page of the novel:
Because you are going away to attend the college at Harvard they tell 
me,” she said. “So I dont imagine you will ever come back here and settle 
down as a country lawyer in a little town like Jefferson since Northern 
people have already seen to it that there is little left in the South for a 
young man. So maybe you will enter the literary profession as so many 
Southern gentlemen and gentlewomen too are doing now and maybe 
some day you will remember this and write about it (AA 6)
But the reason Rosa gives for such a choice is hardly inspiring. She appeals only to the
pecuniar}' aspect o f authorship: “You will be married then I expect and perhaps your wife
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will want a new gown or a new chair for the house and you can write this and submit it to 
the magazines” (AA 6). Miss Rosa herself is said to have written “over a thousand odes to 
southern soldiers:” She is “a woman who even in his (Quentin’s) father’s youth had 
already established (even if not affirmed) herself as the town’s and the county’s poetess 
laureate by issuing to the stern and meagre subscription list o f the county newspaper 
poems, ode eulogy and epitaph, out of some bitter and implacable reserve of undefeat” 
(8). It is significant that Miss Rosa’s artistic achievements have been imparted to Quentin 
as a result, not of ambition or inspiration, but “undefeat,” the negation of a negation, 
rather than a forward-looking effort at artistic accomplishment. The odes to southern 
soldiers, eulogies and epitaphs, are manifestations of mourning the repetition of which 
reveals a morbid obsession with death and loss. These odes, as manifestations of a 
traditional poetic form to which Miss Rosa adheres, are further evidence o f of the 
rigidness and immobility of her thought. This immobility is already suggested by the 
setting and her posture as described in the opening pages and repeated throughout the 
first chapter of the novel.
The decision to frame the Sutpen story with the mechanism of the story’s re­
telling to Quentin, and through him to the outside world, represented by the Canadian, 
Shreve, foregrounds the act of storytelling itself.
Storytelling in Absalom. Absalom!
In Absalom. Absalom!. Faulkner’s text reflects indirectly upon the modality o f its 
own operation in the idiosyncracies o f storytelling which are attributed to Thomas 
Sutpen himself. Sutpen’s taciturn nature renders all the more significant in the few scenes 
in which he does speak. General Compson having seemingly been his sole confidant in 
Yoknapatawpha county, their interviews are In chapterVII, Quentin tells Shreve about 
his grandfather’s conversation with Thomas Sutpen, over the campfire on the night of 
their hunt for the fleeing French architect who was overseeing the building o f the Sutpen 
plantation. It is in this conversation that Sutpen revealed to General Compson some key
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derails o f his origins in the Virginia mountains and his first marriage to a creole woman 
in the French West Indies. The information obtained by Quentin’s grandfather makes 
the Compsons privy to knowledge which the other residents ofYoknapatawpha do not 
have.
General Compson seems to have been struck by the detached manner in which 
the man spoke about his experiences: “and I reckon Grandfather was saying ‘Wait, wait 
for God’s sake wait’ about like you are until he finally did stop and back up and start 
over again with at least some regard for cause and effect even if none for logical sequence 
and continuity” [. ..] Sutpen’s style resembles that o f  the novel itself with repetitions, 
chronological displacements and lack oflinear, logical development. The novel presents 
scenes which are interrupted only to repeated and continued in later passages of the text, 
just as Sutpen’s conversation with General Compson is interrupted and unexpectedly 
continued thirty years later: “It was thirty years before he told Grandfather any more o f 
it” (301).
The manner in which Sutpen told his story seems to have been that of an 
impartial, detached observer, depicting events from the oustide. The description 
Quentin gives o f Sutpen’s attitude as he told his stoy to General Compson, suggests an 
impartiality and detachment from his own life’s story: “he telling it all over and still it 
was not absolutely clear—the how and the why he was there and what he was-since he was 
not talking about himself. He was telling a story. He was not bragging about something 
he had done: he was just telling a story about something a man named Thomas Sutpen 
had experienced, which would still have been the same story if the man had had no name 
at all’ ” (308 - 09). The story he tells is unimbellished, factual and bare-bones. He 
supplies a minimum o f  details, giving the essential elements o f his itinerary:
He went to the West Indies. That’s how he said it: not how he managed 
to find where the West Indies were nor where ships departed from to go 
there nor how he got to where the ships were and got in one nor how he 
liked the sea and it must have been hardship indeed for him, a boy of
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fourteen or fifteen who had never seen the ocean before, going to sea in 
1823 (AA 299).
He gives no motivation or explanation for his actions, none of the “how and why” which 
preoccupies the other storytellers in the novel (and the reader). He mentions his first wife 
and child only in passing: “No more detail and information about that than about how 
he got from the field, his overseeing, to [...] than how he got from the rotting cabin in 
Virginia to the field he oversaw [...] a very condensation of time which was the guage of 
his own violence, and he telling it in that pleasant faintly forensic anecdotal manner 
apparently just as he remembered it” (AA 312). For lack o f any solid clues, the strange, 
indifferent and elliptical manner of his telling becomes symbolic of the man’s single- 
minded approach to his “design.”
There are many parallells which can be drawn between Sutpen’s described 
manner of storytelling and the style of the novel itself: The repetitive and a-chronological 
presentation o f the novel mimics the style Quentin attributes to Sutpen.
He pulls his plantation out of the swamp, but he does not do it by himself: he has 
recourse to a French architect to produce the outward form ofhis design. This architect 
is a comical figure, as he is described by Mr. Compson to Quentin, with his “formal coat 
and his Paris hat and his expression of grim and embittered amazement.” Perhaps 
Sutpen’s need for the French architect is a figure for Faulkner’s own debt to continental 
writers, the “tricks o f the trade” that he alluded to in the interview mentioned above.
The allusions to French and European art Faulkner’s novel always emphasize the concern 
for style, for empty form. The French architect only constructs the facade, the empty 
shell of the home, the interior of which Sutpen must then finish and furnish.
This emphasis on appearance and empty form can be sen in Mr Compson’s 
description o f Charles Bon, whom he depicts in the guise o f a decadent European, an 
effeminate aesthete, with the “Frenchified cloak and hat which he wore, or perhaps (I like 
to think this) presented formally to the man reclining in a flowered, almost feminised
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gown” (AA 117). Mr Compson’s portrayal of Bon’s funeral is filled with allusions to 
various forms ofart and representation: Judith’s mourning dress is “ceremonial 
widowhood’s bright dramatic pageantry.” The appearance of Charles Bon’s octoroon 
mistress and child ar his graveside “must have resembled a garden scene by the Irish 
poet, Wilde” (AA 241). The whole scene is described in terms of theatricality, the 
tombstones “looking as though they had been cleaned and polished and arranged by 
scene shifters who with the passing o f twilight would return and strike them and carry 
them, hollow fragile and without weight, back to the warehouse until they should be 
needed again.” The octoroon herself is described as “a woman created o f  by and for 
darkness, whom the artist Beardsley might have dressed, in a soft flowing gown designed 
not to infer bereavement or widowhood but to dress some interlude of slumbrous and 
fatal insatiation, of passionate and inexorable hunger of the flesh” (AA 242). The 
allusions to Wilde and Beardsley place everything surrounding Bon into a context of 
“decadence.”
Being and Art: The Death of Bergotte 
The work of art is traditionally considered a means for the artist to achieve a kind 
of immortality. Proust’s text will put to question the thesis of an as a means of 
overcoming time without completely abandoning it. The Recherche is often read as a 
supreme example of a modernist esthetic which elevates and affirms the power of the 
artist and the value of the work o f art. Indeed, in one passage o f Le temps retrouve the 
narrator proclaims paradoxically that “La vraie vie, la vie enfin decouverte et eclaircie, la 
seule vie par consequent pleinement vecue, c’est la litterature” (202), “Real life, life at last 
laid bare and illuminated-the only life in consequence which can be said to be really 
lived-is literature” (III: 931). The importance given to art and literature by the narrator is 
counterbalanced by an acute awareness of the mutability of the work ofart, which is 
finally just as fragile and mortal as the human being who created it. The death o f the 
fictional novelist Bergotte is an occasion for such reflection.
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The question the narrator raises in the opening pages is left: hanging for most of 
the novel, and will never be definitively resolved, although he does return to it at least 
once. It is unexpectedly taken up again in the fifth volume, in the presentation o f  the 
illness and death of the author Bergotte, who, is described as a “dying planet.”
II allair ainsi se refroidissant progressivement, petite planete qui offrait 
une image anticipee des derniers jours de la grande quand, peu a peu, la 
chaleurse retirera de la Terre, puis la vie. Alors la resurrection aura pris 
fin, car si avant dans les generations futures que brillent les oeuvres des 
hommes, encore faut-il qu ’il y ait des hommes. Si certaines especes 
animales resistent plus longtemps au froid envaihisseur, quand il n’y aura 
plus d’hommes, et a supposerque la gloire de Bergotte air dure jusque-la, 
brusquement elle s’eteindra a tout jamais. (P 173)
Thus he went on growing steadily colder, a tiny planet offering a 
prophetic image o f the greater, when gradually heat will withdraw from 
the earth, then life itself. Then the resurrection will have come to an end, 
for, however far forward into future generations the works o f  men may 
shine, there must none the less be men. If certain species hold out longer 
against the invading cold, when there are no longer any men, and if we 
suppose Bergotte’s fame to have lasted until then, suddenly it will be 
extinguished for all time. (Ill: 182)
Bergotte’s death comes after after an attack he suffered upon his visit to an exposition
featuring the Dutch painter Vermeer.61
un critique ayant ecrit que dans la Vue de Delft de Ver Meer (prete par le 
musee de La Haye pour une exposition hollandaise), tableau qu’il 
admirait et croyait connaitre tres bien), un petit pan de mur jaune (qu’il 
ne se rappelait pas), etait si bien peint qu’il etait, si on le regardait seul, 
comme une precieuse oeuvre d ’art chinoise, d’une beau re qui se suffirait a 
elle-meme.
an art critic having written somewhere that in Vermeer’s View o f Delft 
(lent by the Gallery at The Hague for an exhibition o f Dutch painting), a 
picture which he adored and imagined that he knew by heart, a little 
patch ofyellow wall (which he could not remember) was so well painted 
that it was, if one looked at it by itself, like some priceless specimen of 
Chinese art, o f a beauty that was sufficient in itself (III: 184 - 85)
61 This passage is apparently one that Proust wrote and added very late in the publication process ofthe 
Recherche, after his own visit to a Dutch exposition at the Jeu de Paume in 1921, during which time he 
suffered an attackofvertigo.
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When he sees the painting in the museum, he is struck by a detail that the reviewer 
described, and which he previously hadn’t noticed.: “Enfin il fut devant le Ver Meer qu’il 
se rappellait plus eclatant, plus different de tout ce qu’il connaissait, mais ou, grace a 
l’article du critique, il remarqua pour la premiere fois des petits personnages en bleu, que 
le sable etait rose, et enfin la precieuse matiere du tout petit pan de mur jaune.”
The exquisite detail o f this “petit pan de mur” stands in opposition to the “pan 
lumineux” which the narrator associates with his voluntary memories of Combray. 
Bergotte, like Swann, is a double for the narrator, whose desire to be a writer is part o f  his 
fascination with the work o f art and the world of the artist. Bergotte’s reaction to the 
painting, influenced by the critic’s review, shows him the weakness of his own powers o f 
observation. Comparing the work of the Dutch artist to his own, he regrets his own lack 
of attention to detail.
«C’est ainsi que j’aurais du ecrire» disait-il. Mes derniers livres sont trop 
secs, il aurait fallu passer plusieurs couches de couleur, rendre ma phrase 
en elle-meme precieuse, comme ce petit pan de mur jaune.» Cependant la 
gravite de ses etourdissements ne lui echappait pas. Dans une celeste 
balance lui apparaissair, chargeant 1’un des plateaux, sa propre vie, tandis 
que 1’autre contenait le petit pan de mur si bien peint en jaune. II sentait 
qu’il avait imprudemmenr donne la premiere pour le seconde. (P 176)
“That’s how I ought to have written,” he said. “My last books are too dry,
I ought to have gone over them with a few layers o f color, made my 
language precious in iteself, like this litde patch o f yellow wall”
Meanwhile he was not unconscious of the gravity o f his condition. In a 
celestial pair o f  scales there appeared to him, weighing down one o f the 
pairs, his own life, while the other contained the little patch of wall so 
beautifully painted in yellow. He felt that he had rashly sacrificed the 
former for the latter. (Ill: 185)
The novelist’s feeling o f  despair at this realization mirrors the hero’s own incessant
expression of regret at his inability to accurately observe and understand the world
around him.
The episode o f  Bergotte’s death is the occasion for a return to the question o f 
death and immortality that was asked in the “Combray:” “Un nouveau coup 1’abattit, il
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roula du canape par terre oil accoururent tous les visiteurs et gardiens. II etait mort. Mort 
a jamais? Qui peut le dire? ” (P 176 - 77), “A fresh attack struck him down; he rolled 
from the settee to the floor, as visitors and attendants came hurrying to his assistance. He 
was dead. Dead forever? Who can say? (Ill: 185 - 86). This is exactly the same formula 
used in the “Ouverture,” in the reflections on the role of chance in human existence, and 
initiates a reflection upon the significance of the work of art and its power to express the 
unicity of the artist’s vision.
As Bergotte is buried, the image o f his novels in shop windows is the occasion for 
a meditation on the role of work o f art in conferring immortality: “O n l’enterra, mais 
toute la nuit fonebre, aux vitrines evlairees, ses livres, disposees trois par trois, veillaient 
comme des anges aux ailes e'ploye'es et semblaient pour celui qui n etait plus, le symbole 
de sa resurrection” (177). This image is incongruous with the narrator’s earlier statement 
that Timmortalite n ’est pas plus promis aux hommes qu’aux oeuvres.” The question of 
art’s ability to transcend death remains unresolved until the hero’s second major 
revelatory experience of involuntary memory in Le temps retrouve.
Voice, Interweaving, Intertextuality
The motif of the written letter can also serve as a form of literary self-reflection.
In Faulkner’s work, it is also through the use of letters and the dramatization of 
storytelling as an oral practice that he self-references his work as text. The novel portrays 
the circulation of the letter in the passage ofthe story from mouth to ear and from hand 
to hand. One might say that it is the status o f the letter which is at stake in Thomas 
Sutpen’s efforts to establish a lign o f dukes which might perpetuate his family name. The 
novel portrays the circulation o f the letter in the passage of the story from mouth to ear 
and from hand to hand. According to Patrick McGee, there are a total o f eight missives 
mentioned in Asbalo m. Absalo m!. two of which are reproduced in their entirety in the 
novel: Mr. compson’s letter to Quentin at Harvard, in which he informs his son o f Miss 
Rosa Coldfield’s death (217 - 18, 470), and Charles Bon’s unsigned letter to Judith
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Surpen during the Civil War, which Judith is said to have given to Quentin’s 
grandmother (AA 160 - 63). These letters function as mirrors for the novel itself. The 
letter from Mr Compson to his son is reproduced in two parts which are separated by 
252 pages of text. Its conclusion is held in suspension for half the novel, like many of the 
actions detailed in the story.
In the letter Judith Sutpen receives from Charles Bon, which she subsequently 
gives to Quentin’s grandmother, As Pat McGee notes, “Absalom. Absalom! analyzes a 
language that has been diverted from its end.” Written with stove polish on paper which 
was equally plundered from Yankee troops.
Mr Compson imagines the letter “to embody the thing he looks for by narrating, 
the missing explanation.”Gl In chapter IV, he speculates about what Judith said when she 
entrusted Quentin’s grandmother with the letter she had received from Charles Bon.
‘Yes,’ Judith said. ‘Or destroy it. As you like. Read it if you like or don’t 
read it if you like. Because you make so little impression, you see. You get 
born and you try this and you don’t know why only you keep on trying it 
and you are born at the same time with a lot of other people, all mixed up 
with them, like trying to, having to, move your arms and legs with strings 
only the same strings are hitched to all the other arms and legs and the 
others all trying and they don’t know why either except that the strings are 
all in one another’s way like five or six people all trying to make a rug on 
the same loom only each one want to weave his own pattern into the rug; 
and it can’t matter, you know that, or the Ones that set up the loom would 
have arranged things a little better, and yet it must matter because you 
keep on trying or having to keep on trying and then all of a sudden it’s all 
over and all you have left is a block o f stone with scratches on it provided 
there was someone to remember to have the marble scratched and set up or 
had time to, and it rains on it and the sun shines on it and after a while they 
don’t even remember the name and what the scratches were trying to tell, 
and it doesn’t matter.’ (AA 157-58)
In this speech, Judith expresses a relationship to the letter in which the subject is born into
a a social web, in which her place is determined by others.The metaphor of the loom is a
figure for the social “fabric” which connects her to others. It is also an image o f
('S Pat McGee. Tcllinp thcOthen The Question ofValue in Modern and Postcolonial Writing. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 1992) 44.
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textualiry, o f language, which is “woven” by one and ail, but in which autonomy is 
difficult. Judith Sutpen admits the subject’s inability to control the status o f the letter by 
giving it to Mrs Compson. As a woman, Judith certainly enjoys much less autonomy 
than her father, or brother, on whom she is dependent for the realization of her own 
goals. Likewise, she does not speak in the text o f the novel. Her voice is caught up in the 
voices of Mr. Compson, General Compson and the General’s wife. This soliloquy on the 
transfer of Bon’s letter is an expression of the intertextuai nature of existence in the letter. 
The moment of passage o f the letter is thus highly sym bo lie.
In Judith’s speech, Faulkner expresses the intersubjective nature of human 
existence. The weaving o f the loom is an image used by Richard Rorty, who urges us to 
think of human minds “as webs o f beliefs and desires, of sentential attitudes-webs which 
continually reweave themselves so as to accommodate new sentential attitudes” [. ..]. He 
goes so far as to suggest that “there is no self distinct from this self-reweaving web. All 
there is to the human self is just that web.^’The metaphor o f the web is appropriate for 
narration, which has long been associated with the act of weaving. Consciousness can thus 
be thought o f as the ongoing rewriting of the self; or better, the act o f writing itself. 
Identity is an unfinished text, artificially and arbitrarily fixed by the closure of the book, 
the finality of death.6^
It is possible to read Mr. Compson’s own fatalism in this speech he attributes 
retrospectively to Judith. The faded writing on the tombstones is also a figure for the 
work of art as a text, and in light of our reading o f Faulkner through Proust, it echoes a 
Proustian metaphor: “un live est un grand cimetiere ou sur la plupart des tombes on ne 
peut plus lire les noms effaces” (TR 210) “a book is a huge cemetery in which on the 
majority of the tombs the names are effaced and can no longer be read” (III: 940).
66 “Inq uiry as Reco ntex rualizatio n: A n A nti-d uaiist Acco un t o f  I nccrpretatio n,” Obiecrivitv. Relativism, and 
Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 93- 
’ Walter Benjamin claims chat “Death is the sanction ofeverything that the storyteller can tell. He has 
borrowed his authority from death” (94).
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The French Architect 
The plantation and especially the house built by Sutpen, with the help ofthe 
French architect, is a symbol for the writer’s creation, the book itself. The architect is 
described as an artist by General Compson: “[.. .] he was a good architect. Quentin 
knew the house, twelve miles from Jefferson [.. .]. And not only an architect, as General 
Compson said, but an artist since only an artist could have borne those two years in order 
to build a house which he doubtless not only expected but firmly intended never to see 
again” (AA 43). This would make the house a work o f  art, a mise en abyme for the 
literary edifice constructed by an author such as Faulkner. The novel suggests this 
possibility when the ghost o f Sutpen is said to inhabit Miss Rosa’s voice “where a more 
fortunate one would have had a house” (AA 4). Narrative, or rather “voice” is here shown 
to usurp the function o f the house, the place of residence for beings, or being in general.
Here artistic creation is predicated on renouncement of any desire for prestige or 
immortality. He is a comical figure “in his formal cout and his Paris hat and his 
expression o f grim and embittered amazement.” His finery is juxtaposed with Sutpen 
and the wild Haitians caked in mud as protection against mosquitos. He is out o f his 
element — more o f  an absolute other in the context o f Yoknapatawpha than the Haitians 
themselves: Sutpen certainly gets along better with the Negroes than with the architect, 
working alongside them and engaging in sportive fist fights with them. Roles seem to 
have been reversed when we see Sutpen and the slaves tracking the runaway architect with 
bloodhounds through the swamps.
Architecture is also used frequently in Proust as a metaphor for the work ofart:
In the lengthy development of the esthetics of his novel in Le temps retrouve. the book 
the narrator hopes to write is likened to a cathedral:
Et dans ces grands livres-la, il y a des parties qui n’ont eu le temps que 
d ’etre esquissees, et qui ne seront sans doute jamais finies, a cause de 
1’ampleur meme du plan de 1’architecte. Combien de grandes cathedrales 
restent inachevees! On le nourrit, on fortifie ses parties faibles, on le
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preserve, mais ensuite c’est lui qui grandic, qui designe notre combe, la 
protege contre les rumeurset quelque temps contre I’oubli. (TR337 - 38)
And in long books of this kind there are parts which there has been time 
only to sketch , parts which, because o f the very amplitude of the 
architect’s plan, will no dobt never be completed. How many great 
cathedrals remain unfinished! The writer feeds his book, he strengthens 
the parts o f it which are weak, he protects it, but afterwards it is the book 
that grows that designates its author’s tomb and defends it against the 
world’s clamourand for a while against oblivion. (Ill: 1089)
Here again it is notable that one of the main points of similarity between the cathedral
and the work ofart as conceived by the narrator, is its essentially unfinished nature. The
enormity o f such an undertaking will mean an unending task for the artist. The work
demands a superhuman effort which, when is inevitably interrupted by the death. The
(un)finished work “designating” the absence o f the artist in its missing elements, has the
function o f a grave marker.
Art is finally overpowered by the forces o f nature in the form o f death, and the 
forces of entropy which resist and erode the structures imposed on its elements. Sutpen 
pulls his plantation out of the primal mud, but is unable to insure its perpetuation. 
Similarly, Miss Rosa, Mr. Compson, Quentin and finally Shreve all attempt to construct 
a narrative about Sutpen, but no one o f  them is able to adequately put all the pieces 
together. The inability of the various narrators to adequately reconstruct the Sutpen 
legend is, as many critics have noted, a commentary on the status of history itself. 
History, like memory is not immutable; it is subject to all the effects o f forgetting and 
revision o f conscious memory. As we have seen, Proust spends whole volumes explicitly 
reflecting on the fragility of memory, in the slow progression of the hero’s forgetting 
about Albertine. Miss Rosa also laments the fading o f memory: “Ay grief goes, fades; we 
know that—but ask the tear ducts i f  they have forgotten how to weep. ’’But Miss Rosa has a 
morbid obsession with preserving memory which prevents her from adapting and living 
in the present. This is underscored by her description in the opening pages of the novel, 
by the rigidity o f her posture and the stillness o f the setting in her “office.” She is in an
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arrested state of mourning, in the “eternal black which she had worn for forty-three years 
now, whether for sister, father, or norhusband none knew, sitting so bolt upright in the 
straight hard chair that was so tall for her that her legs hung straight and rigid as if she 
had iron shinbones and ankles, clear ofthe floor with that air o f impotent and static rage 
like children’s feet” (AA 3-4). The immobility o f Miss Rosa, dwarfed by the chair in 
which she sits, suggests her mentally and emotionally frozen attitude.
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Conclusion: The Identity Crisis o f  Literary Studies
The crisis o f identity which I have been illustrating in the novels o f William 
Faulkner and Marcel Proust is a problem that also feces what we call literary “studies,” 
which seek to differentiate themselves from the fictional texts and documents upon 
which it operates. Inquiry into the nature of identity is itself subject to the 
recontextualization which “research” engenders. Any inquiry into the meaning o f being 
must quickly find itself confronted with the question o f the meaning of meaning. It is 
inevitably the way we formulate the question which will determine the answers we find. 
Indeed all we ever seem to be able to do is continually reformulate the question 
according to the ever-changing contexts from which we approach it.
It is difficult, from our perspective, to understand the novelty of Proust’s work. 
We are a generation which has been weaned on the billboard, the sound bite and the 
video clip. Proust’s poetics become our poetics-a poetics o f continual revision, and 
recontextualization.
Richard Rorty calls Proust and Nietzsche “ironists” because, he says, they “are 
quite aware that what counts as resolution, perfection, and autonomy will always be a 
function of when one happens to die or to go mad. But this relativity does not entail 
futility. For there is no big secret which the ironist hopes to discover, and which he might 
die or decay before discovering. There are only little mortal things to be rearranged by 
being redescribed. If he had been alive or sane longer, there would have been more 
material to be rearranged, and thus different redescriptions, but there would never have 
been the right description. For although the thoroughgoing ironist can use the notion o f a 
‘better description,’ he has no criterion for the application of this term and so cannot use 
the notion o f ‘the right description.’ ”68 Proust’s hero is portrayed as continually being
68 Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony and Solidarirv. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 99.
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the victim of the desire to discover a big secret. One of the ways o f distinguishing the 
“hero” from the “narrator” is the way in which the latter itonizes about this desire.
Marcel Proust corresponds perfecdy to Rorty’s description o f the “thoroughgoing 
ironist.” His narrator’s ideas about people and places are continually subject to correction 
and re-interpretation. Although he is said to have announced with joy to his housekeeper 
the moment when he wrote the word “fin” on his manuscript, he actually continued 
revising, rewriting and rearranging little bits and pieces of his novel right up until the 
moment of his death; and, while “Marcel” attempts to identify himself thro ugh the 
repetition and construction of a narrative about his specific historical and cultural 
context, identity and contexts are ultimately shown to be unstable consrructscontinually 
woven out of the disparate shards of memory and language. Identity is always 
incomplete, requiring a supplement of narration, of writing. Being as well as meaning in 
this narrative is forever differed, qualified, contingent, and reversible. It is dependent on 
contexts which themselves are forever changing. This is what Proust refers to as “le 
kaleidoscope social” (CG I, 181).
Much of what we consider our identity is a response to inquiry, a set o f questions 
and answers about our past and present conditions-a narrative. The answers may not be 
the same in every circumstance. Our story cannot fully be told. It is not only 
inexhaustible, but continually “self-modifying” (that is to say that it modifies itself, 
which is our “self” in the very act of telling that self). It is an act of self-creation. It is us 
writing our selves, a kind o f fiction in which fiction becomes reality. Signs become beings 
or vice versa. It is this same being we allude to when we talk about the style of Marcel 
Proust. But an identity that is based in a certain style o f language, in a certain 
manipulation of signs, say, in what you say or wear, in the letters you write, is far 
different from an identity based on an immutable, essential self. What this style shows is 
not the idiosyncrasies o f  some “individual” consciousness, but rather the melding of 
idiosyncrasy into the impersonal stream of unconscious mechanisms: mechanisms of
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condensation and displacement, of association and combination, o f synchrony and 
diachrony in other words, of language.
Identity is in a practical sense indistinguishable from narration, that is from the 
active functioning of language as it unceasingly constructs and deconstructs memory, 
consciousness or history. There can be no essence to identity; it can never be definitive 
when it is seen as a function of language. Nor can identity be grasped as a whole, 
complete and self-sufficient. The conscious narrative reconstruction o f personal identity 
is never complete, never satisfactory. It always requires further development, more 
narration, more text. Hence the exponential growth of Proust’s work. It’s safe to say that 
A la recherche du temps perdu is a novel that Proust worked on all his life. But Proust 
remains undaunted by the theoretical impossibilities of a definitive text. Indeed, Proust’s 
narrator expresses an admiration for the “great unfinished works” of the nineteenth 
century (P 150; III: 157). The novel remains much more fragmented and inconsistent 
than we like to admit.
Nearly every time Proust’s narrator alludes to great art o f  the past, whether it be 
the art of the eighteenth or the nineteenth century, he admires in it its broken, 
unfinished, asymmetrical character, which nevertheless follows a rigorous, if hidden, plan 
and attempts to adhere to a definite structure. It is the deformation of that structure, 
and its need to be recuperated in an act o f reading, which he admires.
The description of the Hubert Robert fountain, early in the narrator’s entry into 
the salon of the Princesse de Guermantes at the beginning of Sodome et Gomorrhe is 
just one among many examples of the kind o f mise en abyme o f the work of art which is 
repeated again and again in the novel:
Dans une clariere reservee par de beaux arbres dont plusieurs etaient aussi 
anciens que lui, plante a l’ecart, on le voyait de loin, svelte, immobile, 
durci, ne laissant agiter par la brise que la retombee plus legere de son 
panache pale et fremissant. Le XVIIIe siecle avait epuree I’elegance de ses 
Iignes, mais, fixam le style du jet, semblait en avoir arrete la vie; a cette 
distance, on avait l’impression de 1’art plutot que la sensation de 1’eau.
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
It could be seen from a distance, slender, motionless, rigid, set apart in a 
clearing surrounded by fine trees, several o f which were as old as itself, 
only the lighter fall of its pale and quivering plume stirring in the breeze.
The eighteenth century had refined the elegance o f its lines, but, by fixing 
the style o f the jet, seemed to have arrested its life; at this distance one 
had the impression of art rather than the sensation of water.
The fountain is set apart from its surroundings, a relic o f a past age with no apparent
connection to the present. The fixity o f its appearance denotesa coldness and a
lifelessness which Marcel associates here with eighteenth century an.
The fountain becomes symbolic for the narrator, of the artistic heritage o f  the
eighteenth century: “Le nuage humide lui-meme qui s’amoncelait perpetuellement a son
faite gardait le caractere de lepoque comme ceux qui dans le ciel s’assemblent autour des
palais de Versailles.” “Even the moist cloud that was perpetually gathering at its summit
preserved the character of the period like those that assemble in the sky round the palaces
of Versailles.” The dyad of an and nature, set up by this passage, is reversed by an optical
effect dependent upon proximity, which reveals details not seen from a distance, thus
contradiciting the assertion that it “can be seen” from a distance. The view the narrator
has from a distance is arguably not sight, but blindness. The ability to see is critically
dependent on the ability to see the details.
Maisde pres on se rendait compte que tout en respectant, comme les pierres 
d’un palais antique, le dessin prealablement trace, c etait des eaux toujours 
nouvelles, s elan^ant et voulant obeiraux ordres anciens de 1’architecte, ne les 
accomplissaientexactement qu’en paraissant les violer, leurs mille bonds epars 
pouvant seuls donner a distance I’impression d ’un unique elan. Celui-ci etait 
en realite aussisouvent interrompu que leparpillement de la chute, alors que. 
de loin, il m ’avait paru inflechissable, dense, d ’une continuitesans lacune. (SG 
56)
But from a closer view one realised that, while it respected, like the stones of 
an ancient palace, the design traced for it beforehand, it was a constantly 
changing stream o f water thatspringing upsards and seeking to obey the 
architect’s original orders, performed them to the letter only by seeming to 
infringe them, its thousand separate bursts succeeding only from afar in 
giving the impression o f a single thrust. This was in reality as often 
interrupted as the scattering o f the fall, whereas from a distance it had 
appeared to me dense, inflexible, unbroken in itscontinuity (II: 680)
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The description o f this fountain alludes to the French Revolution and to characteristics of 
the Baroque architecture of the period, with its adherence to certain traits o f classical 
architecture, but which displayed increasingly broken and asymmetrical feaures as the 
century progressed. The allusion to eighteenth century art’s form and asthetics, through 
the sculpted waters of this fountain, has immediate relevance and impact upon the 
Proustian text in which it is placed. This fountain is a work of art whose “roots” are said 
to be plunged deep into the character o f  the century: Like the art of that century it 
displays a definite form a “pre-inscribed design” which is nevertheless broken and 
disrupted by the “thousand scattered splashes” o f water, only giving the impression o f a 
completed whole “from a distance.” The image o f clouds gathering in the sky above the 
Palace of Louis XIV at Versailles opposes the orderly chaos of the natural process of 
cloud formtion with the period’s architectural triumph in the grandiose building and 
gardens. It opposes the order imposed by man to the chaotic order of the natural, which 
is framed and domesticated by the buildings and gardens. Again and again, the narrator 
expresses his admiration for this melding of order and disorder, o f artifice and nature, in 
the work o f art.
The Figure of the Author 
The desire to write about the novels o f Marcel Proust and William Faulkner was 
brought about as much by a fascination with the figures of Faulkner and Proust as with 
the texts themselves. In spite of all formalist injunctions to concentrate on the text, and 
nothing but the text, to study a novel by one of these authors is almost invariably at 
some point, to study the figures of the authors themselves. Proust and Faulkner as proper 
names are caught up in a series o f cultural significations and connotations which often 
find their way into the writings o f biographers, historians, and critics. We are assured by 
all those who propose to speak about them that the authors themselves sought a kind o f 
invisibility, stepping back to let their works speak for themselves. Proust actively denied 
that any models were to be found in reality for the characters in his novels. Yet his efforts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
143
were to be in vain, as there continues to be a general preoccupation with biographical 
details, one that can be seen in the success of biographies as well as books containing 
interviews, personal correspondence, tales of the publishing history of their works, and 
even photographs of people who are supposed to have served as models for some of 
Proust’s characters.
The wealth of books devoted to these authors testifies to a kind of fascination 
with them which shows no signs of waning. This fixation on biography ironically mimics 
the very obsession of their main characters with others in the novels.
What is peculiar about the twentieth century is not so much the desire, as the 
availability o f access to the personal letters, details and anecdotes of the famous. Thus 
the author who mocked Sainte-Beuve for judging an artist’s life rather than his work and 
who went out of his way to insist that the characters in his book were purely fictitious, 
that the Recherche was not a roman a clefs, is the object o f “pilgrimages” to the little 
village of Illiers-Combray, site of one of Proust’s aunt’s house, and the “Musee de T ante 
Leonie” named after the fictional aunt o f the narrator of the Recherche. In Normandy, 
the Grand Hotel of Cabourg, supposed to be the model for the “Grand Hotel de 
Balbec,” touts its “chambre Marcel Proust” its Restaurant Balbec, and its “petites 
madeleines.” As Gray demonstrates, these mass cultural appropriations of Proust 
invariably act to simplify, to tame the alterity o f the monstrous Proustian text, reducing 
it to the simplest of images: that o f  the petite madeleine.
Proust added to the confusion, not only by twice inserting his own given name in 
the definitive version of the novel, but also in his letters and interviews, by freely speaking 
in the first person of the narrator o f the Recherche, and especially by using events which 
he actually experienced in the narrative. Faulkner, too, seems to justify such biographical 
approaches when he affirms that “every time any character gets into a book, no matter 
how minor, he’s actually telling his own biography, talking about himself, in a thousand
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different terms, but himself’ [.. .] (FIU 275). According to this theory, narration is 
itself, by definition, autobiography.
There is a certain interpretation of the literary object in which the illusion o f being 
as presence is maintained, through the figure o f the author as origin and master o f  his 
work. Heidegger speaks o f this in “The Origin o f the Work o f Art”
On the usual view, the work arises out o f and by means of the activity o f  
the artist. But by what and whence is the artist what he is? By the work; 
for to say that the work does credit to the master means that it is the work 
that first lets the artist emerge as a master o f  his art. The artist is the origin 
o f the work. The work is the origin o f the artist.69
The author is the origin of the work, through which he expresses himself. Proust’s
narrator’s conclusion in Le temps retrouve is that the work o f art is a work of art because
it is the expression of a unique universe, the vision o f the individual artist. We cannot,
however look to the historical figure of Proust to understand his text. To do so would be
to betray him, for it is precisely for this sort o f interpretation that he reproached the
predominant nineteenth century French critic Sainte-Beuve. It is, instead, through the
work of art, that the artist becomes himself.
The figure o f the author inevitably manifests itself, and even seems to be
inscribed in the language that must be employed to speak about their works. The
vocabulary of criticism posits the “Faulknerian” and the “Proustian” characteristics o f
their object texts, as if there were a unique Proustian or Faulknerian style, a textual form
which functioned as essence. Yet A la recherche du temps perdu demonsrrares through
pastiche that style remains impersonal, because, as a mere function of discourse it is
available to appropriations, and/or assumed almost unconsciously from the corpus o f
common knowledge.70
69 Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 149.
70 Aiexandrc Leupin argues this in his introduction to Lacan and the Human Sciences. “Proust proved by the 
pastiche that style has nothing to do with the subject assuch. since it can be integrally repeated: hence the 
Recherche, which is disconnected from style and literature. In other words there is a Proustian program 
according to which the disappearance ofliterarure should be the rise ofthe pure letter” (p. 40).
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
Language and Chaos
The fascination with the man seeks to mask, or to remedy the complex, 
intertextual nature o f subjectivity in these novels. The author is invariably posited as the 
controlling gaze that brings into being the cosmos portrayed in his texts. 1 The belief in 
the existence o f  the author as a controller o f  the world he has created, as the god which 
breathes life into his characters, provides a convenient identity on which to ground the 
figural play in the novels, since the narrators’ gazes in these works are decidedly not in 
control o f the worlds they are narrating. It is rather voice, as a manifestation o f 
impersonal discourse, as the functioning of the symbolic, which controls them. The 
“consciousness” o f these characters is a fluctuating narrative construction o f  memory and 
sensation, remembered voices and remembered texts. Kowledge of the self, o f who one 
is, is shown to be contingent upon the tenuousness o f memory and sensation.
We nevertheless continue to speak o f  the authorial “voice” in the texts concerned. 
The difficulty with which different voices can be distinguished from one another in these 
novels is often obscured by the attribution o f  the enunciation as a whole to this authorial 
voice. The “Faulknerian” and the “Proustian” serve as metaphors for the writer as 
controlling subject/presence “behind” or “inside” his work. The invocation o f the 
author’s name serves to rescue the concept o f  individuality and the subject at the same 
time. Thus, even if subjectivity in these novels is represented as “decentered,” “fractured” 
or even lost, the “world” of these novels is seen as a harmoniously assembled whole, built 
out of an authorial vision, a “universe.” It is “Faulkner’s” Yoknapatawpha, “Proust’s” 
France.
In spite o f all formalist criticism’s claims to study the text, it is difficult to ignore
the context o f the author’s life. It is obviously impossible due to the laws o f copyright, to
reproduce or to represent a text without linking it to its proper author, as if the text were
'O n  the author’s “controlling gaze” see Philip M. Weinstien, Faulkner’s Subject: A Cosmos No One Owns. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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somehow the property of the author: “William Faulkner, sole owner and proprietor.” Is 
there anyway for criticism around this blind spot? Would be possible to speak of 
Recherche without mentioning the name o f the author? Not without a complete 
reconsideration of the concept of the “work” as well. In the introduction to his 
structuralist analysis of Proust’s work* Genette affirms that “In its debate with literary
history, modern criticism [__] has attempted to separate the concepts of work and
author with the completely understandable tactical approach o f opposing the former to 
the latter, which has been the cause of so many excessive and sometimes worrisome 
activities. Now we have begun to understand that they are mutually dependent, and that 
every form of criticism is necessarily caught up in the circle of their reciprocal 
movement.72 Yet Genette insists, as well he should, that the study o f  the author’s 
biography, the research into sources, and influences, as well as into the genesis and 
destiny of the works, remains secondary to (“a cote de”) the main interest o f literary 
studies. The fundamental interest says the formalist, is the text. But the formalist must 
constantly make reference to the author. The author as a construct o f critical or even 
biographical discourse has the same status as any character in the work, whether they be 
the “hero” the “narrator” or other characters. These figures are constructs of language, 
produced by texts. The person of the author, as a historical entity, is always absent from 
his creation. “He who writes the work,” says Marice Blanchot, is set aside:
It closes in around his absence as the impersonal anonymous affirmation 
that it is—and nothing more. This is what is meant by the observation that 
the writer, since he only finishes his work at the moment he dies, never
' “Dans son debat avec 1’histoire litteraire, la critique moderne depuis un demi-siecle s’est appliqueea separcr 
les notions d'oeuvre ct d'auteurdws ledessein tactique fort comprehensible d'opposerla premiere a la 
seconde, responsable de tant d'exccset d’activitesparfo is oiseuses. On commence a percevoiraujourd’hui 
qu'elles ont partie lice, et quc toute forme de critique est necessairement prise dans le cercle de leur renvoi 
reciproque" “In its debate with literary history, modem criticism fora half-century has attempted to separate 
the norionsofauthorand work with the very understandable tactical goal ofopposing the latter to the former 
which is o ften respo nsible fo r so many excesses and sometimes bothersome activities. T  oday we begin to see 
that they are linked to oneanotherand that any form o f criticism is necessarily caught in the circle of their 
mutual return" (Figures HI 10). My translation.
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knows of his work. One ought perhaps to turn this remark around. For 
isnt the writer dead as soon as the work exists?73
the author is dismissed from it as soon as it is created. Once the work has entered the
world, it has an autonomous existence. “The writers only real relation to what we call the
work,” says Blanchot, is his inability to read it (23).
The definition o f the “text,” however, is also open to question. No longer can
criticism afford to ignore the social, cultural and historical contexts in which literature is
situated and in which it attempts to situate itself. If we are to accept the implications o f
what Derrida affirms in “Structure sign and Play” or what Barthes suggests in his
theorization of the “readerly” and the “writerly,” the field o f textual “play” opened up
by these works increases considerably. As Hayles puts it in her discussion of
deconstructive criticism: “As books became texts, they were transformed from ordered
sets of words to permeable membranes through which flowed the currents of history,
language and culture. Always already lacking a ground for their systems of signification,
texts were not deterministic or predictable. Instead they were capable o f becoming
unstable whenever the slightest perturbation was introduced” (2).
The way that we read these novels, like the ways we identify the literary figures
Marcel Proust and William Faulkner, is itself constantly changing, being, as it is, the
absorption and transformation of other people’s previous readings coupled with our own
previous knowledge ofother texts. The pursuit o f a correct, or “appropriate” reading of
such texts (or the truth about the author’s life), is a useless endeavor, and no one knew
that better than the writers themselves. The models o f interpretation and reading
presented in these texts emphasize this again and again, yet we continue to speak of the
men Marcel Proust and William Faulkner as if we had failed to learn the lessons about
identity contained in their novels: “every reading where consideration of the writer seems
73 Maurice Blanchot The Space o f Literature, trans. Ann Smock, (Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press,
1982) 22,23.
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to play so great a role is an attack which annihilates him in order to give the work back to 
itself: back to its anonymous presence, to the violent, impersonal affirmation that it is” 
(Blanchot 193). The William Faulkner and Marcel Proust we produce in our own critical, 
historical or biographical narratives are often little more than constructions fashioned in 
order to make some point about literature, history or art.
My interest in these writers is ultimately due to the canonical status they hold in 
their respective national literatures. It grew from the suspicion that this status is due to 
the projection o f something essential, solid and unchanging about their works, about the 
figures Marcel Proust and William Faulkner, and about identities, whether they be 
thought o f in terms o f nationality, race, culture, language or individual personality. It is 
my argument that this kind of reading of these texts, o f the men, or o f history betray the 
lessons which can be learned from their texts.
The central figure in each of these novels attempts to reconstitute a coherent 
point of view, a subject position which will enable him to make sense of the series o f 
unstable narratives which envelop him. Their desire for the “truth” is continually deferred 
and hampered by the ever-shifting nature of their perceptions and the symbolic field 
itself. In other words they seek a way clear through a “chaos” of perceptual and symbolic 
phenomena.
The reader of either of these two works is presented with lacuna and anachronies 
which signal not unity, but the fragmentation and artificiality of memory. It is as if the 
authors of these novels set about purposely confounding chronology in order to 
demonstrate the total indifference of conscious mechanisms to linear time.
Consciousness is susceptible to the fluctuations, inconsistencies and degradation of time, 
but the latter is just as often an illusion invented by the former.
Faulkner, like Proust, shows how individuals are thrown into an ever-fluctuating sea 
of sign systems, especially those of language and narrative. They demonstrate that being 
in the world is not based in some essential self, but in the absorption and transformation
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of a certain number o f discourses, the continual reworking of histories both personal and 
communal. The self in these works is thus permeated by language, by what 
p s y c h o a n a ly s is  calls “the field of the other.” These novels are thus concerned with 
representing, not beings engaged in concrete actions, but the process of remembering as 
it structures consciousness Or, to put it another way, they attempt to represent 
representation. Consciousness is treated as phenomenon: the mechanisms o f perception 
are inseparable from that which is perceived. The self is constructed by the field of its 
own perception. The model of consciousness which emerges is altogether different from 
the concept o f the individual as unique, or self-knowing, and calls into question the 
subject as well as the object o f thought.
Identity in Proust and Faulkner is a function of narrative. The story o f  the self is 
produced in the act o f storytelling. The individual is never able to “master” these 
discourses, just as no one is able to mastet the narrative of Thomas Sutpen in Absalom. 
Absalom!, much as they may try. Similarly, Proust’s narrator spends most o f his time 
and most o f  the novel looking for the “essence” of art, and for the mystery o f other 
people’s “true” identities. The discovery Proust’s narrator makes is that through writing, 
by actively recreating the world, he can (re)arrange his own story. But this final 
arrangement cannot be definitive. This explains the repetitive, revisionist nature of his 
texts.
The structures o f Proust and Faulkner’s novels bear some striking resemblances. 
Both texts work by the accumulation of details rather than the presentation o f facts. The 
syntagmaric, diegetic narrative plays a much less significant role than in Proust’s novel, 
which is partially the story o f the hero’s education, and therefore retains a chronological 
organization. In The Sound and the Furv, the various sections are deliberatley given out 
of chronological order. In Absalom. Absalom, the diegetic framework is weak, 
consisting mainly of people talking. Quentin first listens to Miss Rosa and his father tell 
him the story, in Mississippi. Then he tells the same story to his Canadian roommate at
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Harvard several months later. The actions of this frame narrative take place in a very 
limited time period.
In place o f a chronological development, there is an uncontrolled proliferation of 
narrative. This narrative is repetitive-the same events are retold innumerable times, while 
in Proust, repeated actions tend to be told in the synthetic mode, as exemplary, a kind 
of summary o f repeated events. Things that used to happen repeatedly are told once.The 
logical or chronological development o f  action from beginning to end is not as important 
as the potentially infinite series of repetitions and variations. This type o f structure is 
based not on logic and necessity, but on association and contingency. The privileging o f 
association over causality or chronology is equivalent to the privileging of paradigm over 
syntagm and of chance over necessity, and opens up the narrative to multiple readings 
and interpretations. What Proust and Faulkner have done is to suggest the infinite 
complexity and unpredictability of human behavior.
The study of literature is often subject to its own form o f identity crisis, one 
which is not unrelated to the very instability that I seek to point out in my chosen texts.
It would seem then that, at the risk of betraying the works concerned, criticism must be 
condemned to a kind ofschizophrenia. What is the object of literary criticism? O f 
literary history (of any history)? The text? the context? the reception? the genesis? the 
author? the intertext? all of these are, in different ways, valid answers. The multiplicity of 
the “object” o f  literary studies can not but help bring about a fragmentation o f the 
subject (the “voice” o f the critical text itself). Critical texts must now simultaneously 
interrogate themselves as well as their chosen “primary text.” The choice o f a certain 
perspective from which to interpret the literary text inevitably will determine the type of 
interpretation produced. Proust, too, made this danger explicit in passages which dissect 
the act of reading: (“En realite, chaque lecteur est quand il lit Ie propre lecteur de soi-
a  n \meme ).
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Are we then condemned to see only ourselves in the “mirror” o f the text? The 
opposite danger is also present: like Borges’ Pierre Menard attempting to write (not to 
rewrite) Cervantes’ Don Quixote, we may find ourselves attempting to follow the text so 
closely that we are condemned to repeat it word for word, identifying our discourse with 
it much as the young Marcel identifies himself with “a church,” “a quartet,” or “the 
rivalry between Francois I and Charles Quint.”
It is inevitable then that we begin with the conclusion. We write, as Proust did, 
the beginning and the end at the same moment, and fill in the middle as a function of 
our end. The danger here is that we might only be capable o f seeing only what we have 
posited. Proust knew this. To read is to produce a text from what we have internalized 
through previous experiences of other texts. So full of this previous input are we, that 
everything we read seems ripe with meaning: “A partir d’un certain age nos souvenirs 
sont tellement entre-croises les uns sur les autres que la chose a laquelle on pense, Ie livre 
qu’on lit n’a presque plus d’importance. On a mis de soi-meme partout, tout est fecond, 
tout est dangereux, et on peut faire d ’aussi precieuses decouvertes que dans les Pensees 
de Pascal dans une reclame pour un savon” (AD 124). “After a certain age our memories 
are so intertwined We have put something of ourselves everywhere, everything is fertile, 
everything is dangerous, and we can make discoveries no less precious than in Pascal’s 
Pensees in an advertisement for soap” (Ilk 553 - 54).
From which point o f view must we approach these texts? The answer to this 
question must inevitably influence the nature of what will be found. Is it possible to delve 
into the text without any preconceived notions of what is to be found there, without 
imposing an order so as to discover order? Perhaps only if the order we impose is 
simultaneously disorderly, if it contains the possibility of its own unraveling?
For the would-be “Faulknerian” or “Proustian,” critic, and in a world in which 
the scientific pursuit o f the “T  ruth” o f the text, its correct reading, is no longer credible, 
the sanction for undertaking yet still another study of these seemingly well-worn texts
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can only be its effectiveness as performance: “The sanction o f the critic,” as Roland 
Barthes points out in Critique et verite. “is not the meaning o f the work, it is the 
meaningfulness o f what he says about the work” (65). 4 Le sens here must be understood 
not only as meaning but as coherence. All o f these terms are themselves disappointingly 
vague. What exactly does “coherence” imply? Its meaning can be (at least) double: 
Firstly, the critical or text must agree with its object text. It must not stray too far from 
the “letter” of that text. The “close” reading is an exercise which partakes in this attempt 
to reduce the distance between art and interpretation and to insure the validity of the 
latter by somehow anchoring it in the former.
This requirement betrays its dependence upon a traditional metaphysical 
presupposition which unites the spirit and the letter in the “logos.” The spirit o f the 
interpretation is the letter o f the original text. The critical task is that o f an translatorvtho 
must be faithful to the original, to reproduce faithfully and without distortion, to be 
transparent. It is in this sense that Barthes’s statement secretly reintroduces the criterion 
of truth-value into the critical endeavor. Contemporary critical theory is postulated on 
the assumption o f the radical absence of, or at least the inability to determine, 
philosophical truths. The metaphysical presuppositions upon which the “Truth” is often 
established must be taken as presuppositions, that is, subject to revision. The “T ruth ,” in 
the singular and with a capital, is perhaps a dangerously fascist notion. The field o f 
speculative knowledge is made up of a multitude o f “truths,” more properly called 
“hypotheses” which form a web of constantly shifting relations, and which therefore 
resists the logic of completion. T ruth is now seen as contingent, relative, and reversible. It 
cannot easily be consumed and digested, for it is continually reproduced.
The problem of identity in these novels, and the resultant unreliability of their 
narrative voices, do not leave the fields of textual criticism or history unaffected. The
4 My translation.
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critic or literary historian’s task is also to chart a path through the confusing and 
sometimes contradictory disorder ofthe text. If only for the purpose o f constructing a 
coherent commentary, the critical text cannot permit itself the licence o f the literary 
text. Faced with the work of literature, the critic is in much the same position as the 
central character in each of these novels: Quentin Compson trying to reconstruct and 
understand the Sutpen story, and the insomiac “Marcel” attempting to identify himself 
and his surroundings. Both are intent on producing a masterly version of a discourse of 
identity. The extent to which they, and we, are confronted with what seems like chaos 
can be seen in the kind of trouble Proust had in convincing his early readers that there 
was indeed a hidden order to be found in the seemingly random associations o f his 
narrative. In a letter to Paul Souday in 1919 he deplores this assumption: “Je vois des 
lecteurs s’imaginer que j ecris, en me fiant a d’arbitraires et fortuites associations d’idees, 
l’histoire de ma vie,” “I see readers imagining that I’m writing my life’s story, entrusting 
myself to arbitrary and fortuitous associations o f ideas.” Later on in that same year he 
writes to Jean-Louis Vaudoyer, complaining o f reviewers who, he says, failed to 
recognize the tight composition o f his work, and seemed to be saying that he had written 
his memoirs following the tenuous thread o f his recollections, “meconnaissant la 
composition serree de mon ouvrage, ont Fair de dire que je fais des Memoires et ecris au 
fil de mes souvenirs!”75
The Thread of Association 
The difficulty many first-time readers encounter with Proust can be described as 
an impression o f the “chaotic” nature o f  the text. The intricate embedded sentences and 
perceived lack o f plot direction has no doubt caused many readers to abandon the text 
after only a few pages.
75 Qtd. in Thierry Lagct, Thierry Lager prfeenrc Du cotSde chez Swann de Marcel Proust. (Paris: Gallimard 
[Folio] 1992) 29-
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What is generally the reproach made in this case? That the plot has no direction, 
or more precisely, that it advances through an arbitrary pattern “au fil des associations.”
It is not so much the associations which are disturbing, as the “thread.” It seems 
fortuitous, arbitrary, haphaxard, unmotivated. But it is precisely the genius of Proust to 
demonstrate that the motivation comes after. It is only a function o f a “conscious” (and 
thus artifical) retrospective reconstruction. The waking sleeper has no idea which room he 
is in; he has no idea in which rooms he has slept until after they have risen to his 
consciousness. The present is only a function of that act of remembering which brings the 
“past” into the present. This is what he admired in the compositional sryle of Ruskin, 
who, he said, “goes from one idea to the next without any apparent order. But in reality 
the fancy which leads him follows his deep affinities which impose upon him, in spite of 
himself, a superior logic. So that, in the end, he seems to have obeyed a secret plan, 
which, once revealed, imposes retrospectively a kind of order upon the whole and makes 
it seem magnificently arrayed to lead to its final apotheosis.” What Proust proposes here 
is a means of reading his own text, and that of Faulkner as well. The “superior logic,” the 
“secret plan” is one which appears chaotic, random, fantastical, but which retrospectively 
reveals “a kind of order.”
This kind of retrospective recognition of order is precisely the way in which 
“chaos” scientists are forced to proceed. One of the features o f fractal geometry is the 
unpredictability of the behavior exhibited in systems regulated by the simplest of 
equations. Given a minimal set o f variables it remains impossible to determine a priori 
their values at any point in time. It is only retrospectively that a kind of order can be 
observed in what at first appeared to be absolutely random behavior. This also describes 
the work ofthe critic. Often the task is to discover the “hidden” patterns of meaning in 
the text, especially when this meaning seems to contradict the expressed meaning. This is 
what Paul De Man has done in his masterful demonstration o f  the metonymical 
functioning ofthe Proustian text, in spite of its expressed preference for metaphor over
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metonymy. Such hidden meanings are often referred to as the text’s “unconscious.” The 
desire to study, the desire to thoroughly “cover” the works o f Proust or Faulkner is 
finally the desire to suture a fragmented textual spectrum into a coherent, unified 
meaning. The desire to make sense betrays the senselessness of the mechanical 
production and repetition of text in the novels themselves. “Mechanical” here must be 
understood to imply arbitrary, contingent, reversible, meaningless, material, fragmentary 
and metonymic, as these terms are usually opposed to more privileged ones: motivated, 
necessary, meaningful, conscious, complete, and metaphorical. These two series o f terms 
are summarized in the opposition of nature, to artifice.
The explorers of psychology, sociology, history, literature, philosophy and 
anthropology have all been strangely attracted to the same sorts o f models. Again and 
again we can see the reappearance of the axes o f combination and selection, metaphor 
and metonymy, synchrony and diachrony, condensation and displacement etc., which 
all seem to indicate similarity between the various fields o f research. This same 
phenomenon has occurred in the “hard” sciences. The “fractal” nature o f models of stock 
market and population fluctuations, cloud and star formation, liquid and gas flow 
patterns, and the branching patterns in plants and o f veins and arteries in animals, all 
reveal a strange similarity among the seemingly chaotic behavior o f natural systems. 
Katherine Hayles has forcefully argued that the similarities to be seen between scientific 
and humanistic disciplines is due to a shared epistemology, one which breaks with the 
historical valorization of order over disorder: “When a dichotomy as central to Western 
thought as order/disorder is destabilized, it is no exaggeration to say that a major fault 
line has developed in the episteme” (16). Hayles is careful to speak of a fault line and not 
a complete break, for, as she acknowledges, the emphasis in scientific circles is on the 
presence o f order in seemingly disorderly systems, while in literary theory and practice, 
it is the “cohabitation” of order with disorder, the fact that chaos is always already 
present within orderly systems, which is o f most interest.
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Order hidden in randomness seems to be the guiding principle of much modern 
literature, from Baudelaire’s challenge to the readers o f Les Fleurs du mal. to the chaotic 
narrtion o f James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake and beyond. Proust explicitly acknowledged 
his debt to Baudelaire in Le temps retrouve (TR 226).
This problem is even more complex that it at first may seem. Not only must the 
reader or literary critic deal with the texts themselves; increasingly they must also take 
into consideration the multitude of “satellite” texts, such as variants, commentaries, 
biographies, and other critical assessments. W hether it be a blessing or a curse, literary 
scholars now have the possibility of consulting the twenty-one volumes of Proust’s 
personal and literary correspondance, in addition to the volumes upon volumes o f 
studies, essays, analyses and exegeses o f his work. As the corpus of studies and exegeses 
grows, our picture o f the novelists and their creation is constantly changing.
It is also difficult to establish a definitive edition o f the texts in question, in light 
ofthe unfinished nature o f the works. Philip M. Weinstein points out that the very 
“object” which is the Faulknerian text is subject to questioning (97). In the case o f 
Sartoris. which was published much against the author’s wishes, as a pared down version 
of his original Flags in the Dust, the manuscript o f which no longer exists, but which has 
been “reconstituted” from various typescript and manuscript fragments, this question 
must remain unresolved. In the case o f Absalom and The Sound and the Furv. the 
addition of appendices, a chronology and a map to various versions again presents the 
problem o f marginalia which can profoundly affect any reading of these novels.
Faulkner’s recourse to time lines, appendices and cartography seems to be an 
attempt to harmonize the often incoherent narration. Quite often, however, these 
adjuncts contribute to the incoherence of the “world” they attempt to circumscribe; the 
chronology o f Absalom. Absalom! for instance specifies that Judith and Charles E. St. V. 
Bon die o f smallpox in 1884. Yet the text o f the novel claims it was not smallpox, but 
yellow fever. Likewise, in the 1939 appendix to The Sound and the Furv. the Indian
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Ikkemotubbe is said to have traded his people’s land to Quentin Compson’s great-great 
grandfather in exchange for “safe passage to Oklahoma” (in other words, a good horse, 
407). This is said to have taken place in 1813. Yet in Absalom, written in 1936, Sutpen is 
said to have mysteriously acquired his land from Ikkemotubbe in 1833. Mr. Compson 
suggests that this was done in an underhanded manner: “until that Sunday when he came 
to church, if he had misused or injured anybody, it was only old Ikkemotubbe, from 
whom he got his land” (50). It is Mr Compson who is narrating this event to his son 
Quentin in 1909, so the possibility for subjective distortion could be argued to justify 
this inconsistency. The extent to which the information about Sutpen is unreliable can be 
inferred from the multiplicity of voices. Nearly all we know about the man is filtered 
chrough the second, third and sometimes fourth-hand narrations of Miss Rosa, Mr. 
Compson, Quentin and even Shreve. A large part o f each of these narrators’ stories are 
mere speculation. The appendix to Absalom, added by Faulkner several years after the 
original publication seems, by virtue o f its very position to be an authoritative, 
supplementary gloss on the characters and events of the novel, added by the author in 
order to clear up the shady events o f the novel. However, it contradicts the text on 
several points; it is thus an open question as to what extent the appendix is to be taken as 
authoritative.
Each o f these works attempts, in dissimilar ways, to render whole a fragmented 
universe, while simultaneously calling attention to its own fragmentation. Faulkner 
employs, among other strategies, that o f  topography in the map o f Yoknapatawpha 
county which he includes at the end o f Absalom. Absalom!, to portray a totalizing vision 
of the “universe” in his novels. Yet the text o f the novel itself is fragmentary and 
repetitive, there are huge gaps in our knowledge o f the story, and most o f what we do 
know is finally attributable only to conjecture. Cleanth Brooks has done an excellent job 
of demonstrating this in his appendix to William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha 
Country.
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Most o f the action in Proust’s novel seems likewise to be restricted to a limited 
topography. Yet the wealth of inconsistencies and contradictions make it an impossible 
one. One example is the ever-changing itinerary of the little train at Balbec (SG), another 
is the uncertain or fluctuating location of Tante Leonie’s home. Originally Proust wanted 
to place it near Chartes, East of Paris; when the novel expanded to include the war years 
Proust decided to move Combray to the West, to the Champagne region, where it 
would be occupied by the Germans and the church destroyed. Inconsistencies remain in 
the novel, and most critics assume that Proust would have tidied them up had he lived to 
see the publication of the final volumes, but such a task would have been monumental, 
and given Proust’s tendency to continually embellish his text, he might never have 
finished, even if he had lived another decade. The sheer momentum of the text itself, 
with its periodic, serpentine sentences, seems to splice together the disparate parts of the 
narrative.
This incompleteness corresponds to the esthetics propounded by Proust’s 
narrator, who admires the “great art” of the nineteenth century, those unfinished works 
whose unity is only recognized after the fact: Tunite apres coup des grands oeuvres du 
dix-neuvieme siecle”(P 150; III: 157). It is only in the act of reading that the unity is 
produced. Unity and order are constructions formed by the viewer or reader of the 
work.
A phenomenon is manifest in the study of literature which seems to parallel what 
scientists know as the Butterfly effect, which postulates that small changes in initial 
conditions are capable of producing large effects. Scholars of Marcel Proust, as with any 
modern author, are obliged, not only to attend to the details of the Recherche, but also 
to take into account the author’s earlier writings and correspondence along with the 
various manuscript versions of the novel. The novel remains unfinished-this in spite of 
Proust’s writing the word “fin” after Le Temps retrouve-because he never completed the 
revisions which were under way at the time o f his death.
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Thus, if only for purely practical purposes, there can be no definitive reading o f a 
“text.” Indeed, the way in which one generation interprets a literary phenomenon may 
well say more about that generation than it does about the work concerned. This is why, 
as David Carroll puts it, the object o f literary history “must also include the history o f 
various theories used to analyze and explain [literature’s] form and sense.”'6 In other 
words the object o f literary history includes literary history and criticism. It becomes 
virtually impossible to distinguish one from another, literature from the criticisms and 
exegeses which “situate” literature for us, and the literary object itself.
The problem o f subjective perception as represented'm the novels affects the 
reader’s interpretation by calling attention to and problematizing his perception o f the 
text. It is the crucial function o f the detail which gives its weight to all that which, 
though perhaps marginal, nevertheless provides a very real context for any particular 
reading. We as readers approach any given text with our knowledge of other texts, or 
sign-systems, including those o f popular culture.3 In a sense, and as Barthes implies in 
SI Z. we are an amalgam o f all our reading experiences, and these we use to understand 
the Faulknerian or Proustian texts, which are themselves “intertexts,” with their own 
built-in references and allusions to other texts. The very terms text, context and writing 
must all be taken very broadly to include any manifestation o f  an instituted trace, 
including an, architecture, even tool. In this sense geography itself, the setting of these 
novels in Paris or Southern Mississippi is an intertextual reference to everything 
associated with these particular marks on the map, with these names.
A simple example is the last image of Caddy, given in the appendix to The
Sound and the Furv “a photograph in color clipped obviously from a slick magazine-a
picture filled with luxury, money and sunlight-a Cannebiere backdrop o f mountains and
palms and cypresses and the sea, an open powerful expensive chromiumtrimmed sports
6 David Carroll. The Subject in Question: The LanpuagesofThcorv and the StrategiesofFiction, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982)9.
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car, the woman’s face hacless between a rich scarf and a seal coat, ageless and beautiful, 
cold serene and damned: beside her a handsome lean man o f middleage in the ribbons 
and tabs o f a German “staffgeneral” (415). Caddy’s association with a Nazi officer, and 
the name “Cannebiere” (the main street in the French port town o f Marseille) all carry 
connotations reinforcing the idea o f her decadence suggested also by the “luxury, money 
and sunlight,” the sports car, the “rich scarf” and seal coat and the “cold” “damned” 
face. Her association with the enemy marks her as a traitor. The fact that she is last seen 
in Marseille, a port on the Mediterranean is also suggestive of a certain exoticism. 
Through the connotations of its constituants, this simple image o f  Caddy standing with 
the enemy is charged with symbolism.
Scaling effects
Writing involves making choices. A critic who undertakes a piece ofcriticism 
invariably chooses to concentrate on certain aspects, on certain sections o f  text, thus 
taking an intentionally myopic view of the whole when it comes rime to generalize about 
authorial intention, textual meaning or even critical method. The nature o f critical 
writing itself demands such general statements (if only in introducing concepts or 
concluding). What would be a critical text which consisted o f nothing but details? It 
could be nothing more than a collection o f extracted quotations from the object text 
with no commentary possible.
All critical assessments of the A la recherche du temps perdu must necessarily 
operate by means o f an analysis in which a part (an excerpted section o f  the text) stands 
for a whole. Doubrovsky employs this strategy with the simple assertion that “Narrative 
micro-structures reproduce the global structure o f the narrative” [“Les microstructures 
narratives reproduisent la structure globale du recit”].77 Genette makes a similar move, 
but qualifies it by admitting that “U va de soi qu’une analyse [au niveau du
"  Serge Doubrovsky. La place de la madeleine: Ecritureet fantasme chez Proust. (Paris: Mercure de France,
1974) 33.
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macrostructure] ne peut tenir compte des details qui relevent d’une autre echelle, et 
quelle procede done d’une simplification des plus grossieres” (85), “It goes almost 
without saying that an analysis [at the level o f the macro-structure] cannot take into 
account details perceived at another scale, and that it is therefore based on a gross 
simplification.” In spite o f the admitted oversimplification, the metonymical relation of 
part to whole must then be demonstrated to metaphorically represent the whole. What is 
introduced as a contingent, arbitrary excerpt must be shown to necessarily and 
sufficiently justify the exclusion o f  the rest. This then allows the critic to enlarge his 
argument to include that whole. The passage from the specific to the general, from the 
partial to the holistic and from fiction to theory is equvalenr to the passage from signifier 
to signifed, from letter to spirit and from the mechanical, the automatic and the 
meaningless to the conscious, the intentional and the fullness o f meaning. All of these 
oppositions are binary and hierarchical. The logic of our chosen texts is multiple and 
equivocal.
The crisis of western identity is thus one of a loss o f a “master” context, the 
social, ideaiogical and poetic master discourses which determine the kinds of narratives 
or pronouncments about identity and personality which are recognized as “truthful” or 
somehow “definitive.” If there’s one experince that characterizes modernity, it might 
well be the experience of the ever-changing contexts of everyday life.
One of these theories which has had a great deal of influence on critical 
approaches to these two texts is psychoanalysis. Indeed, it hardly seems possible to speak 
of identity, the self, consciousness or subjectivity without grappling with the enormous 
psychoanalytical apparatus attached to these terms. This would not be altogether 
inappropriate, not only because Faulkner expressed an oven admiration for Freud, but 
also because of the general familiarity o f such theories to practically anyone writing since 
the turn of the century. It is no coincidence that Proust was writing his masterpiece at the 
same time that Freud was developing theories of the self which postulated a psyche split
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into an “ego,” a “superego” and an “unconscious.” Research and speculation on 
psychological functioning had been going on all throughout the nineteenth century. 
Freud did not appear out o f the blue. He built on the work of predecessors and 
contemporaries. Proust probably hadn’t read Freud, but that doesn’t mean he wasn’t 
privy to the kinds of speculations going on at that period. It is likewise doubtful that 
Faulkner really grasped Freudian theory, in spite o f his expressed admiration for it. It is 
undeniable, however, that such ideas were “in the air.” Writers, artists, critics and 
scientists were speculating on these topics at the time Proust and Faulkner were writing. 
What is portrayed in the Recherche and in Absalom. Absalom! might be described as 
two forms of the “talking cure,” two attempts to articulate the mystery o f personal 
identity, to bring to light the hidden motives and desires o f characers, especially those o f 
the narrators as they are revealed in the language and the structure of their narration. The 
link between Faulkner, Proust, and Freud is their concern with the structuring function 
o f language in the very deepest recesses of memory and “consciousness.”
That which we call “personality” is dependent upon the impersonal system of 
language, even before we are born we are integrated into the linguistic economy when we 
are given a name. The naming process is the very movement of identification. This is as 
true in the hard sciences as it is in everyday life. It is part o f a process which divides the 
world into small, assimilable, “identifiable” units. It is a way of separating, of cutting the 
substance of reality into manageable components. This is o f course the first step in the 
Cartesian method. Another way o f saying this is that subjects as well as objects are 
creations of language. But, as noted in the introduction to this dissertation, the naming 
process is potentially infinite.
In this respect, the weaving of many voices is an example a kind of 
intertexruality. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari provide a useful (and interesting) 
metaphor which might best describe the kind of “chaotic” process at work in these 
novels. In the language o f  Deleuze and Guattari, Marcel’s discovery could be said to
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represent the resurgence of a circular, rhizomatic proliferation in the hierarchical 
branching structure o f the (family) tree. A rhizome, they claim,
ne commence et n’aboutit pas, il est toujours au milieu, entre les choses, 
inter-etre, intermezzo. L’arbre est filiation, mais le rhizome est alliance, 
uniquement d alliance. L’arbre impose le verbe «etre», mais le rhizome a 
pour rissu la conjonction«et . . . e t . . .  et . . . ».
neither begins nor ends, it is always in the middle, in between things, 
inter-being, intermezzo. The tree is heredity, but the rhizome is alliance, 
uniquely by association. The tree imposes the verb “be,” but the rhizome 
is formed with the conjunction “and . . . and . . . and” (36)
Ross Chambers has also identified this as the potential for diversion, mis-direction, or
bifurcation inherent in traditional narrative. He calls it the “etc. principle.” Texts that
work “episodically” or which tend to be digressive, to indulge in long descriptions, work
against the linear progression of traditional narrative, which attempts to drive inexorably
toward closure.78
Roland Barthes recognizes this explicidy in Proust. He characterizes Proust’s text 
as an infinitely explorable space or galaxy o f signification
une des grandes cosmogonies que le vingtieme siecle, principalement, a su 
produire [. . .] dont le caractere, a la fois statutaire et historique, est 
precisement celui-ci: qu'elles sont des espaces (des galaxies) infiniment 
explorables: ce qui deporte le travail critique loin de route illusion de 
«resultat» vers la simple production d'une ecriture supplementaire, dont le 
texte tuteur [. . .] ne serait que le pre-texte.
one of the great cosmologies that the twentieth century, primarily, was 
able to produce [. . .] the statutory and historical character o f whis is 
precisely this: that they are infinitely explorable spaces (galaxies), which 
displaces critical work far from any illusion o f “results” to the simple 
production o f a supplementary writing, for which the target text [. . .] 
would merely be the pre-text.79
78 “The Etc. Principle." Lecture sponsored by the Department o f  French and Italian and the Center for 
French and Francophone Studies. Louisiana State University. Baton Rouge. 29 Mar. 1993. See also 
Loiterature (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1999).
“Une idee de recherche” in Recherche de Proust. (34 - 39). My translation.
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Discription has always been the “other” o f narration. It is essential, yet it is an 
inertial factor resisting the forward momentum of plot. As Barthes noted in a speech 
given to the College de France in 1978: “chaque incident de la vie peut donner lieu ou a 
un commentaire [...] ou a une aftubulation qui en donne ou en imagine 1’avant et I’apres 
narratif’ (8), “each incident in life can give rise to a commentary [...] or to a fabrication 
which would give or imagine the narrative before and after.”®
Our perception ofthe texts we encounter as readers (and I include here that 
particular form o f reading which is the writing o f the critical text), can likewise be 
pursued along any number of paths, but the possibility of expansion inherent in the 
“opening up” o f  any of the details we encounter along the way implies an infinitely 
detailed network. Such a network o f relations would be mote than two dimensional. It 
would display all the characteristics o f a fractal dimension. As in a fictional narration 
when the forward motion of the story’s action is slowed down to allow for a detailed 
description or an a chronological “filling in” o f details, such procedures have the potential 
to allow for infinite detail.
Recontextualization
Richard Rorty has made the case that the quest for truth should be considered as 
“recontextualization.” That is to say that the notion of “Truth” as an absolute should be 
discarded. History has shown that what one generation considers to be “T ruth” the next 
has abandoned as myth or superstition. “The truth” is inevitably what people have come 
to agree upon as the truth. It is formed by consensus, and thus is subject to revision. 
Rorty, in urging us to think of human minds as self-reweaving webs of sentential 
attitudes, says that “T o view beliefs as habits of action is to view the self from the outside 
[ ...]” (93). His point is that this outside is all we can pretend to know, yet it is not fixed 
once and for all: “As one moves along the spectrum from habit to inquiry—from 
instinctive revision o f intentions through routine calculation toward revolutionary science 
® My translation.
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or politics—the number of beliefs added to or subtracted from the web increases. At a 
certain point in this process it becomes useful to speak o f ‘recontextualization.’ The more 
widespread the changes, the more use we have for the notion o f‘a new context’ ” (94) 
There is a very real sense in which these two novels are about this process even as they 
enact recontextualization in their very form, in their myriad “visions and revisions.”
This study has been an attempt to “recontextualize” the novels o f these to 
authors, to draw a connection or establish a relationship between them in themes and 
techniques which signal a particular approach to the representation o f consciousness, 
subjectivity, or personality. Identity is seen in Proust as an ongoing process of textual 
weaving. The infinite detail and complexity o f this weaving is what these novels enact.
Paradoxically, the sheer volume o f writing devoted to the same life-long project 
produced by these authors testifies at once to the inexhaustibility of such processes, and 
to the will to exhaust, or we might also say, to thoroughly “cover,” a subject. Their 
efforts bear witness more to the desire than to the possibility of such a totalization. There 
is a very real sense in which each o f these novels is, as Roland Barthes might say, a tribute 
to the “infinite dilatory power” of the proper name. As a result, the worlds these texts 
“portray” remain irreducibly suggestive, plural and open to interpretation-in spite of the 
remarkable efforts at explication and summarization which are the perhaps inevitable 
endeavors o f criticism or literary history as such.
Such efforts are inscribed within an ontological/epistemological project which is 
effectively undermined by the literary works concerned. Literary critics or historians who 
undertake to explicate, interpret, comprehend or elucidate the coherence o f these textual 
universes run up against the same problems as the authors themselves. The text which 
thoroughly “exhausts,” which might completely “cover” the subjects o f these works 
(again, both their topos, as well as the figure of the narrating subject portrayed in them: 
“Marcel” or “Je” and “Quentin Compson,” and we might just as well include the 
authorial figures Marcel Proust and William Faulkner) is non-existent, cannot exist as a
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unified whole, not without distorting or betraying the irreducibly enigmatic nature o f 
the works and o f the human beings concerned.
The genius o f these novelists may well consist in restoring to consciousness the 
complexity that realist fiction had often denied. Balzacian characters (for example) are 
often perceived as remaining true to the nature they are described as having from the 
very start ofthe novel. Human nature in such fiction is seen as immutable, following 
nearly inflexible laws of behavior. The error o f Proust’s hero, the one which he will spend 
much o f the novel failing to learn-is the belief in the possibility of discovering such laws: 
The narrator describes himself as a young man in seacrch o f some great “abstract 
philosophical truth” to be the subject o f a “great literary work” (S 176-77). His only real 
discovery' is a law o f chaos, of contradiction and vacillation. In this respect one o f the 
work’s original working titles, “Intermittences o f the heart” (“Les intermittences du 
coeur”), is very telling. The intermittences he referred to are not merely the caprices 
which are normally associated with “affairs o f the heart.” What Proust perhaps had in 
mind is more closely related to a specific physical affliction known today as heart 
“murmurs,” the unpredictable ways in which the heart fails to beat in a constant or 
regular rhythm. What the narrator has learned, by the time he takes up the pen to write, 
is that he must abandon the quest for essences, for the definitive work o f art, one which 
would embody some great philosophical truth.
Complexity is a Value
Proust’s narrator expresses the need to restore to life the complexity which 
certain deterministic views of human behavior effectively masked: “nous sentons que la 
vie est un peu plus compliquee qu’on ne dit, et meme les circonstances. Et il y a une 
necessite pressante a montrer cette complexite” (TR 223). “We feel merely that life is a 
little more complicated than it is said to be, and circumstances too. And it is absolutely 
necessary that we should portray this complexity” (III: 956). Why did Proust feel that 
there was such a pressing need to show this complexity? His novel is a reaction to the
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positivist attitude which sought to arrive at a simple, scientific explanation o f human 
behavior. Literary theory may do well to look to metaphors and theories from other 
disciplines, such as the theories o f fractal geometry. The recent growth of the internet 
and hypertext seem to confirm, or at least lend credence to much o f post -structuralist 
thought about the web ofintertextuality and intersubjectivity.
This desire for completion, for universality for the fina l word seems to drive or at 
least to have driven a great deal o f literary historians and critics to write on these two 
authors. The present text participates in this desire in as far as its ambition is to connect 
Proust and Faulkner with scientific, philosophical and political theories and paradigms, 
to connect readings o f textual “samples” to general statements and extrapolations about 
language, history and society based on those readings. It breaks with such a desire in its 
recognition o f  such generalizations as strategies or processes which allow for new 
understandings of these texts, rather than “methods” of arriving at definitive results. 
Criticism participates in the process by which texts are continually modified to signify 
on our terms. Indeed, such processes are themselves not unlike the mechanics o f 
consciousness at work in Absalom. Absalom? or A la recherche du temps perdu.
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